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ABSTRACT 
 
ORBITAL DECAY: SPACE JUNK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF  
EARTH’S PLANETARY BORDERLANDS 
 
Lisa Ruth Rand 
John Tresch  
Adelheid Voskuhl 
 
What is space junk, and who defines pollution in an environment seemingly devoid of 
nature as we know it? Beginning with the launch of Sputnik in 1957, spacefaring nations 
transformed the region between the upper atmosphere and the moon from a wilderness 
into a landscape. Like any terrestrial industry, the construction of a satellite 
infrasctructure in orbit also yielded a system of byproducts—human-made waste 
colloquially known as “space junk.” Although remote and largely invisible to the 
majority of space technology users, the orbital environment nonetheless played a critical 
role in Cold War geopolitics.  Contrary to current space policy literature that portrays 
space junk and awareness of space junk as recent phenomena, communities around the 
world were both aware and concerned about space junk from the very first moments of 
the Space Age. By tracing convergent changes in the orbital landscape and in the political 
landscape below during the Cold War, concurrent with the rise of mainstream 
environmentalism, this dissertation reveals the roots of an international understanding of 
the borderlands between Earth and outer space as a natural environment at risk. Focusing 
on highly mobile, unruly space junk artifacts illuminates the many ways that humankind 
mutually shaped and was shaped by the global ecosystem surrounding our planet during 
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the Cold War. Situated at the intersection of the histories of science, technology, and the 
environment, this dissertation illustrates how space junk in orbit and falling to Earth 
brought geographically and politically disparate states into dangerous proximity during 
the Cold War. An international consciousness of outer space as a fragile environment 
emerged early in the Space Age, and influenced the negotiation of new modes of 
international scientific and environmental governance in near-Earth space. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 10, 2009, a defunct Russian communications satellite and a functioning 
American commercial communications satellite approached each other from opposite 
directions. As they crossed over Siberia, Kosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 collided head-on, 
destroying both satellites and generating two intersecting plumes of debris clustered 
along their former orbital paths. Widely considered the most destructive on-orbit accident 
in history, the event validated a prediction made over thirty years earlier by Donald 
Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais in the Journal of Geophysical Research.1 In the 1978 
article, Kessler and Cour-Palais suggested that, given the growing volume of satellites 
and other objects being launched into orbit by an ever-increasing club of spacefaring 
nations, the first major orbital collision would occur within the next few decades.2 This as 
yet hypothetical destructive chain reaction, now called the Kessler Syndrome, has 
become a bogeyman among the international space policy community. 
 The 2009 Cosmos-Iridium accident was by no means the first on-orbit collision, 
nor did it yield the largest amount of orbital debris from a single incident. Two years 
earlier, China intentionally destroyed one of its own defunct weather satellites using a 
																																								 																				
1 Frank Jr. Morring, “Collision Of Satellites Was Worst Ever,” Aviation Daily & Defense Report, 
February 12, 2009, http://aviationweek.com/awin/collision-satellites-was-worst-ever; Paul Marks, 
“Satellite Collision ‘more Powerful than China’s ASAT Test’,” New Scientist, February 13, 2009; 
Geoff Brumfiel, “Kaputnik Chaos Could Kill Hubble,” Nature, February 17, 2009, 940–41. 
2 Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, “Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The 
Creation of a Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research Vol. 83, No. A6 (1978): 2637–2646 
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projectile anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.3 The resulting debris cloud accounted for a 60 
percent spike in the number of observable orbital debris.4 The detritus produced by both 
the 2007 ASAT test and the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision continues to circle the globe 
at speeds upwards of eight kilometers per second. This orbital debris, or “space junk,” 
moves so quickly that even the small pieces could damage or destroy functioning 
satellites.   
 In late 2011, the National Research Council (NRC) published a report that painted 
a grim picture of the built environment in Earth orbit. The authors of the report 
emphatically argued that the quantity of human-made objects orbiting the planet had 
grown to such an extent that a state of continuous collision and cascading spacecraft 
failure will almost certainly arise in the surprisingly near future—that the planetary 
periphery had reached a “tipping point.”5 This characterization draws much of its 
rhetorical strength from its association with climate change research. The term “tipping 
point” describes a delicate threshold after which global scale change cannot be stopped or 
reversed.6 A majority of climate researchers worldwide have agreed that the planetary 
																																								 																				
3 Frank Jr. Morring, “China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever,” Aviation Week 
& Space Technology, February 12, 2007, http://aviationweek.com/awin/china-asat-test-called-
worst-single-debris-event-ever. 
4 Nicholas L. Johnson et al., “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 14th Edition” 
(Houston, TX: NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, June 2008), i. 
5 National Research Council, Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of 
NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies 
Press, 2011). 
6 For more on the rhetoric of thresholds and tipping points in climate science and public 
discourse, see Richard D. Besel, “Communicating Climate Change: Climate Rhetorics and 
Discursive Tipping Points in United States Global Warming Science and Public Policy” 
(Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007). For an accessible take on the 
idea of tipping points in different contexts, see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little 
Things Can Make a Big Difference (Little, Brown, 2000). 
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climate has already crossed the threshold. A famous 2006 Time cover story featuring a 
polar bear balanced precariously on a tiny ice floe proclaimed to the world that Earth had 
reached the point of no return.7 Past the tipping point, ocean ice will shrink away, 
greenhouse gases will stifle the atmosphere, shorelines will bulge, and global 
temperatures will rise with drastic consequences for biodiversity, ecological resilience, 
and human environments. 
The orbital tipping point, perhaps, cannot be as alarmingly and effectively 
illustrated—no charismatic, imperiled polar bears circle the planet, no ice floes 
encapsulate landscape change in a landless, illegible, invisible environment. And yet, to 
anyone who has noticed the regularity of news stories about astronauts taking shelter as 
debris approaches the International Space Station, satellites disabled by space junk, and 
spacecraft riskily moved to avoid collision with other objects in orbit, the NRC argument 
that a looming debris crisis may be imminent provides a fitting analog.8 These dramatic 
encounters between functioning spacecraft and orbital debris—defined by NASA, the 
United Nations, and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee as human-
made objects in space, or reentering the atmosphere, that do not serve a designated 
purpose—comprise only the most recent newsworthy incidents capping half a century of 
																																								 																				
7 Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,” Science 306, no. 5702 
(December 3, 2004): 1686; “Earth at the Tipping Point: Global Warming Heats Up,” Time, April 
3, 2016. 
8 “NASA: Space Station Dodged Debris 16 Times in Past 15 Years,” accessed February 19, 2014, 
http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/nasa-space-station-dodged-space-debris-16-
times-past-15-years; Leonard David, “Russian Satellite Hit by Chinese Anti-Satellite Test 
Debris,” SPACE.com, March 8, 2013, http://www.space.com/20138-russian-satellite-chinese-
space-junk.html; “The Day NASA’s Fermi Dodged a 1.5-Ton Bullet,” NASA, April 30, 2013, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/GLAST/news/bullet-dodge.html. 
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mounting material evidence of a growing anthropogenic waste system encircling the 
planet.9 
 On the surface, the story of humankind’s presence in near-Earth space since the 
launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957 might seem like a textbook narrative of 
environmental decline. Operating under Big Sky Theory—the belief that space is so vast 
as to be unfillable—a small club of spacefaring nations launched ever more objects into 
orbit and transformed the foothills of the mythical final frontier into an unmanageable, 
moving junkyard.10 Many current space policy analysts portray orbital debris as a recent 
problem—the gradually compounding result of ignorance at best and negligence at worst 
on behalf of the Soviet and American space industries of the 1960s.11 This misconception 
																																								 																				
9 “Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris,” NASA-HANDBOOK 8719.14 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, July 30, 2008), 21; “Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” (United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs, January 2010); Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,” September 2007. 
10 Big Sky Theory’s antecedent, Big Sea Theory, has also been challenged by the presence of an 
unmanageable, moving junkyard, in the form of so-called “garbage patches”—plastic and 
chemical debris, mostly microscopic, caught in several of the major ocean gyres. The Great 
Pacific Garbage Patch has been estimated to be the size of Texas. Lindsey Hoshaw, “Researchers 
Explore Growing Ocean Garbage Patches,” The New York Times, November 9, 2009. 
11 Representations of the history of orbital debris awareness in space policy analysis of recent 
decades vary. Research staff at the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office typically recognize 
early awareness among those in the space industry, but in at least one publication make the false 
argument that orbital debris only entered the public eye very recently. See for example Nicholas 
L. Johnson, “Orbital Debris Research in the U.S.,” in Proceedings of the 4th European 
Conference on Space Debris (ESA SP-587) (4th European Conference on Space Debris (ESA SP-
587), Darmstadt, Germany, 2005); Jer-Chyi Liou, “The Near-Earth Orbital Debris Problem and 
the Challenges for Environment Remediation” (3rd International SPACE World Conference, 
Darmstadt, Germany, November 6, 2012). However, outside of NASA, presumptions of ignorant 
negligence on the part of the American and Soviet space industries during the Cold War 
perennially crop up in policy documents and presentations. See for example Marshall H. Kaplan, 
“An Integrated Approach to Orbital Debris Research and Management” (Space Traffic 
Management Conference, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2014), 1–2; Marietta Benko 
and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, “Space Debris in the United Nations: Aspects of Law and Policy,” in 
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erases a remarkably longstanding transnational environmental dialog about outer space—
a dialog that brought spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations into material and 
discursive contact during the early years of the Cold War Space Race, and influenced the 
development of new, tenuous models of international governance in near-Earth space.  
 In recent decades environmental historians investigating the histories of terrestrial 
landscapes and envirotechnical systems have charged that such a declensionist, 
presentist—and often racist and classist—approach ignores the categorically messier 
ways that humans and the non-human biological and geophysical world interact and 
mutually shape one another over time.12 Histories of environments on Earth merit a closer 
look at a broader range of actors, physical forces, and living and nonliving actants. A 
similarly nuanced, multivalent approach to environmental change also more accurately 
illuminates the history of humankind’s virtual and material encounter with the outer 
space environment. I refer to the near-Earth space environment as the planetary 
borderlands to call attention to the ways that the physical ecosystem of outer space 
collapse geography and bring states and polities into proximity. Additionally, this 
categorization explicitly counters the racial and teleological undertones of the Turnerian 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Proceedings of the Second European Conference on Space Debris: ESOC, Darmstadt, Germany, 
17-19 March 1997, SP 393 (Noordwijk, The Netherlands: European Space Agency, 1997), 749. 
12 See for example Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the 
American West (University of Washington Press, 1999). Frank Uekötter, “The Old Conservation 
History — and the New: An Argument for Fresh Perspectives on an Established Topic,” 
Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 29, no. 3 (109) (January 1, 2004): 171–
91. Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2003) In referring to outer space as an envirotechnical system, I am borrowing 
Sara Pritchard’s term to describe the overlap and mutual influence of natural and technical 
systems. Sara B. Pritchard, “An Envirotechnical Disaster: Nature, Technology, and Politics at 
Fukushima,” Environmental History 17, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 219–43. 
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frontierism that motivated the Soviet and American space programs, and acknowledges 
the global and extraterritorial attributes of the orbital environment.13 
 In exploring a half-century of environmental change in an extreme, remote 
environment, the historical analysis in this dissertation traces early perceptions of outer 
space as an environment at risk. It prioritizes these historiographical imperatives of 
environmental history and merges them with a theoretical grounding in the histories of 
science and technology. The conceptual frameworks of the social construction of 
technology and technological momentum apply to both the history of the early 
development of satellite technology and a coinciding new perception of space as a 
pollutable natural environment. Space junk itself, it will be shown, is socially 
constructed.14 In many cases, then and now, on Earth and in space, one person’s useful 
spacecraft can be another person’s dangerous space junk. Perhaps surprisingly, given its 
lack of colonized peoples or biota, near-Earth space—for the purposes of this analysis, 
defined as the regions of cislunar space that contain the majority of human-made space 
																																								 																				
13 For an overview of the origins and trajectory of borderlands historiography, see Daniel H. 
Usner, “Borderlands,” in A Companion to Colonial America, ed. Daniel Vickers (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2008); for the conceptualization of the borderlands as a response to the 
Turner frontier thesis, see David J. Weber, “Turner, the Boltonians, and the Borderlands,” The 
American Historical Review 91, no. 1 (February 1986): 66–81; for outer space as one among 
many frontiers in Western political thought, see Will Wright, The Wild West: The Mythical 
Cowboy and Social Theory (Washington, DC: SAGE, 2001), 123–137. 
14 Many of the foundational texts on the social construction of technology apply to the history of 
space objects. See Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds. The Social Shaping of 
Technology: How the Refrigerator Got Its Hum. (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 
1985); Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994); Wiebe E. Bijker et al., 
eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, anniversary edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2012). 
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objects—has been a subject of environmental concern since the first days of human 
access.15  
 Near-Earth space fits remarkably well within classical narratives of both 
wilderness and landscape. As a region “where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain,” the orbital regions of planet Earth fit nearly perfectly into the definition of 
wilderness set forth in the landmark Wilderness Act of 1964.16 Once humankind began to 
cultivate orbit by constructing a satellite infrastructure, it also became a place well 
described by John Brinckerhoff Jackson’s characterization of landscape as “a 
composition of man-made or man-modified spaces to serve as infrastructure or 
background for our collective existence.”17 Considering David Nye’s suggestion that 
Western society views modern landscapes only through inventions and interventions of a 
largely technical visual culture, near-Earth space may be considered an extreme example 
of a technological landscape. Cultivated by human interventions, the very satellites that 
enable valued technological practices on the ground are all but invisible to the majority of 
Earthbound users.18 Only specialized equipment and abstract modeling allow direct 
visualization of an infrastructure that has become, in the words of Paul Edwards, “the 
connective tissues and the circulatory systems of modernity”—invisible structures that 
																																								 																				
15 The rhetoric of contact in the context of outer space both harkens to and clashes with other 
histories of colonialism. The bodily racial components of colonization so crucial to late 20th-
century American frontier history do not map directly onto the initial technological colonization 
of near-Earth space, though the movement and reentry of space debris brings bodies and race 
back into the picture (see Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a brief example). 
16 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 1131-1136, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) 
17 John B. Jackson, Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1984), 8. 
18 David Nye, introduction to Technological Landscapes: From Reaping to Recycling, ed. David 
Nye (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 16. 
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we only notice on the rare occasions when they fail.19 During the first decades of the Cold 
War Space Race, the United States and the Soviet Union constructed an information 
infrastructure in orbit, thereby shaping the true wilderness of outer space into a 
landscape.  
While popularly portrayed as a void—the opposite of verdant green-and-blue 
nature portrayed by environmentalists and artists alike—the nearest reaches of outer 
space support an abiotic ecosystem consisting of energy exchanges, radioactivity, natural 
rocky objects and energetic plasmas, and gravitational forces. Space has its own 
“weather” driven by regular solar cycles that affect the matter and energy in near-Earth 
space, including artificial satellites and uncontrolled orbiting waste.20 Near-Earth space 
even boasts self-cleaning mechanisms to rival any river or wind current—the atmosphere 
expands and contracts along regular solar cycles, exerting drag on space junk until it falls 
back to Earth through intense friction and pressure. However, the boundary between 
space and terrestrial climates has become more tenuous as humankind has expanded its 
domain into the nearest regions of the cosmos. Even anthropogenic climate change has 
impacted the near-Earth ecosystem: Burgeoning carbon dioxide emissions have caused 
the planet’s thermosphere to contract, thereby reducing the altitude at which atmospheric 
																																								 																				
19 Paul N. Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the 
History of Sociotechnical Systems,” in Modernity and Technology, ed. Thomas J. Misa, Philip 
Brey, and Andrew Feenberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 185. 
20 Historians Gregory Good and Dagomar Degroot are currently developing research projects that 
examine the history of space weather, from the study of sunspots during the 19th century to 
current space-based research. For more on the effects of space weather on orbiting artifacts, see 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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drag brings space junk out of orbit and diminishing the resilience of this ecosystem.21 
These exchanges suggest that the planetary borderlands consist of an interactive 
continuum of natural and anthropogenic exchange in what anthropologist Valerie Olson 
calls “the extended ecological heliosphere.”22 
 In 1961, four years after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1 into orbit, some 380 
trackable anthropogenic objects circled the planet. By the end of 1963, that number had 
mushroomed to 685—though this number only included objects large enough to be seen 
from the ground. Among the byproducts of human-driven change to the orbital 
environment during these years were objects too small to be detected by space 
surveillance technology at the time. At most recent count, the Space Surveillance 
Network estimates that nearly seventeen thousand objects large enough to be tracked 
orbit the planet. Of these, 77% have been confirmed as objects with no designated use or 
purpose—space junk.23 Another approximately 500,000 pieces of debris between one and 
ten centimeters in diameter, and over 100 million anthropogenic particles smaller than 
one centimeter, round out the system of waste in near-Earth space.24 
																																								 																				
21 J. T. Emmert et al., “Observations of Increasing Carbon Dioxide Concentration in Earth’s 
Thermosphere,” Nature Geoscience 5, no. 12 (November 11, 2012): 868–71. 
22 Valerie A. Olson, “NEOecology: The Solar System’s Emerging Environmental History and 
Politics,” in New Natures: Joining Environmental History with Science and Technology Studies, 
ed. Dolly Jørgensen, Finn Arne Jørgensen, and Sara B Pritchard (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 195–211. 
23 U.S. Space Surveillance Network, “Satellite Box Score,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News 19, 
no. 1 (January 2015): 10. 
24 Ibid. 
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 These minute, largely invisible bits of anthropogenic material orbit alongside the 
empty rocket bodies, dead satellites, and other large objects speeding overhead.25 
Awareness of the potential dangers of accumulating debris drove the first international 
debates in the late 1950s over how to define and control pollution in outer space. As soon 
as the first satellites reached orbit, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to 
use this new environment for both peaceful and nefarious purposes. Both superpowers 
carried out high altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear weapons tests beginning in 1958 
and ending in 1963 with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. New kinds of satellites—
from giant, shiny inflatable balloons to a ring of hundreds of millions of tiny copper 
fibers—tested the use of space for communications while spurring controversy over 
whether such satellites could interfere with astronomy, crowd the electromagnetic 
spectrum, or present a collision hazard to other spacecraft.26 Just as outer space became a 
site of political prestige and technological utility during the Cold War, scientists around 
the world came to embrace Earth orbit as a valuable subject and site of investigation, and 
rapidly abandoned the idea of a physically isolated Earth. 
																																								 																				
25 All objects in orbit are in constant motion, but the speed of these objects depends on altitude. 
Objects in low-Earth orbit (between approximately 160 and 2000 kilometers above the surface of 
the Earth) can travel at speeds up to 7.8 kilometers per second. Objects at higher altitudes move 
more slowly, but still at speeds that would cause catastrophic damage in a collision with another 
object. In an analogy used by NASA, a piece of debris smaller than half an inch in diameter 
traveling at about six miles per second would hit as hard as a bowling ball moving at 300 mph. 
26 Current geoengineering proposals intended to correct atmospheric change by “seeding” orbital 
space with reflective material recall some of these early controversies, and could spur similar 
debate over the environmental protection of near-Earth space. For analysis of historical and 
contemporary weather control, see Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate 
Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2010); James Rodger Fleming, Fixing the 
Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control, Columbia Studies in International 
and Global History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Clark A. Miller and Paul N. 
Edwards, eds., Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, 
Politics, Science, and the Environment (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001). 
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 As the Space Age wore on, the larger objects became a threat—not just to other 
objects in orbit, but to people, property, and environments on the ground. The natural 
geophysical ecosystem of the Earth-Sun environment experienced particularly stormy 
periods of space weather during the first peaks of the eleven-year solar cycle to take place 
after the launch of Sputnik. As the atmosphere expanded, uncontrolled objects succumbed 
to friction and fell back to Earth through the destructive upper atmosphere. With no 
control over where surviving fragments might land, orbital space became a site from 
which pollutants could cross geographic boundaries and extraterritorial regions. In cases 
such as the nuclear-powered satellite Cosmos 954, which fell over the Northwestern 
Territories of Canada in 1978, such reentries raised a very real specter of radioactive 
contamination of ground, sea, and sky—originating not out of geopolitical antagonism 
but rather the caprice of the natural geophysical forces of the Sun. From the first space 
nukes to the reentry of Cosmos 954, the circulating imprint of what Will Steffen calls the 
“Great Acceleration” extended from underground to outer space.27 As the first byproducts 
of the fledgling space industry circled the planet, newly minted space scientists reached 
the consensus that the physical influence of our planet extended dozens of kilometers into 
a physically interactive solar system. Just as the Great Acceleration coincided with the 
rise of mainstream environmentalist movements around the world, concern over 
																																								 																				
27 The Great Acceleration describes the postwar period, or more accurately the world without 
analog that began after the detonation of the first atomic weapon. Steffen et al. argue that the 
Anthropocene began concurrently with the Great Acceleration, in contrast to other suggested 
starting points like the Neolithic Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. See Will Steffen, Paul J. 
Crutzen, and John R. McNeill, “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great 
Forces of Nature?,” Ambio 36, no. 8 (December 2007): 614–21; Will Steffen et al., “The 
Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration,” The Anthropocene Review 2, no. 1 
(April 2015): 81–98. 
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environmental risk extended into the nearest reaches of outer space from the first 
moments of the Space Age. 
 Representations of outer space as the final frontier permeated popular culture 
during the Cold War—particularly in America, where the heady rush to the Moon 
replicated a mythology of American exceptionalism rooted in the conquest of the West.28 
However, despite the appearance of unregulated orbital prospecting by the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the conquest of near-Earth space did not occur in an absence of 
authority. As during the colonization of the American West before it, state governments 
played a large role in facilitating and regulating the expansion of empire in yet another 
expansive frontier.29 Scientific, industrial, and state actors of spacefaring and non-
spacefaring nations alike competed to exercise control in the planetary borderlands 
during the Cold War Space Race. I will show that in the early days of the satellite age, the 
built environment in orbit was constructed atop a web of international governance driven 
in part by an early worldwide understanding of near-Earth space as an environment at 
risk. Concurrent with the rise of mainstream environmentalism, the material and 
rhetorical matter of space junk undergirded a multivalent, wide-reaching dialogue about 
cosmic environmental morality at the dawn of the space age—far earlier than recognized 
in most current space policy research. 
																																								 																				
28 Asif Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” in Remembering the Space Age, ed. 
Stephen J. Dick (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2008), 26-27. 
29 Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-
Century America (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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The Envirotechnical History of Near-Earth Space 
This dissertation brings together the histories of science, technology, and the environment 
to trace the mutual influences and interactions of humankind, terrestrial environments, 
and orbital environments over the first decades of human access to outer space. It breaks 
new ground in space history by highlighting the role of the geophysical world of outer 
space as a historical actor of equivalent importance to astronauts, engineers, 
governments, and publics. Historians of space technology examine the emissaries that 
humankind has sent into the alien beyond, but not how these artifacts in their afterlives 
interacted with the orbital ecosystem—with profound consequences for Cold War 
geopolitics.30 Roger Launius has noted that to date the extensive space history scholarship 
has given little more than passing notice of the space environment itself as an important 
feature in the history of space technology and politics.31 
 Since the late 20th century, environmental historians have sought to represent the 
natural world as a significant force in human history—a priority often neglected in the 
																																								 																				
30 For examples of history of space technology, see Dwayne Day, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the 
CORONA Spy Satellites (Smithsonian Institution, 2015); Constance McLaughlin Green, Milton 
Lomask, and Charles A. Lindbergh, Vanguard, A History: The NASA Historical Series 
(Washington: NASA: Scientific & Technical Information Division, 1971); Pamela Etter Mack, 
Viewing the Earth: The Social Construction of the Landsat Satellite System. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press); David A. Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2008); Asif A. Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge, 1st edition 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003); Simone Turchetti and Peder Roberts, The 
Surveillance Imperative: Geosciences during the Cold War and Beyond (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014); David J. Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications, 1945-1965, Smithsonian 
History of Aviation and Spaceflight Series (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
2002). 
31 Roger D. Launius, “Writing the History of Space’s Extreme Environment,” Environmental 
History, July 1, 2010, 526–32. 
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preceding decades of historical scholarship.32 This study of the history of human 
interactions with the near-Earth ecosystem takes up Martin Melosi’s call to reframe this 
priority to include a more expansive definition of nature and the natural. In his critique of 
Donald Worster and those historians who isolate “the natural world” as a narrow, 
necessarily miniscule category of spaces and assemblages devoid of any human 
intervention, Melosi argues that environmental historians ought to focus instead on “the 
role and place of the physical environment in human life.”33 The physical environment of 
near-Earth space encompasses naturally occurring phenomena and the built environment, 
growing over the course of the Cold War into an exemplary combination of what Bill 
Cronon calls “first nature” and “second nature.” In Cronon’s take on Hegelian and 
Marxist rhetoric, first nature represents the natural world that existed before humans, and 
second nature the artificial structures that human societies construct upon first nature. 
When first and second natures merge into a landscape made up of geophysical, material, 
and economic forces they become all but invisible, indistinguishable from one another. 
Just like the flow of commodities and capital through the markets and hinterlands of 
Chicago, the second nature of the satellite infrastructure quickly became as invisible, and 
																																								 																				
32 J. R. McNeill, “Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History,” History 
and Theory 42, no. 4 (December 1, 2003): 5–43. 
33 Martin V. Melosi, “The Place of the City in Environmental History,” Environmental History 
Review 17, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1–23; In this article, Melosi responds to Donald Worster's 
appendix to The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
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its technological and economic momentum as unstoppable as any natural force (with 
notable exceptions that will be covered in the chapters that follow).34 
 Second nature not only turns creatures, plants, and things into market 
commodities—it also collapses the distance between the point of production and the point 
of consumption. Most consumers of the products of modern capitalism do not see the 
origins of these products, nor do they reside in proximity to the byproducts of this 
consumption.35 Scholars of waste and discard studies also emphasize the temporal and 
geographic discontinuity between sites of consumption and the transformation and spatial 
relocation of byproducts. Susan Strasser, Joel Tarr, Martin Melosi, and Carl Zimring 
represent a few among many historians who examine the afterlives of waste. Other social 
scholars of waste and discard have emphasized the global pathways of refuse, including 
Anna Davies on the geographies of waste circulation, Marisa Cohn on the decay of global 
technological systems, and Joshua Reno on waste at social and spatial peripheries.36 In 
studies of the byproducts of similarly high-tech, invisible information infrastructures, 
Phaedra Pezzullo, Josh Lepawksy, and Nathan Ensmenger examine the high-technology 
wasteways of electronics production.37 Like these terrestrial wastes, space junk that 
																																								 																				
34 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1991). 
35 Ibid., 266–267. 
36 Anna Davies, The Geographies of Garbage Governance: Interventions, Interactions, and 
Outcomes (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008); Marisa Cohn, 
“Lifetimes and Legacies: Temporalities of Sociotechnical Change in a Long-Lived System” 
(Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2013); Joshua O. Reno, Waste Away: Working and 
Living with a North American Landfill (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016). 
37 Phaedra C. Pezzullo, “What Gets Buried in a Small Town: Toxic E--Waste and Democratic 
Frictions in the Crossroads of the United States,” in Histories of the Dustheap: Waste, Material 
Cultures, Social Justice, by Stephanie Foote and Elizabeth Mazzolini (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
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remains in orbit or falls back to Earth nearly always winds up in regions far removed 
from the state of origin, and far from the communities that use the information produced 
using the technologies of the space industry. 
This analysis of environmental change in near-Earth space both contributes to and 
expands upon recent historical scholarship in environmental history which connects the 
acceleration of global environmental change during the Cold War to the shifting 
environmental politics of the era.38 By illuminating how Cold War spacefaring humanity 
shaped, and was shaped by, the orbital geophysical environment, this dissertation for the 
first time situates the history of near-Earth space within a burgeoning historiography that 
analyzes the interactions of Cold War politics, technology, and environmental change.39 
During this period, the global scale of the conflict between the United States and its allies 
and the Soviet Union translated into an imperative to know the enemy by way of 
knowing the Earth, as evidenced by the rise of federal funding for geosciences and Earth 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																				
Press, 2012), 119–46; Josh Lepawsky and Charles Mather, “From Beginnings and Endings to 
Boundaries and Edges: Rethinking Circulation and Exchange through Electronic Waste: From 
Beginnings and Endings to Boundaries and Edges,” Area 43, no. 3 (September 2011): 242–49; 
Josh Lepawsky and Chris Mcnabb, “Mapping International Flows of Electronic Waste,” The 
Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 177–95; Nathan 
Ensmenger, “Dirty Bits: An Environmental History of Computing” March 24, 2015. 
38 See for instance J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, Environmental Histories of the Cold War 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth 
of Catastrophic Environmentalism, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Joshua 
P. Howe, Behind the Curve: Science and the Politics of Global Warming (University of 
Washington Press, 2014). 
39 For recent histories of Cold War politics, technology, and environmental change, see Jacob 
Darwin Hamblin, Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013); J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, Environmental 
Histories of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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surveillance in the postwar period.40 With the boon of state support, scientific disciplines 
from geophysics to ecosystem ecology served the double purpose of controlling the 
enemy and controlling the environment. Like global-scale ecosystems within the 
biosphere, the near-Earth space environment proved difficult to control, and the objects 
placed into the environment did not always stay where they were placed—much like the 
circulation of pollution at the poles or the consolidation of plastics in ocean gyres. Like 
garbage patches circling within the gyres, gravity wells in orbit tend to attract and pool 
objects whose position in orbit can no longer be actively maintained.41 
However, as in the burgeoning field of Anthropocene studies, most existing 
efforts stop at the arbitrary line of the atmosphere. My dissertation explores the historical 
permeability of this demarcation, demonstrating how Cold War environmental discourse 
spatially extended humankind’s ecological impact beyond the biosphere. The history of 
humankind’s technological presence in the nearest reaches of outer space suggests a 
broader, more nebulous reality in which terrestrial and extra-terrestrial environments 
intertwine in a natural, cultural, and technological continuum with the cosmos. During 
the first decades of the Space Age, changing scientific and popular understanding of the 
outer space environment, rising transnational awareness of invisible pollution, and 
																																								 																				
40 Simone Turchetti and Peder Roberts, eds., The Surveillance Imperative: The Rise of the 
Geosciences during the Cold War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
41 In geosynchronous orbits, debris gathers at two points on opposite sides of the planet due to 
irregularities in Earth’s gravitational field. See S. Valk, A. Lemaître, and F. Deleflie, “Semi-
Analytical Theory of Mean Orbital Motion for Geosynchronous Space Debris under Gravitational 
Influence,” Advances in Space Research 43, no. 7 (April 2009): 1070–82; Peter B. de Selding, 
“Debris-Control Report Card Cites Improvement by Geo Sat Owners,” SpaceNews, October 25, 
2013, http://spacenews.com/37861debris-control-report-card-cites-improvement-by-geo-sat-
owners/. 
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material evidence of real or anticipated mismanagement of orbital resources led to near-
Earth space becoming the subject of the earliest international debates about the “global 
environment.” 
 This dissertation diverges from an American environmental history literature that 
has largely overlooked what Steve Pyne calls “extreme environments”: remote, 
uninhabited, and unruly natural places that nonetheless constitute compelling sites of 
human practices and politics.42 Near-Earth space resembles Antarctica, the deep sea, and 
the atmosphere in its illegibility, unruly boundaries, and remoteness.43 As Steve Pyne has 
argued, these extreme environments represent places where humans can go, but only by 
using life-sustaining technologies, and only temporarily. In these places life either does 
not exist, or exists only at the microbial level and at the margins. Pyne argues that a lack 
of other humans and even biota to resist or conquer has translated to a lack of urgency in 
examining the environmental histories of extreme environments. As the first historical 
study to assess the history of outer space itself as a natural environment, this dissertation 
pushes historiographical boundaries by spotlighting the environmental history of a non-
																																								 																				
42 Steve Pyne, “Extreme Environments,” Environmental History, July 7, 2010, 509–13. 
43 For historical studies of extreme terrestrial environments, see Helen M. Rozwadowski, 
Fathoming the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea, (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2008); Adrian Howkins, The Polar Regions: An 
Environmental History (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2015); James Rodger Fleming, 
Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012); Samantha K. Muka, “Working at Water’s Edge: Life Sciences at 
American Marine Stations, 1880-1930” (Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2014); Rachel 
Emma Rothschild, “A Poisonous Sky: Scientific Research and International Diplomacy on Acid 
Rain” (Dissertation, Yale University, 2015); Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: 
Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (Rutgers University Press, 
2009); Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. Van Keuren, The Machine in Neptune’s Garden: 
Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment (Science History 
Publications/USA, 2004). 
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terrestrial ecosystem.44 By dismantling the discontinuous planetary boundary of 
environmental studies scholarship, I demonstrate a new way of seeing the history of the 
Space Age inextricably bound up in larger questions about environmental governance in 
an increasingly globalized world.  
As an extreme environment that humankind may only access by direct or virtual 
technological mediation, this dissertation balances environmental history with the history 
of technology. My analysis of the evolving discourse of environmental risk employed by 
different communities to control the extreme orbital environment heeds the call by Nelly 
Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch to keep users at the center of histories of technology.45 
However, in order to explore how the politics and practices of early space technology 
users shaped an inchoate orbiting information infrastructure, I take an interdisciplinary 
approach which prioritizes not only how users matter, but also how nature matters—even 
in environments so extreme and illegible as to push the limits of our understanding of the 
natural. In addition to treating the satellite network as an infrastructure, I examine the 
ways that the evolution of technological systems in an extreme, remote, illegible, and 
physically complex environment both illustrate, and require the expansion of, existing 
theories of technological development. In particular, the construction and decay of an 
orbiting infrastructure calls for a closer look at the social construction of technology and 
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the ways that the geophysical world participates in the shaping of technologies and 
waste.46 This analysis of the mutual shaping of space environment and space technology 
over the course of the Cold War contributes to envirotech scholarship—interdisciplinary 
studies that highlight the mutually shaping interrelationships between the nonhuman 
natural world and technology.  
 Finally, this dissertation also explores how Cold War scientific politics factored 
into broader cultural understanding of near-Earth space as natural environment. By 
examining the ways that astronomers, orbital physicists, and other space scientists sought 
to use and protect the planetary borderlands, I show how the interactions between 
specialist and lay communities inflected a discourse of environmental protection of outer 
space. I also demonstrate the pathways by which communities of scientists sought to 
position themselves as the ideal arbiters of safe activity in outer space. The analysis of 
internal and external conflicts among astronomers during the earliest moments of human 
access to space contribute to the historiography of Cold War physical sciences and the 
unique cultural space carved out by American and European astronomers as separate 
from their physicist colleagues.47 
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Anthropocene Without Borders 
In the decade and a half since Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer published the first 
printed use of the term “Anthropocene” to describe the current epoch of human-driven 
geophysical change, environmental scientists, social scientists, and humanists have 
debated its temporal limits.48 Some argue that the era began with the industrial revolution 
in the late 18th century, others millennia earlier at the Neolithic Revolution in crop and 
livestock domestication—and still others argue that such an epoch should not be 
recognized at all as a formal geological period separate from the Holocene.49 In 2015, 
climate scientist Will Steffen suggested a dramatically recent start to the Anthropocene: 
the post-war period that he, Crutzen, and John McNeill previously named the “Great 
Acceleration.”50 Claiming that records of large-scale environmental change prior to the 
Second World War could be attributed to the natural variability of the Holocene, Steffen 
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48 The first published use of the term briefly mentions that humans have stepped on the moon, but 
otherwise limits the scope of human ecological impact to the biosphere. See P.J. Crutzen and E. 
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77–80. 
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and his co-authors poignantly describe the current state of planet Earth as “a no-analogue 
world.”51 
 The Great Acceleration marked an exponential increase in atmospheric 
greenhouse gases and large-scale environmental degradation that resulted from the 
exploding human population and resource use. The first atomic bomb was exploded over 
New Mexico at the cusp of the Great Acceleration, unleashing an unprecedented quantity 
of radioactive material into the atmosphere which became one of the hallmarks of this 
period as the nuclear arms race unfolded. At the same time that nuclear weapons and the 
first intercontinental ballistic missiles annihilated the time and space of annihilation, 
humankind used these same technologies to irrevocably and incontrovertibly expand the 
spatial dimensions of anthropogenic change beyond the atmosphere. Starting with the 
launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the environment of anthropos expanded into outer 
space. In the midst of the Great Acceleration, humans began to play a major, measurable 
role in the evolution of natural environments beyond the tenuous boundaries of the 
terrestrial biosphere.52 Valerie Olson and Lisa Messeri recently took steps to break down 
the discursive boundaries between “inner” and “outer” environments in theorizing the 
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spatial parameters of the Anthropocene.53 As anthropologist Alice Gorman has argued, 
the Anthropocene cannot truly be understood without considering the place of outer space 
in geophysical change.54 
As difficult as it may be to imagine human-caused global change, thinking about 
the Anthropocene also requires shaking up a more basic, seemingly innate set of 
assumptions about the world around us. It requires reimagining our ideas about nature 
and the natural, and redrawing the limits of the human environment to include even those 
places most alien, empty, and seemingly antithetical to nature as most understand it. The 
Earth of the Anthropocene is a much larger world than can be bounded by biology, 
geology, or atmosphere. Through the production, use, and discarding of spacecraft and 
space junk, humanity has broadened the boundaries of Earth into the universe. Our use 
and disuse of the nearest regions of space rendered our species materially and virtually 
cosmopolitan, in the earliest meaning of the word espoused by the Cynics and Stoics of 
Ancient Greece.  A cosmopolitan rejects loyalty to a particular polity in favor of being a 
citizen of the universe.55 This effective cosmopolitanism, arising in the midst of the 
deeply stratified Cold War Space Race, represented a deeply paradoxical new identity for 
spacefaring societies.  
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Silent Spring / Sullied Space 
In September 1962, Rachel Carson’s groundbreaking book Silent Spring hit bookshelves 
across America and rapidly became a worldwide best seller. Silent Spring introduced an 
international mainstream readership to an unseen biological threat, the gravity of which 
Carson likened to nuclear fallout—but not as broadly recognized, understood, or resisted 
by affected communities at the time. Carson criticized en masse the authoritarian 
government officials that she deemed responsible for indiscriminately dispensing 
chemical pesticides in an effort to selectively eliminate specific unwanted organisms, but 
ultimately harming entire ecosystems and human bodies. Silent Spring articulated failures 
of visibility, consent, authority, and education as key social factors underpinning 
dangerous chemical pesticide use around the world. Should these practices continue 
unabated, Carson argued, humanity could face a shocking ecological apocalypse—from 
the loss of cherished birdsong insinuated in the book’s title, to the destruction of soil 
productivity and subsequent conquest by the very organisms targeted for eradication.56 
 The same month that Silent Spring was released, newly knighted British radio 
astronomer Bernard Lovell published an article in Nature detailing a similarly grave, 
similarly invisible environmental threat. In this article and a simultaneously published 
book—neither of which accrued the same broad readership as Silent Spring—Lovell 
extolled recent advances in satellite-facilitated knowledge about the outer space 
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environment that had totally transformed scientific understanding of Earth’s place in the 
cosmos. Not yet five years after Soviet engineers launched Sputnik into orbit, a rapidly 
coalescing international community of space scientists discovered a complex topography 
of magnetism, radiation, energy, dust, and atmospheric and trapped solar particles 
extending tens of thousands of kilometers from Earth into space. ⁠  Lovell lauded these 
discoveries as early as 1960, noting that the “earth’s environment” now dominated its 
own cosmic neighborhood to a distance of some ten Earth radii.57 In The Exploration of 
Outer Space he warned, however, that the near-Earth space environment—new to human 
access and study—had already been polluted beyond repair by the same faceless 
authorities that drenched an unconsenting society with chemical pesticides.58 Lovell 
argued that in a jingoistic race to technological supremacy, Cold Warring states had taken 
egregious risks by launching dangerous materials—including nuclear devices—into a 
poorly understood, fragile environment that scientists could no longer study in its natural 
state. Without proper oversight, Lovell anticipated the imminent militarization of outer 
space and the apocalyptic destruction of entire scientific disciplines, whose practitioners 
believed themselves to be standing on the cusp of revolution predicated on future access 
to outer space.59 
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 While many in the chemical industry vilified Carson as anti-science, her text 
proclaimed otherwise. She argued that pesticide programs required oversight by 
scientists, many of whom could lose the ability to study organisms and ecosystems in an 
unaltered, chemical-free state.60 Likewise, Lovell also anticipated that invisible 
contamination, abuses of authority, and insufficient consent of affected communities 
could lead to irreparable destruction of the mythical final frontier as an object of analysis. 
Both Carson and Lovell claimed that, in American suburbs and thousands of kilometers 
overhead, moral scientific governance provided the only hope of reversing the dire fates 
they announced. Hope for salvation could be found only by giving regulatory power to 
those specialists “guided by the purest of scientific motives,” as put by Lovell.61 
 Both Carson and her astronomer contemporaries sought to educate concerned 
citizens and promote a specific kind of specialist as the most qualified and morally 
equipped individuals to serve as clairvoyant environmental watchdogs against Cold War 
state authorities. Lovell’s writings exemplify surging dissent among transnational 
networks of American, European, and Soviet astronomers that emerged during the early 
1960s against American military space activities. Just as chemical pesticides threatened 
the work of zoologists and biologists, these astronomers feared that an increasing amount 
of artificial material launched into orbit threatened the contemporary and anticipated 
research practices of astronomers around the world. Lovell and many of his colleagues 
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promoted astronomers as the best line of defense against potential ethical and moral 
disasters wrought by poorly informed bureaucrats in positions of unchecked power.62 
Like Carson, they enrolled the metaphor of nuclear resistance to garner popular and 
legislative support for the protection of an invisible environment. Attaining regulatory 
authority over outer space activities required engaging new opponents and forging new 
alliances—particularly with those outside the astronomy community who might have the 
power to affect policy change. Astronomers’ efforts to manage environmental risk in 
space gave shape and meaning to invisible orbital pollutants. Outer space itself became 
real, tangible, and vulnerable in the hands of mainstream journalists who employed proto-
environmentalist language legible to lay communities that would never directly encounter 
the environment—and unlike the pesticides of Silent Spring, would not likely experience 
bodily encounters with the pollution in question. 
 The confluence of publications by Rachel Carson and Bernard Lovell—both of 
which called for similar forms of expert governance to avoid ecological destruction—
suggests that at this moment, widely considered a germinal moment in the subsequent 
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expansion of mainstream environmentalism, the very definition of the natural 
environment itself had begun to expand beyond the boundaries of the biosphere.63 Like 
chemical pesticides released into watersheds, chemical fuels, fission particles, and metal 
fragments shed by spacecraft in orbit could not be guaranteed to stay put, or disappear 
without consequences. These material and rhetorical parallels suggest that the discourses 
of invisible environmental threat, destruction of nature broadly defined, and the politics 
of scientific morality and authority of Silent Spring extended well beyond the elm-lined 
streets of suburbia, farmlands of the Midwest, and marine estuaries of the eastern 
seaboard. Aptly, if coincidentally, the frontispiece to Chapter 10 of Silent Spring features 
a drawing of a nuclear family gazing into a night sky dotted with stars. At the same time 
that communities around the world confronted the prospect of a silent spring, many also 
came face to face with the prospect of a crowded sky. 
Chapter Overview 
Rather than conducting a chronological examination of a single institution, group, or 
cultural movement, this dissertation will present four intersecting case studies which 
together reveal the formation of an international environmental consciousness of outer 
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space during the Cold War. The five substantive chapters demonstrate how different 
communities attempted to control an environment that few had directly encountered, and 
how early perceptions of environmental risk in orbit shaped the material and discursive 
contours of the planetary borderlands. 
Chapter one, “’Sputnik’s Companion’: 1957α1 as Global Boundary Object,” 
begins with a case study of the rocket that launched Sputnik and accompanied it into 
orbit. Most Americans who reported seeing Sputnik cross the night sky actually glimpsed 
the much larger, shiner core of the rocket. Different communities around the world 
understood and used this globally mobile artifact as a scientific instrument, political tool, 
and intelligence commodity, among many other interpretations. With the mythical final 
frontier opened, the United States and the Soviet Union launched greater numbers of 
satellites into orbit. These early space artifacts took multiple forms, from passive to 
active, and the shape, materiality, and institutional home of each contributed to a deep 
interpretive flexibility during the first few years of the Space Age. 
In a geopolitical reality in which high-altitude nuclear devices could be used to 
disable radio systems across an entire continent, the United States military sought new 
ways to communicate in case the Cold War turned hot. Chapter two traces the history of 
Project West Ford, a United States Air Force experiment that culminated in the launch of 
hundreds of millions of tiny copper needles into space for use in long-range radio 
communications. In “Under the Copper Curtain: Project West Ford and the Roots of 
Outer Space Environmentalism, 1958-1964” I follow an international community of 
astronomers—no strangers to environmental conflict after a century spent battling the 
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sky-obscuring effects of urbanization— which protested the project in an attempt to halt 
the extension of the industrial atmosphere into orbit.64 Astronomers’ disciplinary fight 
against West Ford transformed in popular presses around the world into a prohibition on 
“littering,” “trashing,” and “dumping” in outer space. This rhetoric was consistent with 
an emergent zeitgeist of proto-environmentalist anxiety heralded by the concurrent 
publication of Silent Spring. While project designers saw the needles as valuable 
information infrastructure, news items and letters from concerned citizens in America and 
abroad suggest that some interpreted these artifacts alongside fallout and pesticides as 
invisible environmental threats imposed upon a non-consenting society. 
Chapter three focuses on what happens when what goes up comes back down. 
Subjected to punishing friction, objects that reenter the atmosphere typically break into 
fragments. In passing through the planetary borderlands, these artifacts change 
materially, but also ontologically—particularly in legal discourse after space junk falls 
where it should not. In “’Terror in the Skies:’ Falling Space Junk, Space Weather, and 
International Environmental Liability During the Long 1970s” I argue that falling space 
junk becomes a perilous kind of boundary object, bringing states, legal regimes, and 
bodies into unexpected and dangerous proximity, principally in instances where the 
reentry causes real or anticipated environmental damage.65 Such reentries, particularly of 
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artifacts containing radioactive materials, evoked Cold War apprehensions of nuclear 
terror coming from the skies. Whether unintentional delivery vehicles for toxic waste or 
alien pathogens (as feared by some American biologists at the dawn of the space age), the 
fear of invasion by our own out-of-control technologies punctuated popular responses to 
high profile reentries. This anxiety also surfaced in mass culture from novels to films that 
portray existential disaster delivered by falling space junk. 
Finally, chapter four illuminates how economic concerns about space junk 
factored into a temporary turn away from the single-use culture of the American space 
industry. This shift occurred during the development and operation of the Space Shuttle 
and Space Station programs, when NASA faced a shrinking budget under the guidance of 
an administrator with deep personal environmental commitments. In “Salvaging Space: 
Refuse, Reuse, and the Pursuit of Orbital Economy, 1968-1986” I examine the Space 
Shuttle itself—partially reusable and initially expected to facilitate retrieval and reuse of 
damaged or dead satellites. I have also rediscovered a largely forgotten space station 
proposal, called the Space Operations Center, which was championed by its designers as 
an on-orbit salvage and recycling facility. As in postwar American civic recycling 
programs, these priorities fell away when the cost of reuse surpassed that of single-use 
operations, and space commerce returned to the throwaway ethos of the early sixties.66 
The history of the first space shuttle, christened Columbia in a hopeful and 
unintentionally ominous reference to another historical moment of exchange between 
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“old” and “new” worlds, serves as a tragic but apt coda: its early intended use for orbital 
cleanup, its unique capability to provide safe passage for space artifacts through the 
destructive planetary borderlands, and its ultimate transformation during the final 
passage, along with its human passengers, into falling space junk. This final analysis 
synthesizes the ways that the technologies nations have fashioned, sent aloft, and ceased 
to control, have brought us into jarring contact with the near-Earth space environment, 
and with each other. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“Sputnik’s Companion”: 1957α1 as Global Boundary Object 
 
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite into orbit 
around the planet. American citizens picked up newspapers and tuned their radios and 
televisions to breathless reports of nationwide agitation and fear: The Communists—
whose economic system and social backwardness should, by contemporary American 
jingoist logic, have kept them on the ground—had beaten the United States to outer 
space.67 In the days following the spectacular achievement, illustrations and eventually 
photographs of the so-called “red moon” presented Americans with an idea of the 
object’s physical appearance. News programs reproduced the sound emitted by the radio 
beacon aboard Sputnik, diffusing a taunting, now-iconic “beep-beep” through the radios 
of a nation that had nearly four months to go until it would successfully launch its own 
artificial moon. These visual and aural indices of the first artificial satellite became 
symbols of a new chapter in the Cold War that began with Sputnik—an era known as the 
Space Age.68 
 Though these mediated encounters with the satellite through photos and sounds in 
mass media constituted most Americans’ first exposure to the first satellite, many 
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subsequently attempted to view the Russian moon with their own eyes. Regional, local, 
and national news outlets printed schedules of when readers could expect the satellite to 
pass overhead in the hours immediately following dusk and preceding dawn, when the 
light of the sun from below the horizon illuminated the shiny object against a dark sky. 
Interested individuals went outside and looked up, hopeful that they would catch a 
glimpse of something that no one had ever seen before—perhaps not knowing exactly 
what they might find.  
 Those who looked in the right place at the right time, under the right weather 
conditions, saw a point of light moving rapidly across the night sky, reminiscent of a tiny 
star traversing the familiar spread of fixed constellations and planets.69 Hundreds of 
thousands of people on either side of the Iron Curtain viewed the same bright object. 
Some 4% of Americans reported seeing Sputnik overhead during its short months in 
orbit.70 The Sputnik-watching experience has been memorialized in memoirs, historical 
literature, Hollywood movies, and the personal recollections of multitudes. However, the 
tiny moving star that shone twice as bright as the North Star was not what it seemed.71 
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The object that the newly minted cosmopolitans of Earth breathlessly tracked through the 
night sky was not Sputnik, but part of the rocket that had sent it aloft.72 
 This strange, obscure, largely forgotten object received the official designation of 
“1957α1” in the official catalog of orbiting objects now maintained by the US 
Department of Defense (DOD). It continues to occupy the first entry in a list that has now 
grown to over 39,000 since October 1957.73 Sputnik itself comes in second, as 
“1957α2.”74 The round spherical satellite with the trailing “whiskers” or “mustaches” 
received a proper name and occupies a hallowed place in history as the first artificial 
satellite. However, Sputnik was only one of a trio of human-made objects that first 
orbited Earth on October 4, 1957: the named satellite, the core of the rocket that launched 
it into space, and an uncatalogued object that some believed to be the nose cone that 
protected Sputnik during launch. These objects, of drastically different sizes and shapes, 
chased each other around the planet until one by one each reentered the atmosphere and 
plummeted back to Earth. By early January 1958, the last of the artifacts fell from orbit. 
 Like more familiar discarded things on the ground, space artifacts such as the 
rocket core do not always fit into neat binary categories of product and byproduct.75 
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Rather, this particular object meant a variety of different things to different communities 
during the few short months it circled the Earth. Most waste products are mobile in some 
way—from the transportation of municipal solid waste to the circulation of carbon 
emissions in the atmosphere. Unlike these out-of-sight, out-of-mind wastes, which never 
truly disappear even when rendered invisible at the point of consumption, 1957α1 
remained both visible and mobile, passing over most populated regions of the planet and 
visible to everyone regardless of access to technology. The global, visible mobility of 
1957α1 contributed to its exceptional array of uses and user communities, and heralded a 
new form of technology that would be subject to a high level of interpretive flexibility 
during the early years of the Space Age. 
 The many identities imposed upon Sputnik’s empty rocket core illustrate how the 
politics of different communities on the ground determine the meaning and value of 
space technologies along a slippery, shifting dialectic of utility and waste.76 From the very 
beginning of the satellite age, the potential for multiple, coexisting, contrasting 
definitions of objects transiting through outer space and returning to Earth influenced the 
design, purpose, and use of space technologies themselves. The stories of how these 
objects came to be valued or discarded also reveal how state actors, scientific 
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communities, and ordinary citizens across the world confronted a new and illegible 
environment as the Cold War extended beyond the tenuous boundaries of the biosphere.  
The Many Identities of 1957α1 
The brief history of Sputnik’s rocket core reveals how the first artifacts that would come 
to be known to some observers as “space junk” became broadly flexible, heterogeneous 
boundary objects, collapsing vast geographical distances and political divides both while 
in orbit and after returning to Earth through the atmosphere. Multiple communities used 
and interpreted this first broadly visible space artifact in a variety of sometimes 
contradicting ways, from space waste to space craft. Beyond constituting the first 
encounter with outer space as a human environment for thousands of untrained 
individuals around the world, this artifact also became a range of other artifacts, from 
political tool to scientific instrument to intelligence commodity. The meaning of the 
artifact was contingent on the identity of the user and the location of the rocket core 
relative to the user. 
 The rocket core artifact in many ways fits the categorization of a “boundary 
object” as initially described by Star and Greisemer.  A boundary object must have a 
strong identity that nevertheless can be stretched to meet the local needs of different 
communities, thus serving as a unifying point of translation between divergent social 
worlds. Unlike the atlases, museums, forms, and state boundaries at play for the different 
communities of the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology that Star and Greisemer use as a case 
study, 1957α1 appeared on the world scene as something entirely novel and different, an 
artifact that drew together new communities of unaffiliated users. Different groups 
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collaborated to produce representations of outer space and spaceflight using an artifact 
that turned out to be both elastic in meaning and robust in identity.77 The rocket core 
meant different things within different social worlds, but remained recognizable as a 
Soviet-built piece of space technology. In addition to representing different meanings and 
uses to different communities, the global motion and visibility of the orbiting artifact 
redrew the boundaries of what could be considered a “boundary”—between 
communities, environments, and worlds.  
 Valerie Olson has argued that near-Earth objects (NEOs) such as asteroids and 
meteors act as boundary objects that tack between astronomy and environmental and 
national security communities, as well as between Earthly and extraterrestrial 
environments.78 As naturally occurring objects, however, NEOs boast a much longer 
presence in geophysical and human history, with records of terrestrial boundary crossing 
in abundant evidence through geological impact features and texts ranging from Chinese 
folklore to the Bible.79 Olson and Lisa Messeri group NEOs alongside solar radiation as 
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objects that gain significance through cultural interpretations of their crossing between 
Earth and space. Olson and Messeri look at how these cosmic transitory objects challenge 
acts of discursive boundary drawing through which different communities separate the 
planet from the rest of the cosmos.80 The transit of early space artifacts like the Sputnik 
rocket core through and from space challenges this distinction between the planet and the 
rest of the universe further, particularly due to the anthropogenic nature of these objects. 
Designed and built by humans, 1957α1 retained the initial inscriptions from its creators, 
which then influenced the proliferation of alternate meanings and uses beyond its primary 
use as the means by which the named first artificial moon reached orbit. It was 
simultaneously familiar and strange: Though human-made, it inhabited a space external 
to any that humankind had directly encountered—an uncanny alien artifact that sat astride 
environments and eras. 
 In what follows, I identify eight discrete interpretations of the Sputnik rocket core 
by different communities of users during its short few months in orbit and immediately 
after its plunge to Earth in December 1957. This wide variety of meanings and uses was 
echoed in the subsequent development and deployment of the first communications and 
scientific satellites during the following decade. I then compare Project Echo and Project 
West Ford81—two passive satellite systems with common material attributes imbued with 
widely varying cultural meanings. The divergent interpretation of these two systems 
illustrates the persistent material and social flexibility of space artifacts during the years 
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following the launch of the first space boundary object. Before the form of the satellite 
settled into the active, electronics-laden version that we currently understand to be the 
archetypal satellite, the first flexible space artifacts further blurred the distinction between 
satellite and space junk. As the interpretive flexibility of satellites subsided—as a 
particular form of active satellite became successful and as a result became “black 
boxed”—the expanse of communities and uses for these boundary objects also 
narrowed.82 Before anyone could fear space junk, they first had to know what space junk 
could be. This chapter shows how the category of “space junk” emerged within a range of 
many possible interpretations of the same space artifact: propaganda tool, scientific 
instrument, diplomatic offering, intelligence object, and environmental pollution. 
First Satellite 
The rocket core reached orbit at the same time as Sputnik, separating from the sphere 
314.5 seconds after the full R7 rocket assembly lifted off from the windswept plains of 
Kazakhstan. The Soviet engineers responsible for designing the version of the R-7 
ballistic missile that launched Sputnik gave it the nickname “Article 8K71PS,” following 
the Soviet practice of labeling classified technology with deliberately neutral, obscure 
descriptions and by extension leaving it open to the manufacture of unlimited meanings 
beyond its initial designed purpose.83 In contrast, the planned Soviet satellite itself gained 
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the relatively specific moniker prosteyshyy sputnik, or Simplest Satellite.84 An aluminum 
sphere with a radio transmitter aboard could be seen as simple indeed; and yet, Article 
8K71PS, also made of metal and containing a transmitter that was, in the words of an 
eminent Soviet engineer, “so basic that it would be a snap for any group of young hobby 
technicians to reproduce it,” could have been described by the same name.85 
Appropriately, Russians today typically refer to the rocket launcher as “Sputnik,” the 
name most Westerners use for the satellite itself.86  
 Even as the image of the named satellite graced news reports around the world, 
the core became the object that most observers, knowingly or unknowingly, assumed to 
be the first artificial satellite. Many American news outlets neglected to note the true 
identity of the moving star, while some explicitly identified the naked-eye visible object 
as the rocket core. The Los Angeles Times claimed that 1957α1 “stole the show” from 
Sputnik as the more spectacular of the two objects, to which Sputnik received second 
billing in other articles as its “companion” in space.87 Many Americans had easy access to 
information identifying the object as the rocket body. However, few memoirs and oral 
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histories of Americans who recalled seeing Sputnik mention realizing the true identity of 
the moving star. In popular memory, the rocket body has become Sputnik itself. During 
its time in space, the rocket core, together with reproduced images and sounds of and 
from the named satellite, made up the Sputnik Experience for those who looked into the 
dawn and dusk sky in October and November of 1957.88  
 The rocket core served as a visual index that enabled a direct, unmediated 
connection with the first human-made moon. Except among certain communities of 
specialists and the amateur astronomer networks enrolled to track the first satellites, this 
artifact has been all but subsumed under the identity of its more famous companion.89 In 
hindsight, even some specialists seem to have forgotten the existence of the rocket core. 
Engineer Homer Hickam, who would pen the best-selling memoir Rocket Boys that 
inspired the 1999 Hollywood film October Sky, recalls the moment in which he first saw 
Sputnik crossing over his West Virginia coal mine town as the motivation behind his 
entering a career designing spacecraft for NASA. 
 
I stared at it with no less rapt attention than if it had been God Himself in a golden 
chariot riding overhead. It soared with what seemed to me inexorable and 
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dangerous purpose, as if there were no power in the universe that could stop 
it…in less than a minute, it was gone.90 
 
Had 17-year-old Homer known that this powerful, dangerous, inexorable, nearly divine 
object had been a piece of a rocket rather than the Russian moon, perhaps he would still 
have built a career in rocket engineering. However, for most Americans, a satellite was 
something remarkably different from the rockets that, until October 4 1957, had only 
served to lift warheads into globe-crossing trajectories.  The named satellite attained lofty 
cultural status as an artifact of value and meaning due to a combination of socially 
constructed realities including its having a legible name, novel purpose, and a sound that 
could be heard indirectly by anyone with a radio receiver or television. In spite of ample 
contemporary news reporting that clarified the true identity of the moving star, the rocket 
core has disappeared in a worldwide act of collective forgetting. As something designed 
to place the named satellite into orbit and then to be discarded, the small moving star 
would mean little more than waste if defined solely by its planned use. In seeing the 
rocket core with their own eyes and identifying it as the first satellite, communities 
around the world first experienced outer space as a real, tangible place through a messy 
visual encounter with an artifact that was simultaneously spacecraft and something else 
entirely new: space waste. 
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Figure 1.1: Researchers at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory put together this 
map of the path of the rocket core as it traced a path across the globe. Note that the 
caption refers to the core by its catalog name, and identifies it as a satellite.91  
 
First Space Junk 
Unlike those who looked up into the sky with the naked eye, many specialists with access 
to the equipment and information necessary to view Sputnik would have been aware of 
the rocket core as a separate object entirely. Soviet engineers designed the rocket core to 
provide the final push that sent Sputnik into its path around the planet. To those who 
acknowledged the rocket’s primary function, 1957α1 could be best understood as a 
discarded industrial byproduct in an environment that humankind could now claim as part 
of its domain. Professional and amateur scientists and radio operators who could see the 
actual satellite or used the radio signal to signify its existence were aware of the 
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difference between the two artifacts. American astrophysicist Alan Hynek called the 
rocket core “a traveling junk pile in the sky.”92 To many of those who could identify and 
encounter Sputnik through technologically mediated means, 1957α1 became little more 
than useless space junk—the very first of a highly mobile, illegible, uncontrollable form 
of waste that would grow in quantity and complexity as the Space Age progressed. 
 Nothing about the construction of 1957α1 rendered it more space junk than space 
craft, particularly given its many material similarities to 1957α2. In spite of its high level 
of visibility, in intentionally or unintentionally subsuming the identity of the rocket core 
within that of its named companion, an array of observers, by omission, relegated 1957α1 
to the category of invisible waste. Like all artifacts that humankind sends into space, the 
rocket core would eventually fall back to Earth. 1957α2 would follow a month later. 
Upon passing through the nebulous borderlands between Earth and outer space, 1957α1 
became the first example of a different kind of space junk—the kind that replicated a 
distinctly Cold War cultural anxiety of technological destruction delivered from afar and 
above. 
 
Political Tool 
The mistaken identity of the rocket core as Sputnik proper did not come about entirely by 
accident. The very first Soviet press release announcing the successful launch noted that 
some form of equipment would be required to view the simplest satellite as it circled the 
planet: 
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At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajectories around the 
earth, and its flight can be observed in the rays of the rising and setting sun with 
the aid of very simple optical instruments (binoculars, telescopes, etc.).93 
 
At only 58 centimeters in diameter, roughly the size of a beach ball, Soviet engineers 
realized that the sphere would be too small to view from the ground with the naked eye, 
so they planned to make the much larger rocket core a more easily visible substitute.94 
Following orders issued via the Soviet Academy of Sciences, they outfitted the 20-meter-
long rocket core with reflective prisms designed to deploy when it reached orbit so that 
Soviet radars could more easily track it.95 Beyond this officially stated purpose, the core 
performed the perfect Sputnik impersonation. Because it was much larger and designed 
to catch and reflect more sunlight, anyone on the ground with the ability to see, 
regardless of education or access to specialized equipment, could spot the rocket core and 
confirm for themselves that the notoriously secretive Soviet Union had indeed put a new 
moon into orbit.  
																																								 																				
93 Tass, “Announcement of the First Satellite,” Pravda, October 5, 1957, Historical Reference 
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. 
94 Chertok, “Rockets and People,” 386; Matthew Brzezinski, Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the 
Hidden Rivalries That Ignited the Space Age (Macmillan, 2007), 176. 
95 Siddiqi, “Iskusstvennyy Sputnik Zemli,” 432. 
		
47 
 
Figure 1.2: Sputnik 1 alongside a technician, compared to the R7 rocket used to launch 
the satellite. Note that the central core of the rocket is shorter than the entire assembly 
prior to launch, as pictured here with an average person for scale.96 
 
Such a sight had public relations benefits beyond the expectations of Sputnik’s 
designers: Ordinary viewers saw the object and felt pride or terror, anticipation or 
anxiety, depending on their political inclinations and nationality. The Soviet engineers 
intentionally crafted the rocket core to be more than waste: They shaped the material 
form of the object so that, even in what some might determine to be a state of disuse, it 
yet served a valuable technical and political purpose. By providing a visible index for the 
Soviet achievement, Soviet engineers ensured that their achievement would become 
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incontrovertibly understood as the instigating moment of what would unfold into over a 
decade of proxy conflict known as the Space Race.97 
 In order to capitalize further on this additional use of the rocket core, the Soviet 
government released information about the revolutions, distances traveled, and apogee 
heights of each component of the Sputnik system. The Kremlin continued to publish such 
information over the next few launches, including predictions of where and when specific 
satellites might be visible to observers on the ground.98 For the second Sputnik launch, 
Soviet engineers decided not to separate the spacecraft from the core stage of the 
launching rocket.99 As a result, Sputnik 2 would be just as visible from the ground as the 
unnamed rocket core launched weeks prior. The Kremlin continued to release viewing 
information for this most recent satellite, privileging information about the more visible 
artifacts over the orbital viewing times of Sputnik 1. 
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Figure 1.3: This graph, released by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory to 
illustrate Soviet predictions of when 1957α1 (the core of the Sputnik R-7 rocket) and 
1957β1 (Sputnik 2) would be visible from different latitudes at dawn and dusk. Note that 
both featured artifacts are R7 rocket cores, and this information was not provided for the 
much smaller Sputnik 1.100 
 
Scientific Instrument 
Although they had access to the optical and radio equipment necessary to “see” Sputnik, 
some specialist communities in the West found the discarded rocket core to be more 
useful than the named satellite. American and British physicists found an additional use 
for the object as an unprecedented opportunity to study the upper atmosphere. A group of 
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British physicists, who would soon take on the new professional identity of “orbital 
analysts,” used the rocket core as a research instrument that they did not have to design, 
order, operate, or pay to use. Tracking the object as it tumbled end over end in its path 
around the planet, orbital analysts at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) and the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) examined the motion of the rocket core to 
study its interactions with atmospheric particles at high altitudes.101 These particles 
exerted drag on the object, causing its orbit to “decay,” or dwindle in altitude far more 
quickly than it would in a vacuum.102 During its over eight weeks on orbit, 1957α1 
revealed entirely new information about the wind currents and density of the upper 
atmosphere and the shape of the Earth itself.103 
 The calculations made by RAE and SAO researchers using the tumbling rocket 
core represented the first in situ data about the material dimensions of near-Earth space 
that would subsequently reveal a complex physical landscape of interacting gravitational 
forces, radiation, and energy. Earth’s atmosphere and geophysical influence constituted 
neither a thin, fragile shell around the planet, nor a “vast region of emptiness,” as Bernard 
Lovell put it.104 Using the rocket core to measure high altitude wind currents and particle 
density, physicists on the other side of the Iron Curtain from the launching state took 
enormous first steps towards a new understanding of the natural environment of planet 
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Earth that extended far beyond the biosphere, tens of thousands of kilometers into space, 
where planetary forces shape natural processes and human-made objects alike.105 
 The early research produced using the rocket core changed contemporary 
understanding of the orbital environment. Before the Sputnik, RAE physicist Desmond 
King-Hele called scientific understanding of the atmosphere “abysmally inadequate.”106  
However, once the Soviet press revealed details on the dimensions of the rocket core, 
physicists could then observe the motion of the rocket and determine how friction and 
gravity interacted to bring the object back to Earth. Research conducted using the rocket 
core fostered SAO researchers’ claim that the atmosphere at altitudes of 220 kilometers 
and 233 kilometers was far denser than initially thought.107 The first orbital analysts 
themselves attached great value to 1957α1. As King-Hele noted in 1960, most upper 
atmospheric data used for these revolutionary studies came from tracing the paths of the 
first rocket bodies to orbit the planet, rather than from native instruments designed for the 
specific purpose of measuring particle density. Sputnik 3, which the Soviet Union 
launched in May 1958, would be the first satellite to fly with direct atmospheric 
measuring devices on board.108 Thus, American and European physicists made some of 
the first measurements of the near-Earth space environment indirectly, using an 
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improvised scientific instrument unintentionally provided by a foreign, hostile power.109 
Although the named satellite fulfilled multiple roles in scientific and political arenas, to 
King-Hele and his cohort of orbital analysts the empty rocket was “more important than 
the satellite itself.”110 Some saw it as waste; the Soviets turned it into propaganda; orbital 
scientists used it as an instrument. 
 
Diplomatic Gift 
Unlike the data gathered by Soviet scientists using instruments aboard satellites like 
Sputnik 3 and the first American satellite Explorer 1, the rocket core’s motion and its 
global visibility rendered the technology non-proprietary and free to use by observers in 
any nation regardless of political or national affiliation.111  The relatively simple rocket 
core and its successors provided cost-effective means of atmospheric and space research 
during the 1960s, when funding for European space science remained remarkably low, 
and before and during the unprecedented state spending bonanza that would soon 
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characterize the American space program.112 In stark contrast to the $110 million that the 
US federal government spent on the early Vanguard satellite program, those who studied 
1957α1 generated groundbreaking, prestigious scientific research at a price tag of $0 to 
taxpayers in America and the UK.113 
 Desmond King-Hele of the RAE wrote an entire popular book to justify the 
expense of satellite research to the British public—and noted that many of the discoveries 
made through such research essentially cost nothing to said public.114 By “stealing a look 
at satellites launched by other nations,” orbital researchers like King-Hele reformed 
models of the upper atmosphere without having to pay for satellite development and 
launch. King-Hele and his cohort at the RAE gave effusive public thanks for the 
foresight, ingenuity, and unintentional generosity displayed by the Soviet engineers for 
providing a free, non-proprietary instrument for learning about the orbital environment. 
He even expressed some degree of guilt over the RAE’s uncompensated use of 1957α1, 
referring to British study of the rocket core as “piratic.”115 However, a subsequent meeting 
between British orbital analysts at the RAE and Soviet astronomer Alla Massevitch to 
discuss and exchange information about the decay of 1957α1 forged new links between 
Western European, American, and Soviet scientific communities. As part of this 
exchange, the Smithsonian-sponsored Operation Moonwatch shared its observational 
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data with Massevitch, who in turn provided analogous Soviet data and feedback on the 
equipment used by the amateur astronomer network as compared to Soviet satellite 
tracking technology.116 
 The launch of Sputnik set off a new, antagonistic proxy front in the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The existence of the satellite itself posed 
a challenge and a taunt to the US from across the world, and the subsequent American 
effort to catch up with and surpass Soviet space achievements would yield harsh 
exchanges between the two states and cost billions of dollars. However, at the same time 
the forgotten rocket core became the focus of a brief, nearly anomalous reprieve in these 
tense relations during the Sputnik crisis. At the outset of the Space Race, 1957α1 became 
a peacemaking object and a diplomatic tool, bringing together kindred amateur and 
professional scientists on either side of the contentious Cold War conflict in peaceful 
collaboration. This was the first instance of an ebbing and flowing relationship between 
Soviet and Western scientists that often followed its own amicable route independently of 
the temperature of the Cold War as the Space Race progressed.117 
 
Telemetry Test  
Compared to Sputnik and its beeping radio signal, which quickly became an aural icon of 
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the Space Age, the orbiting rocket cores appeared to be “dumb, deaf, and blind.”118 
However, in the context of British orbital analysts’ research, 1957α1 was far from silent. 
Soviet engineers installed an early version of the new Tral telemetry system into the 
rocket core that remained active throughout its time on orbit. Telemetry systems like Tral 
provide a constant stream of data regarding the rockets’ operation, altitude, and position. 
Before they could acquire Sputnik’s radio signal, the signal emitted by Tral aboard the 
rocket core provided Soviet engineers with the first confirmation that both the rocket and 
satellite had successfully reached orbit. Sputnik itself would not reveal its location until 
completing a second arc around the planet.119 
 So successful was this telemetry system test that when the Soviet Union began to 
make plans to launch its second Simplest Satellite, they determined that the rocket core’s 
Tral provided enough data to dispense with a separate detachable satellite with a native 
radio transmitter like the one on Sputnik 1. Rather than outfit Sputnik 2 with its own 
radio, the Tral-equipped rocket core itself would remain attached to the named satellite, 
with its canine passenger, Laika, ensconced in the cabin.120 During this second Soviet 
space flight, the rocket core once again provided an easily visible visual index for the 
named satellite and emitted a series of signals to confirm its place in orbit around the 
planet. The talkative 1957α1 served as a test article for Tral, which the Soviet space 
program would use as a primary telemetry system throughout the Sputnik and Vostok 
programs, and which would serve as the basis for subsequent ground tracking 
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technologies.121 The otherwise silent rocket core spoke volumes to those who had the 
means to listen. 
 
Intelligence Commodity 
Soviet engineers and orbital analysts around the world tracked the rocket body until its 
orbit fully decayed.122 After 882 trips around the planet, the object began to spiral into the 
atmosphere on November 30, 1957, ultimately falling back to Earth on December 2 
1957.123 As it plunged into denser regions of the atmosphere, punishing heat and pressure 
caused it to fracture into pieces. Some of these pieces dissipated into the atmosphere; and 
some of the larger fragments survived intact. In its return to terra firma, 1957α1 
transformed into the first of a different kind of space junk—the kind that falls to Earth, 
often far from the launching state, with the potential to threaten the safety of people, 
property, and ecosystems. 
 Upon hitting the ground the artifact transformed once again, offering new value to 
a different set of communities. The American intelligence community valued the rocket 
core as a potential source of information about the design and production capabilities of 
the Soviet space industry. Soviet officials sought to uncover any surviving fragments 
with equal urgency, driven by the inverse objective of preventing such information from 
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falling into enemy hands. Observers on either side of the Iron Curtain tracked the rocket 
body as it fell from the sky, but disagreed about where the object landed. Soviet scientists 
and officials claimed that it landed in Alaska, and that the American government had 
covered up its retrieval of exploitable debris. The Americans in turn argued that the 
object had landed in Mongolia, well within Soviet territory.124 The matter eventually 
faded from public view, and the final resting place of the rocket body fragments remains 
unknown.125 However, the debate over its landing site initiated several decades of tense 
exchange between the Cold Warring super powers in which space junk like 1957α1 
became intelligence commodities—critical political currency of the Space Race. Where 
traditional intelligence methods failed, the natural geophysical environment of near-Earth 
space provided occasional insight by delivering falling space junk across geographic 
boundaries and geopolitical divides.126 
The Matter of Early Satellites 
The multiple interpretations of 1957α1 foreshadowed the interpretive flexibility of the 
first artificial satellites launched after Sputnik. While the material attributes of the rocket 
core remained static over months on orbit and on the ground, different, dispersed user 
communities found varying meanings and uses for it. As will be discussed in further 
detail in the following chapter, during the earliest days of the satellite age engineers in the 
US and USSR considered multiple forms that communications and science satellites 
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might take. The stuff of satellites mattered greatly during the design phases of each 
satellite program, as the shape and makeup of passive satellites determined how that 
satellite functioned, who could use it, and perhaps just as importantly, whether the 
satellite would be accepted as a technological benefit or technological threat. In a broad 
field of potential satellite technologies, the matter, shape, size, and quantity of objects 
sent into space during the first five years of the satellite age deeply impacted how 
astronomers and other concerned groups interpreted the safety of space artifacts. The 
material configuration of satellites played a large role in how those on the ground 
determined a satellite’s scope of use, its designers’ intent, and its modernity—an 
important attribute in the early days of the Space Age.127 
 Two passive satellite projects developed in the United States during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s resulted in deeply divergent outcomes on this last point. Project West 
Ford, a space communications system designed by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory and 
funded by the US Air Force, launched twice—in 1961 and again in 1963. West Ford 
consisted of a field of hundreds of millions of tiny copper fibers orbiting at an 
approximate altitude of 3500 kilometers, tuned for use with microwave signals sent from 
a powerful transmitter on the ground. NASA launched two versions of Project Echo—
Echo 1 in 1960 and Echo 2 in 1964—sending inflatable Mylar “satelloons” into orbit, 
also for use as a reflector of microwave signals. Both West Ford and Echo served similar 
purposes in relaying signals sent from one point on the ground to another point without 
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using any electronics installed aboard the satellite themselves. The space components of 
both satellite systems coexisted in orbit, and both received attention in open literature and 
popular presses before, during, and after their primary missions. However, West Ford 
ultimately inspired a furor from astronomers, diplomats, and journalists who interpreted 
the copper fibers as dangerous space pollution, whereas Echo became known to most 
communities as useful, anomalously friendly satellites in a largely hostile night sky.128 
 During the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957 to 1958, American 
atmospheric researchers working under the auspices of the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics (NACA) designed a small inflatable sphere that could be launched into 
the upper atmosphere, where its movements would allow researchers on the ground to 
determine air density at high altitudes, primarily for use in aircraft design. After the 
Soviet Union provided 1957α1 free of charge for this purpose, the project evolved into a 
balloon satellite, or “satelloon,” of exponentially larger diameter to be used primarily to 
test experimental communications methods. After the Sputnik experience touched 
thousands of people around the world, NACA officials hoped that a satelloon could also 
serve similar nationalist purposes. Like the rocket core, an American space object that 
would be visible to the naked eye could yield pride and a sense of accomplishment 
among American citizens who might have experienced the inverse upon seeing the first 
Russian moon. Under the name Project Echo, the fledgling National Aeronautics and 
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Space Administration launched the first of these satelloons into orbit in August 1960, 
followed by the launch of Echo II in January 1964.129 
 
Figure 1.4: An Echo satellite undergoes static testing at a facility in Weeksville, NC on 
June 28, 1961.130 
 
 Echo and West Ford had plenty of material attributes in common. At the most 
basic level, both were passive satellites constructed out of shiny, metallic materials, and 
both were intended to test novel radio communications methods. The designers of each 
project hoped that their satellites would yield new information about the near-Earth space 
environment. West Ford’s designers hoped that their project would test the hypothesis 
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that sunlight pressure could be relied upon to bring down objects with low mass-to-area 
ratios from relatively high orbits.131 Echo’s designers anticipated that the motion of the 
satelloons over time would reveal how solar energy affects the expansion, contraction, 
dormancy, and decay of large objects in low orbits.132 Both West Ford and Echo reflected 
signals sent and received by MIT equipment on either side of the continental United 
States. Supporters of both West Ford and Echo celebrated the inherent universal 
accessibility of each satellite form as communications devices—for those who had the 
resources and capital to use them. On the negative side, astronomers and astrophysicists 
anticipated likely interference to their observations by both passive satellite systems. This 
specialist community initially opposed satellites of all forms, including the active 
(containing an electronic repeater) type. Bernard Lovell anticipated that West Ford, Echo, 
and active satellites like Telstar all posed possible threats to astronomical research.133 
Astronomers affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted studies 
of what impact an Echo or West Ford system would have on their research should either 
type of passive satellite become a permanent part of the orbital infrastructure.134 
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 However, in spite of these similarities in construction, method of use, and alarm 
among astronomy communities, the response to Echo among scientists, politicians, and 
general publics worldwide was generally positive in stark contrast to the battle that raged 
around West Ford. Even in the admittedly hostile audience of the Soviet popular press, 
which pilloried West Ford as a “criminal act,” Echo earned the nickname “the Friendship 
Sputnik.”135 At the Eleventh Meeting of the International Astronomical Union (IAU), 
during which the assembled passed anti-West Ford resolutions, the daily programs 
distributed to attendees listed where and when Echo 1 would pass over their Berkeley 
location each night, in English and in French.136 Echo was emblazoned on 
commemorative postage stamps issued by states and local governments around the world, 
from Paraguay to Kazakhstan to Qatar.137 Besides being photographed next to a generic 
postage stamp to illustrate the small size of the dipoles, West Ford never received such 
philatelic honors. 
 The sponsoring institution may have been part of the reason for this disparity. 
Both military and civil science communities considered potential applications of balloon 
satellites—in a defense context, an Echo type satellite might pose as a decoy to trick 
enemy spacecraft detection systems, much like West Ford’s World War II radar foil 
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ancestor Project Chaff.138 However, the newly formed NASA—a civilian agency—
ultimately funded Echo.139 West Ford was funded by the United States Air Force, and 
launched atop an Air Force missile as a secondary payload to a classified military 
satellite. In 1960 the Space Science Board (SSB) of the NAS advised the Lincoln 
Laboratory to consider NASA sponsorship instead. In a report to the general board, 
members of a West Ford review committee included an appendix addressing the issue of 
public perception of the project should it remain attached to a branch of the armed forces. 
The committee strongly suggested that sponsorship by a civilian agency might go far to 
ward off popular assumptions at home and abroad that, however benign in practice, the 
project had a malicious purpose.140 However, the New York Times reported that due to 
the U2 incident the preceding year, NASA declined to take over West Ford in order to 
avoid any appearance of military engagement within the agency—though the US 
delegation to the United Nations chose a representative from NASA to defend West Ford 
against critics who accused the United States of military aggression after the second 
launch in May 1963.141 
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 In comparing the material attributes of each system, the West Ford and Echo 
projects most drastically diverged in the shape of the orbital components. Both projects 
were designed to launch a small container that released the reflective payload once it 
reached the intended orbit. The West Ford dispenser, which bundled hundreds of millions 
of copper fibers into a cylinder smaller than a coffee can, would slowly release the 
dipoles into a widely dispersed band that surrounded the planet at an altitude of about 
3500 kilometers. Each dipole would be separated by about 400 meters.142 In contrast, the 
Echo “shot-put” mechanism, about a meter in diameter, jettisoned and instantaneously 
inflated a single satelloon to a diameter of over 30 meters (Echo I) or over 40 meters 
(Echo II). Echo I and Echo II orbited at under half the altitude of West Ford, reaching a 
perigee of approximately 1600 kilometers. 
 The shape and size of these two satellite systems largely determined who could 
use the satellites, and how. The primary purpose touted by Echo and West Ford 
managers—a test of passive satellite communications—could not be undertaken without 
specialized equipment. However, NASA touted several ancillary uses for the Echo 
satelloons, including their accessibility as a “worldwide laboratory tool” for both radio 
communications and for measuring high altitude air currents. NASA welcomed 
independent communications researchers to use the satellite at will, offering to provide 
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any interested parties with tracking data to facilitate such experimenting.143 The first radio 
transmission sent via Echo I carried a voice message from President Eisenhower inviting 
all nations to use the satellite for its own communications interests.144 The SSB West Ford 
committee envisioned similar public relations benefits from the non-proprietary nature of 
the proposed dipole system, noting in its April 1960 report that “properly handled, the 
Project might even be made into an asset in the realm of international cooperation in 
space activities, since it is the type in which scientists of any country can participate 
independently.” They suggested that the belt be used to transmit signals to the Soviet 
Union and to Western Europe in order to demonstrate its universal accessibility. 
Otherwise, the project might be open to negative interpretations—the dipoles could be 
seen as the dangerous waste byproducts of a wanton, unchecked American military.145 
 Neither Echo nor West Ford were particularly “useful” in the primary purpose for 
which they were designed for any users outside of the state-funded research organizations 
that had the powerful transmitters and receivers on the ground to send and receive signals 
from the satellites. This did not preclude others from trying to use them, however. 
Following the successful second West Ford launch, a British amateur radio operator 
wrote to the Lincoln Laboratory to express his support of the project in contrast to the 
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vocal opposition among the professional radio astronomers in his country. Curious about 
how the Lincoln Laboratory and ham operators might mutually support each other, the 
letter writer requested information about how amateurs like him might use the belt in 
order to attain the prestige of long-distance communication. The chief designer of West 
Ford personally responded with the requested information, but noted that ham operators 
likely would not transmit at the correct frequency, or with enough power, to be able to 
use the dipoles.146 
 Of course, as with Sputnik’s rocket core, the primary designated use of orbiting 
artifacts was not always the sole, or even most important, use in practice. Particularly 
during the early years of the Cold War Space Race, a satellite that could be clearly seen 
from the ground served important political purposes. Unlike West Ford, which designers 
planned to install in an orbit so far away and diffusely dispersed as to be all but invisible 
even through powerful telescopes, Echo’s designers built them to be seen from the 
ground. One of the primary goals of Project Echo was to put an American satellite into 
orbit that would demonstrate to even the least educated citizens of the world that the 
United States had reached outer space.147 An object so large and shiny could be seen with 
the naked eye, by anyone who knew when and where to look. Journalists who had viewed 
Echo with their own eyes described the satellite as “a tiny traveling star” or a “small 
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bright starlet.”148 Regional newspapers published schedules listing when local viewers 
might see Echo passing overhead, and when Echo would be invisible while in the Earth’s 
shadow.149 Echo watchers buzzed about a mysterious “companion” to the satellite later 
attributed to Air Force pilots attempting to get a better look at the satellite while in 
flight.150 Three years into the orbital lifetime of the first mission, one American journalist 
likened Echo-watching to other popular trends like hula hoops, 3D movies, and the twist. 
NASA reported receiving twenty to thirty calls per week about Echo in 1963, and those 
who regularly followed its path through the sky described it as a mathematical puzzle, 
backyard science game, and evidence of American ingenuity visible from anywhere in 
the world, from American backyards to the Nile River. Echo took on an anthropomorphic 
identity to some, who described the satelloon as a “sentimental friend.”151 One Echo-
watcher wrote a letter to the SAO upon Echo I’s demise, lamenting: “I shall greatly miss 
seeing ‘him’ float by.” By the time Echo I reentered the atmosphere in 1968, the New 
York Times claimed that more people in more countries had seen the satelloon than any 
other human-made spacecraft.152 The exact opposite could be said of the West Ford 
dipoles. Even long-exposure photographs taken by the highly sensitive Baker-Nunn 
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camera space tracking system could only detect the dispenser mechanism and the faintest 
fuzzy band inclined approximately three degrees to the surrounding star field.153 
 
 
Figure 1.5: This long-exposure photograph demonstrates the faintness of the West Ford 
system. Taken on September 17, 1963 at the San Fernando station of the Smithsonian 
Astrophysical Observatory in Spain using a 20-inch Baker-Nunn satellite tracking 
camera, the dipole field barely appears as a faint, fuzzy line extending from either side of 
the dispenser (circled), inclined several degrees relative to the star field.154 
  
Echo and West Ford also diverged in material composition. While both satellite forms 
represented innovative products of the Space Age in function and design, they were not 
both “Space-Age” in construction. In order to attain the enormous size and reflectivity 
necessary for the proposed satelloon, Echo’s designers chose to build the body of the 
spacecraft out of Mylar, an aluminized polyester compound newly developed by DuPont 
for use in the manufacture of recording tape and food packaging.155 Mylar provided the 
requisite combination of strength and incredible thinness—about half as thick as the 
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cellophane wrapper on a pack of cigarettes, extolled a NASA press release and 
promotional film distributed in advance of the first Echo launch.156 Project Echo yielded 
the first use of Mylar in the spaceflight industry. Soon, the compound would become 
culturally bound to the space program, as NASA engineers incorporated Mylar into the 
construction of all Apollo-era spacecraft, as well as the enduringly popular outdoor 
product spinoff known as the “space blanket.”157 Touted as a miracle product of space-age 
chemistry, Mylar soon became a fixture in the silver, streamlined fashion design of the 
late 1960s.158 
 In contrast, the West Ford dipoles were made out of an ancient, mundane element: 
copper. If aluminum alloys and shiny silvery materials typified space-age design and 
consumer culture, copper represented an earlier, bygone age. Space-age alloys were 
innovative, high-tech, and post-industrial; copper a product of industrial production that 
most Americans would recognize in their homes, businesses, and in the pennies in their 
pockets. During the 1960s this industrial substance did not align with the silver, platinum, 
and white symbols of modernity made most famous by fashion designer André 
Courrèges.159 
																																								 																				
156 “Project Echo Payload and Experiment,” 3; Jerry Fairbanks, The Big Bounce. 
157 Hansen, “The Odyssey of Project Echo,” 170–175. 
158 A 1968 advertisement for Lane Bryant titled “Moonlit Silver Orbited in Black” capitalizes on 
the “space-age blend” of Mylar, cotton, and acrylic to sell garments that evoke the drama of 
spaceflight: two dresses described respectively as “flouncy-skirted with a striped countdown” and 
“A-shaped and launched in a silver streak.” “Display Ad 171 -- No Title,” Chicago Tribune 
(1963-Current File), March 31, 1968, sec. 7. 
159 Copper-infused fabric is currently becoming fashionable, particularly for its purported 
antimicrobial properties. Laura Johannes, “Silver Lining to Fighting Germs,” Wall Street Journal, 
July 19, 2011, sec. Health and Wellness; Valerie Steele, Paris Fashion: A Cultural History 
(Oxford University Press, 1988). 
		
70 
 Together, the shape, size, and composition of Echo and West Ford combined to 
create a vastly divergent landscape of acceptance. Managers of both projects saw benefit 
in sending samples of project components to those with the influence or power to lend 
legitimacy to a new and potentially controversial technology. NASA sent samples of 
Mylar to space program advocates in the federal government, demonstrating the 
remarkable attributes of the new material and lauding Echo as a breakthrough in 
materials and communication technology.160 The Lincoln Laboratory also circulated 
material samples from West Ford to potential allies, but for a different purpose. When 
John Kessler, the publicity manager of the West Ford project, sent around packets of 
dipoles to journalists, diplomats, and lawmakers, he did not intend to demonstrate 
anything revolutionary about plain old copper. Rather, he hoped to showcase its 
banality—boring, ordinary, and inoffensive, copper was not the stuff of military 
aggression or revolution.161  
 The Lincoln Laboratory often accompanied press releases and other informational 
materials with a photo of several dipoles arranged next to cat whiskers, or on an 
unidentified human finger. With the fingerprints as clearly visible as the dipoles 
themselves, such an image demonstrated the short length and minute diameter of the 
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copper fibers. By allowing individuals such as the delegates present at a United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space meeting held two days after the second 
launch to see and handle dipoles directly, the circulation of West Ford samples provided 
an unparalleled method to demonstrate objectively the size of the dipoles, and by 
extension their harmlessness.162 Kessler also hoped that this material encounter might also 
help spur a creative rebranding of the embattled Lincoln Laboratory endeavor. 
Recognizing the damage that the enduring nickname “needles” seemed to be inflicting 
upon public opinion of the project, Kessler circulated dipoles to journalists in order to 
solicit suggestions for how to rename the project one more time, hoping that a softer 
moniker would render its composite parts both popularly legible and rhetorically 
innocuous. Suggestions such as “space fluff,” “space hair,” and “space halo” softened an 
otherwise sharp intrusion into the outer space environment—though none of these 
suggestions found official or popular traction.163 Those who did not encounter the dipoles 
themselves had free range to imagine—they imagined needles raining from the sky, or 
falling into their gardens. 
 Compared to the highly visible, widely celebrated Echo I and Echo II, West 
Ford’s invisibility proved a double-edged sword. The fact that the belt could not be seen 
by anyone, including professional astronomers who had vocally opposed its potential 
effect on their research, was a triumph for the Lincoln Laboratory. However, the visibility 
																																								 																				
162 Special to the New York Times, “U.S. Assures World Scientists Space Needles Are 
Harmless”; Oswald Schuette, “Letter from Oswald F. Schuette to J. A. Kessler,” May 20, 1963, 
History of West Ford, MIT Lincoln Laboratory Archives, Lexington, Massachusetts. 
163 Kessler, “Letter from J. A. Kessler to Watson Davis, Director Science Service”; Schuette, 
“Letter from Oswald F. Schuette to J. A. Kessler.” 
		
72 
of the Echo satellites made them familiar and even lovable to certain communities on the 
ground. While astronomers opposed both Echo and West Ford, they did not raise an 
international incident over Echo as they did with West Ford. In remarks that inverted 
Western praise for 1957α1 years earlier, Soviet physicist Alla Massevitch publicly 
thanked the United States for providing scientists around the world with a free scientific 
instrument that could be used to study the effects of sunlight pressure of orbiting 
objects—and at the end of the same remarks condemned West Ford.164 During the first 
years of the Space Age, those artifacts that, like Sputnik’s rocket core, could be seen and 
accessed around the world for multiple uses earned admiration, even from hostile 
audiences, while invisible orbiting artifacts were not flexible enough to serve as global 
boundary objects and thus earned fewer defenders. Visible artifacts like satelloons and 
rocket cores could be interpreted as friendly and useful. Invisible artifacts could be 
menacing matter out-of-place—in spite of the utility professed by their designers, objects 
such as the West Ford dipoles could easily be interpreted as dangerous waste. 
Conclusion 
Whether space waste, satellite, political tool, scientific instrument, diplomatic olive 
branch, test facility, or intelligence commodity, Sputnik’s rocket core played multiple 
critical roles in the history of humankind’s first steps into outer space. When visible and 
accessible to multiple communities, artifacts like 1957α1 and the Echo satelloons became 
expansive boundary objects, bringing specialist and lay communities around the world 
into contact across ideological, political, and geographic divides. West Ford’s largely 
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invisible dipoles could not fulfill this mediating function. As a result, many communities 
interpreted them as dangerous weapons or potentially disastrous waste, without 
redemptive secondary uses. The strange mobility, remoteness, variable visibility, and 
ephemerality of these flexibly defined objects undergird the elastic boundaries between 
utility and waste, particularly in a technological system in which byproducts typically go 
unnoticed by the majority of users. The divergent interpretations of these early space 
artifacts suggests that on Earth and in space alike, one user’s tool is another user’s 
garbage. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Under the Copper Curtain: Project West Ford and the Roots of Outer Space 
Environmentalism, 1958-1964 
 
Talking Over the Bomb 
Thirteen minutes before midnight local time on July 31, 1958, an Army Redstone missile 
carrying a nuclear device lifted off from Johnston Island in the South Pacific. Its intended 
target was a patch of upper atmosphere 76.8 kilometers above and approximately 10 
kilometers south of the launch site, but a programming error in the missile’s guidance 
system led the missile straight up instead.165 Upon detonation three minutes after launch, 
the weapon unleashed a 3.8 Megaton yield directly above the island and the roughly 175 
souls that remained on site for the test. The resulting debris cloud rose one and a half 
kilometers per second, spreading to a diameter of nearly 30 kilometers in three and a half 
seconds. The night sky over Johnston Island turned bright as daylight for a few seconds, 
and observers in Samoa reported spectacular aurora displays—a phenomenon rarely seen 
in that region of the world.166 
Sensors mounted on sounding rockets launched alongside the nuclear device 
returned data that indicated the presence of a layer of fissile debris in the upper 
atmosphere. This debris disrupted Earth’s ionosphere, the layer of the atmosphere used as 
a reflector for long-distance middle and high frequency radio communications. For 
several hours, radio operators could no longer use the ionosphere to transmit signals 
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across the region below the blast zone. A blackout of trans-Pacific high-frequency 
communications lasted for nine hours in Australia and two or more hours in Hawaii.167 
Certain radio frequencies in Honolulu also went silent for several hours until the debris 
dispersed and the ionosphere returned to its natural state. On Johnston Island itself, 
communications systems shut down for the rest of the night. While civilian observers 
1300 kilometers away in Honolulu remarked upon the stunning visual display as the 
unannounced explosion turned the sky from black to yellow to orange to red, military 
personnel on nearby ships desperately attempted to reach their colleagues at the test site. 
The blast had so comprehensively disrupted Johnston Island’s communications systems 
that outsiders worried the island itself had been obliterated. The first communication to 
get through to island personnel in the morning hours following the event was a frantic 
“Are you still there?”168 
 This nuclear test, codenamed Hardtack-Teak, was the second of three high-
altitude blasts set off as part of the series of 35 nuclear demonstrations comprising 
Operation Hardtack. Each detonation provided experimental data to test the hypothesis of 
physicist Nicholas Constantine Christofilos that high-altitude electromagnetic pulses 
(EMPs) might be used to black out communications and electronic systems over a large 
area, a potentially valuable countermeasure against incoming missiles, enemy satellites, 
or even hostile cosmonauts. A strategically placed nuclear detonation in the upper 
atmosphere launched from the Indian Ocean might even cause Moscow to fall silent for a 
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few hours without causing any material damage on the ground—an appealing tactical 
advantage in the age of mutually assured destruction.169 Teak, and the subsequent 
Operation Hardtack-Orange, clearly demonstrated the validity of Christofilos’s 
hypothesis. A nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere could critically disable local and 
international communications over a particular geographical area. The tests not only 
confirmed a potential weapon for the United States military, but also identified a possible 
weakness in the American military communications infrastructure. What could be done if 
the Soviet Union used this tactic against America in conjunction with cutting transatlantic 
cable, destroying the president’s ability to maintain contact with forces and nuclear 
arsenals deployed across the world should the Cold War turn hot?170 The demonstrated 
vulnerability of the natural ionosphere motivated several branches of the United States 
military to consider more robust alternatives to contemporary radio and cable 
communications systems.  
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Event Name Location Date Altitude (km) Yield 
Hardtack-Yucca Eniwetok 4/28/1958 26.2 Low 
Hardtack-Teak Johnston Island 8/1/1958 76.8 Megaton 
range 
Hardtack-
Orange 
Johnston Island 8/12/1958 43 Megaton 
range 
Argus I South Atlantic 8/27/1958 200 1-2 kilotons 
Argus II South Atlantic 8/30/1958 240 1-2 kilotons 
Argus III South Atlantic 9/6/1958 540 ± 100 1-2 kilotons 
Starfish Prime Johnston Island 7/9/1962 400 1.4 Megatons 
Checkmate Johnston Island 10/20/1962 Tens Low 
Bluegill Johnston Island 10/26/1962 Tens Submegaton 
Kingfish Johnston Island 11/1/1962 Tens Submegaton 
Tightrope Johnston Island 11/4/1962 Tens Low 
 
Table 2.1. American high-altitude nuclear tests, 1958-1962.171 
 
Alongside the high-altitude nuclear tests conducted under Project Argus in 1958, 
the spectacular Hardtack explosions incontrovertibly showed that the reach of the 
American military and its weapons now extended to space—even as governments on 
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either side of the Cold War debated how to define where space begins.172 Though cloaked 
under a veil of scientific justification, these tests strained the definition of the 
militarization of space that President Eisenhower condemned in speeches and national 
security policy reports.173. However, these dramatic, catastrophic moments of martial 
might did not inspire significant backlash among those who hoped to preserve near-Earth 
space from human alteration. Rather, a seemingly benign attempt by the American 
military to address this perceived weakness in communication infrastructure sparked the 
first heated international discussions about what constituted environmentally dangerous 
activity in outer space. Astronomers in particular spoke out about changes in the orbital 
environment caused by military operations in space. Few responded during the first 
volley of high altitude nuclear tests in 1958. Not until 1960, when the United States Air 
Force announced the details of a space communications system that would come to be 
known as Project West Ford, did astronomers on both sides of the Iron Curtain become 
the first advocates for pollution control in orbit. Their response to Project West Ford 
instigated a broad-reaching worldwide debate about what rules would ensure the safe, 
long-term use of near-Earth space. This debate led to the codification of environmental 
protection measures in incipient international space law. While Project West Ford and the 
maelstrom of controversy that surrounded it have fallen out of popular memory, the 
questions it inspired about how best to protect a strange, isolated, globally shared natural 
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environment—and who should be the guardians of this environment—continue to inform 
current policy discussions about orbital sustainability. 
A Passive Solution: Project Needles, 1958-1960 
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, into 
orbit around the planet, ushering in the cultural and aesthetic era known as the Space 
Age, and the sociotechnical order more accurately called the Satellite Age.174 Space Age 
visionaries predicted that once space became a place that humans could regularly reach, 
albeit indirectly, satellites would become integral to societies on the ground as conveyers 
of information. The idea of using high-orbiting satellites to enable nearly instantaneous 
communications across the globe had been anticipated as early as 1945 by science fiction 
author Arthur C. Clarke.175 Sputnik and America’s first satellite Explorer, however, were 
not communications satellites. They contained radio transmitters that emitted signals, but 
could not relay information sent from the ground to another point on the ground as 
proposed by Clarke and other early satellite communications proponents.176 The iconic 
beeping of Sputnik’s radio beacon could strike pride or terror into the hearts of 
listeners—depending on their political affiliations—and anticipated the increasingly 
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complex on-board electronics that became standard for satellites in the late twentieth 
century. However, the design and function of communications satellites was anything but 
predetermined. The first true communications satellite predated Sputnik, contained no 
electronics, and had not even been fashioned by human hands. In 1946 the US Army 
Signal Corps conducted the first radar astronomy experiment code named Project Diana, 
during which they bounced radio signals off the Moon and set the stage for the so-called 
“passive” artificial satellites that would follow in subsequent years.177 As the United 
States and the Soviet Union launched greater numbers of satellites that incorporated new 
technologies produced simultaneously by the electronics and synthetic materials 
industries, satellite designers considered multiple potential forms that communications 
spacecraft might take.178 
By the summer of 1958, only six artificial satellites orbited the planet, and the 
design of satellite technology remained subject to broad interpretive flexibility.179 The 
vulnerability of ground-based communication systems revealed by the 1958 high-altitude 
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weapons tests of Operation Hardtack led several branches of the U.S. military to push for 
new, resilient ways to maintain open communication lines in case of nuclear war. Eight 
months after the launch of Sputnik and two months after the first American high-altitude 
nuclear test, the United States Army Signal Corps funded an MIT Lincoln Laboratory 
summer study in Cape Cod. Participants in what came to be known as the Barnstable 
Study considered how space technology could be used for military communications, and 
discussed ways to make such critical remote infrastructure invulnerable to high-altitude 
EMPs triggered by nuclear detonations—or at least to have an emergency system ready 
to deploy in case of such an attack.180 They considered two main forms that a military 
communications satellite might take, and debated the merits and disadvantages of each.181 
The “active” satellite type incorporated electronics that could receive and store a signal 
sent from the ground, then amplify that signal upon sending it to another point on the 
ground. The “passive” satellite form—like its natural cousin the Moon—did not 
incorporate onboard electronics. Instead, the body of the satellite itself served as a 
resonant reflector for powerful signals tuned to the satellite’s shape and size.182  
Two Barnstable study participants, Harold F. Meyer of the Ramo-Wooldridge 
Corporation and Walter E. Morrow Jr. of the Lincoln Laboratory, devised a system based 
on the latter, passive form of satellite. Morrow and Meyer’s design called for a simple but 
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cost-effective method of radio communications that would reliably replicate the 
properties of the natural ionosphere. Instead of a single, expensive active satellite with 
EMP-vulnerable electronics on board, Morrow and Meyer’s model called for a ring of 
simple copper dipole antennas, called “chaff” or “needles,” diffused into a an orbiting 
ring. The dipoles would ideally be established in two belts—one polar, and one 
equatorial—to ensure worldwide coverage. Such a system could be used to complete 
multiple communications circuits from any point on the globe using no more than one 
ground transfer point.183 The design specified that the dipoles should be cut into short, 
thin, oblong threads tuned for use with a specific radio frequency, a technique rooted in 
World War II radar countermeasures and tropospheric scatter telecommunications 
already in use at remote military installations, including the United States Air Force’s 
White Alice network within the DEW Line aircraft early warning system.184 
After struggling to find financial support to build and test the Morrow and Meyer 
model under the code name Project Needles, the Lincoln Laboratory found a funder in 
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the U.S. Air Force.185 Under military sponsorship, MIT researchers revised the theoretical 
plan presented at Barnstable and specified the material and spatial parameters of a test 
system: a field of several hundred million dipoles orbiting in two diffuse rings at about 
3600 kilometers above the Earth’s surface, positioned along polar and equatorial orbits. 
Two large ground terminals—one in Camp Parks, California and one in Westford, 
Massachusetts—would be constructed to send and receive signals using the belts. A 
powerful microwave signal sent from one terminal would hit the charged dipoles and 
scatter in multiple directions, enabling the receiver at the other terminal to intersect one 
of the scattered signals. This mechanism mimicked the natural ionosphere that had 
temporarily fallen prey to the first high-altitude nuclear tests, but with greater consistency 
over longer distances. It also enabled the use of higher frequency transmissions than 
could be reliably reflected by the natural ionosphere.186  
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Figure 2.1: A diagram created by one of the original designers illustrates the simplicity 
of the orbiting chaff model of microwave communications.187 
 
 
By using dipole belts in space as an ionosphere-like scatter medium, Lincoln 
Laboratory researchers envisioned an economical, durable communications system that 
would span the globe. All complex, expensive technology would be constructed on the 
ground, where repairs could be conducted—in stark contrast to the complex technology 
of active satellites, which could not be retrieved and repaired once launched into orbit. 
Space components would be made of simple industrial materials easily and cheaply 
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installed as a secondary “piggyback” payload on a single Air Force rocket launch.188 A 
1961 white paper on the model lauded its “singular nature of being the cheapest of all 
communications satellite systems studied to date.”189 The redundancy of a field of tiny 
reflectors made the system more resilient against direct or large-scale attack than active 
satellites. At 3600 kilometers above the surface of the Earth, the belt would be situated 
significantly higher than the highest recorded altitude of a nuclear explosion, protecting 
the system from a known method of sabotage. Even if a high-altitude nuclear weapon 
were to be detonated in the same orbit as the belt or belts, the remaining millions of 
dipoles would coalesce and fill the gap in short order, rendering any communications 
outages temporary.190 Such an open access system yielded additional promise in the form 
of nearly unlimited circuits, a potentially valuable provision for military applications 
around the planet.191 Although the dipoles would be placed in a relatively high orbit, 
Irwin Shapiro of the Lincoln Laboratory calculated that sunlight pressure would bring 
them down within a maximum period of five years.  Shapiro emphasized that testing the 
effect of sunlight pressure on low mass-to-area ratio objects—a primary purpose of 
Project Needles in the minds of a few of those who designed the system—would yield 
new, valuable information about the near-Earth space environment and the physical 
forces at work between the Sun and the Earth.192 Researchers at the Lincoln Laboratory 
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believed that testing Project Needles in situ would contribute significantly to applied 
physics, national security, and the American space industry. With the Air Force footing 
the bill and providing passage to orbit, these contributions would come about in secret, 
invisible to the majority of citizens on the planet below. 
Sniffing Out a Watchdog: The Space Science Board and Risks to Astronomy 
In September 1959, as plans for a test launch proceeded apace, Lincoln Laboratory 
administrators determined that the project would benefit from external consultation on 
the possible impact of the proposed project on space research. Given its classified status, 
the Lincoln Laboratory requested assistance from the Space Science Board (SSB) of the 
National Academy of Sciences in vetting the safety of the system, particularly to radio 
astronomy, optical astronomy, and current and future orbiting spacecraft.193 In January 
1960 the SSB convened a small group of astronomers and engineers from its ranks to 
form an ad hoc committee that would weigh the potential outcomes and risks of the 
proposed test belts.  
The SSB charged the committee, chaired by radio engineer O. G. “Mike” Villard, 
with the task of evaluating how Project Needles might alter and be altered by the outer 
space environment at the proposed altitude, and to assess any danger of the proposed 
experimental dipole belts to scientific research. The committee also planned to gauge 
how information about the project as designed would be received by scientists and the 
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public at home and abroad.194 In his initial invitation to a group of ten astronomers that he 
hoped would join the committee, Villard enthused about the project that they would 
shortly gather to evaluate, stating: "I am sure the view is shared by many that Project 
"Needles" represents one of the most important developments in the communications 
field which has come to hand in recent years." He closed with a promise that participation 
on the committee would yield “an interesting and rewarding experience.”195 
On April 14, 1960, after several months of collaboration, the SSB ad hoc 
committee on Project Needles met with representatives of the Lincoln Laboratory and 
liaisons from the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA), and NASA. The following day, the SSB committee issued a 
confidential report to the general board. In this report, committee members stated that 
they were “deeply disturbed by the project…because of what appears to be a serious 
threat to radio astronomy observations in the short-wave end of the radio spectrum.”196 
While the committee predicted that the test system as proposed should not adversely 
affect optical or radio astronomy in the long run, they anticipated that the success of a 
prototype would likely spur the United States and the Soviet Union to each establish its 
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own fully functional, denser, longer-lived set of dipole belts, thus crowding Earth orbit 
with reflective material.197 Should other nations follow suit in the future, the night sky 
could soon be replete with shimmery obstructions and errant radio signals, with dire, 
inescapable consequences for practitioners of radio and optical astronomy. 
The committee predicted widespread negative reaction to the proposed project 
among scientists from around the world, particularly if it continued to be conducted under 
a veil of secrecy. They recommended that the Air Force publicize some details of the 
classified test through a series of articles published in an open academic journal and by 
actively soliciting feedback from the international astronomy community. Most 
importantly, they stressed that the Lincoln Laboratory must ensure that all dipoles would 
safely reenter the atmosphere within two years so as to limit the duration of any 
unforeseen negative effects to observational astronomy that might arise from their 
presence in orbit.198 The committee also suggested that certain material details of the 
project should be communicated to the general public through international news media 
so as to ward off negative publicity. They contemplated possible reactions by everyday 
American citizens, including protests that the dipoles would cause climate changes, 
collide with spacecraft, or rain down on the heads of unsuspecting victims. While 
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acknowledging that falling copper space needles posed no real threat to individuals on the 
ground, the committee accounted for the possibility that some citizens might harbor fears 
of personal injury or property damage and blame the Air Force for unintentionally 
bombarding its own soil.199  Although several space artifacts had fallen back to Earth by 
the time of this report, none had been recovered as would happen with some regularity in 
subsequent years. The SSB committee’s prediction of fallout from falling space junk 
shows that even before the first highly publicized reentries of the long 1970s, fear about 
falling space junk among specialist and lay communities alike originated at a much 
earlier, much quieter moment.200 
The committee ended its report on an optimistic note. Although worried that the 
project might be seen as a unilateral military invasion of the new global resource of near-
Earth space, committee members suggested that such a blow might be tempered by 
emphasizing the system’s universal accessibility to scientists, governments, and the lay 
public. Scientists of any nationality could conceivably use the dipole belts, suggesting 
possible international relations benefits. Beyond its use as a military system, Project 
Needles might even yield public relations benefits as a tool for civilian space science 
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research.201 However, these suggestions did not negate the report’s overall 
recommendation that the Air Force put an end to Project Needles. The risks to optical and 
radio astronomy appeared too grave to outweigh the military need and minimal secondary 
benefits. 
After the completion and initial general board review of this report, committee 
astronomers including Fred Whipple of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 
demanded further analysis of the possible physical and material outcomes of the test 
project. Whipple had missed the April 14 meeting, and wrote urgently to Leo Goldberg, a 
prominent optical astronomer and chair of the SSB Committee on Astronomy, to inform 
him of Whipple’s misunderstanding of the planned altitude for the dipoles—rather than 
being satisfied that the dipoles would come down within the predicted two years, he now 
expected them to stay up forever, diffused into a cloud that would in time cover the 
whole sky.202 Over the following weeks, members of the committee prepared studies of 
expected interactions between Needles components and the near-Earth space 
environment, and how the physical properties of orbital space itself might affect the 
structural integrity and longevity of the dipoles, individually and in aggregate.  
Less than two months after the committee issued its first, explicitly negative set of 
recommendations regarding Project Needles, a second version of the report dated June 6, 
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1960 opened with a stark reversal. The introduction lauded the test project as an “exciting 
and interesting…opportunity for doing important basic research in several scientific 
fields.” The general recommendations of the previous report were preserved, including a 
call for radio frequency allocation for astronomy, declassification and publication of 
project details, and reassurances that an operational set of dipole belts would not be 
launched. However, the change in overarching sentiment about Project Needles in the 
report’s introduction from deeply wary to enthusiastic dramatically altered the overall 
thrust of the committee’s recommendations from discouragement to outright support.203 
Among members of the small committee, opinions on Project Needles ranged 
from ambivalence to outright dissent, a reality unchanged, if not worsened, in the 
intervening weeks between reports. The abrupt change of official position—from deep 
opposition to support—for the Needles project as a whole did not accurately reflect the 
convictions of the board membership in full. It did, however, comply with SSB Chairman 
Lloyd V. Berkner’s belief that SSB astronomers ought to work with Lincoln Laboratory 
to adjust the project so that it would not harm astronomy, rather than working against the 
Lincoln Laboratory (and its powerful military funders) in an attempt to cancel the project 
outright. Berkner, himself an ionospheric researcher, argued that taking a collegial 
position would “go much farther in safeguarding the unquestionable rights of 
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astronomers204.” Berkner brought several decades of experience in building relationships 
between the United States military and the nation’s scientists to bear in adopting a newly 
conciliatory approach.205 Berkner understood that the U. S. military would likely launch 
the experiment regardless of scientific dissent, given its potential importance to national 
security. Indeed, the Air Force had already set a date for a Needles launch in December 
of that year. The second ad hoc committee report reflects Berkner’s strategy of 
cooperation and critical support to ensure that astronomers would maintain some level of 
control over the parameters of the project.  
Adhering to the strategy meant expressing general support of Needles overall, 
alongside more detailed analyses of potential dangers that the experiment might pose and 
how best to avoid them. In addition to the newly added optimistic window dressings, the 
June report differs from the April report in the inclusion of overviews of the committee 
members’ studies of how the Needles belt might affect different areas of scientific 
research, as well as how the dipole package would impact, and be impacted by, the 
physical and material environment of Earth and near-Earth space.206 A brief study of how 
Project Needles might affect radio astronomy merited a separate appendix, and included 
projections of how the dipoles might be detected by radio sensors of different sizes and 
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sensitivity; these calculations were completed by John W. Findlay of the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), who would remain an active participant in 
international discussions of the project in the years to come. The committee predicted that 
radar research would likely not be impacted by Needles, and the dipole belt’s effects on 
optical observations would likely be variable—optical astronomers’ exposure times 
might be limited by an increase in background illumination caused by the belts, but 
auroral and air glow researchers could find the belt an interesting tool for studying 
atmospheric phenomena. Mercury spacecraft would not be threatened by the 
experimental belt, as the dipoles were expected to orbit at a much higher altitude than the 
first astronauts’ spacecraft; however, the NASA researcher who contributed the 
spacecraft collision analysis warned that future space stations and other high-flying 
spacecraft could be threatened by speedily orbiting dipoles should Needles remain aloft 
for a longer period than predicted. The committee’s analysis of the effects of the space 
environment on the dipoles themselves was sunnier: The report suggests that meteorites 
and micrometeorites would likely have negligible effects on the orientation of the 
needles, as would corpuscular radiation, sputtering, and Van Allen radiation. Solar 
radiation pressure, however, would likely reduce the perigee, or minimum altitude, of the 
dipoles’ orbit by 1000 kilometers per year, resulting in a 1.5 year orbital lifetime, a 
prediction that satisfied the committee’s demand that the belt come down within two 
years.207 
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The committee also evaluated the inverse of this environmental impact—noting 
not only the ways that the space environment might affect the dipoles but anticipating the 
ways in which Project Needles might alter Earth’s atmosphere and the near-Earth space 
environment. This attention to how human actions could transform space represented an 
early, novel shift in thinking about outer space: an explicit discussion of how 
technologies change the space environment. The committee predicted that the effects of 
decreased insolation—the obscuring of solar energy—would be insignificant because the 
belt would only occupy a sliver of space covering a tiny fraction of Earth’s total area. 
Ionization of the needles upon reentry would also likely have little to no effect upon the 
total composition of the atmosphere: The 70 to 75 pounds of dipoles that would fall back 
to Earth over the course of weeks or years paled in comparison to the 10,000 tons of 
micrometeorites that reenter each day at far greater velocity. In a subsection titled 
“contamination,” a group of four committee members suggested that the dipoles should 
not make any significant changes to the chemical composition of the nearest regions of 
space, given that the copper fibers would be essentially analogous to micrometeorite 
material. They warned that the naphthalene binder material used to package and dispense 
the dipoles would likely increase the amount of particulate matter at that altitude by 
“many orders of magnitude” with possible photochemical results visible to those with 
specialized equipment. However, they agreed that this effect would likely be short-lived, 
and negligible against a background of heavy emissions produced by as-yet hypothetical 
deep-space rockets or the thrusters of space probes.208 
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In a landmark statement in the conceptualization of near-Earth space as a 
vulnerable environment, the committee included a pointed statement about the likelihood 
of “future contamination of space” in the June 1960 report. In spite of the overarching 
recommendation that the project “should be done” as “a useful scientific experiment” that 
would not in and of itself obstruct research or destroy the physical and chemical 
environment in orbit, the committee issued a caveat. The committee evaluated the test 
system as presented by the Lincoln Laboratory. However, the ever-present specter of an 
operational system—denser, with a longer orbital lifetime, and possibly consisting of 
multiple belts— prevented committee members from issuing what might otherwise have 
been a net positive recommendation in favor of carrying out the test. This motivated the 
committee to issue a pointed statement about the likelihood of “future contamination of 
space” in the June 1960 revised report. Considering the possibility that, should Project 
Needles prove successful, dipole belts might become the wave of the future, the 
committee recommended that “the Board…consider whether it is desirable at this time to 
urge the formation, at the international level, of what might be termed a ‘Space Pollution 
Control Agency.’”209 Although such a formal group did not imminently form following 
the publication of this report, this suggestion not only constituted one of the earliest 
arguments for orbital preservation against pollutants. It also foreshadowed imminent 
attempts by astronomers in America and Europe to appoint themselves as international 
environmental watchdogs for outer space. 
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Not all astronomers on the ad hoc committee were in favor—or even aware of—
the change from condemnation to support in the June 6, 1960 revised report. Some 
appeared to be taken by surprise by the update. Fred Haddock, a radio astronomer serving 
on the ad hoc committee, sent an urgent Telex to chairman Villard claiming that he and 
the majority of other members of the committee strongly disagreed with the updated 
position and asking that the top-level recommendations revert back to the April 15 
version in which the committee refused to endorse Project Needles.210 Later that month 
the committee drafted a third revised report for distribution to the SSB membership. Its 
modified four-point position on Project Needles drew from both reports, and the overall 
conclusion on the advisability of the experiment split the difference between the outright 
condemnation of the April 15 version and the enthusiasm of the June 6 version. The first 
point concluded that the initial Needles experiment should not adversely affect any 
branch of science, followed by the caveat that any plans for an operational belt must 
protect the interests of astronomical research and “science in general.” The remaining 
points called for declassification and release of information through international 
channels, the establishment of globally protected frequency bands for radio astronomy, 
and the creation of a committee of radio astronomers who would serve as advisors to the 
Lincoln Laboratory to prevent interference to radio astronomy.211 
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A larger wave of dissent followed the delivery of this final version of the report to 
SSB Chair Berkner and its distribution to the general board. Optical astronomers in 
particular felt that their interests were inappropriately subsumed under the priorities of 
radio astronomers. Leo Goldberg voiced some of most strident disapproval within the 
SSB. While Goldberg did not serve on the ad hoc Needles committee, he conducted his 
own independent calculations predicting the nature and lifetime of the belt and went 
directly to Berkner to lodge his complaints. Goldberg argued that the committee’s report 
had underestimated the myriad possible damages that the belt could inflict on optical 
astronomy. He emphasized that the June 6 report that undergirded the final, cautiously 
positive SSB position on Needles relied on the calculations and opinions of two 
astronomers whose overall positive conclusions about the potential benefits of the dipole 
belt only served a small subset of optical researchers. Goldberg complained that the 
conclusions of two minority voices constituted “sheer nonsense as far as astronomers are 
concerned” and did not faithfully represent the position of the entire SSB.212  
Attempting to allay Goldberg’s concerns, Berkner reiterated his belief that a 
positive approach would yield the best results for astronomers as a larger group, 
supporting the conclusions and suggestions provided by the ad hoc committee and 
arguing that most dissent by general SSB membership stemmed from “unsubstantiated 
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fears of damage.”213 Since the participants in the ad hoc committee had carefully 
determined the first experiment to be unobtrusive to astronomy, Berkner argued that the 
burden of proof now shifted to those who disagreed with their collective conclusions. He 
suggested that, as part of his preferred positive approach, apprehensive astronomers in 
Goldberg’s camp should instead view Project Needles as a carefully controlled 
experiment that could enable the United States to test and define the safe limits of such a 
system and set international protocol to police those limits—before some other, 
unscrupulous country tried it first. Berkner called for an end to what he considered to be 
nothing more than bewildering “grumbling” by Needles dissenters, but hedged in his 
commitment to the final committee report by suggesting to Goldberg that the opposition 
engage in a “true scientific study”—whether or not said study would comply with the ad 
hoc committee’s positive recommendation or result in the cancellation of the project. 
Regardless of outcome such an endeavor, Berkner believed, would “go much farther in 
safeguarding the unquestionable rights of astronomers.”214 
While clearly irked by the accusation of baseless complaining, Goldberg agreed 
that a broader study ought to be arranged—though this would require declassifying 
sensitive information on Project Needles. Stating his doubt “that any single committee is 
capable of supplying all of the answers to a problem that has so many unknowns,” 
Goldberg called on the entire population of American astronomers to serve as watchdogs. 
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If Berkner wished the burden of proof to be placed on their shoulders, all relevant 
Needles data must be widely published in the open scientific literature and astronomers 
given enough time to evaluate every detail before a decision could be made on whether or 
not the Air Force should be allowed to launch the project. Otherwise, Goldberg argued, 
“astronomers have a right to grumble.”215 Berkner and Goldberg agreed that the time had 
come to publish the ad hoc committee’s studies and information on Needles in the open 
literature, in a journal that would be widely read by astronomers at home and abroad.216 
In the meantime, the Secretary of the SSB met with several Lincoln Laboratory 
officials—including Needles designer Morrow—to discuss the SSB’s position. They 
eventually agreed that a more established SSB Needles committee could be useful “not 
only in safeguarding the Needles experiment from unjustified criticism but also in 
keeping the Board informed of significant aspects which may affect areas of basic 
research as the Needles project develops.”217 The SSB disbanded the ad hoc Needles 
committee and organized a formal “watchdog” committee composed of three radio 
astronomers and one optical astronomer that would stand for the duration of the 
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project.218 This committee would serve as a liaison between the SSB general board and 
the Lincoln Laboratory, as well as an information conduit for members of the 
international radio and optical astronomy communities once the journal articles detailing 
Project Needles were published.219 The four astronomers came together in their new roles 
for the first time in August 1960. In preparation to present the project publicly to 
potentially hostile audiences, the Lincoln Laboratory changed the experiment’s name 
from Project Needles to the less-provocative “Project West Ford,” after the town in which 
the Lincoln Laboratory built one of the ground terminals to be used to communicate 
using the dipole belt.220 
Lincoln Laboratory staff and members of the SSB committee moved forward with 
a program of public information about the upcoming experiment. In September 1960, 
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Walter Morrow presented his brainchild to the general assembly of the International 
Union of Radio Science.221 Subsequently, researchers from the Lincoln Laboratory and 
the SSB published a series of papers in the April 1961 issue of the Astronomical Journal 
describing the projected properties of West Ford, though some details, such as the launch 
date and design of the dispenser mechanism, remained classified.222 The Astronomical 
Journal articles predicted dipole lifetimes of one to two years before reentry. Although 
they would be placed in a relatively high orbit, the low mass-to-area ratio of the dipoles 
meant that sunlight pressure would in theory bring them all down within five years at 
maximum. In his article, Morrow insisted that the ethereal dipoles—less than an inch 
long and thinner than a human hair—would cause only minor surface scratches in the 
highly unlikely event that any of them should collide with other objects in space.223  
Hoping that this unusually high level of transparency for a military project would 
foster good will, West Ford’s managers and the SSB West Ford Committee awaited 
response from the broader scientific community. 
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Figure 2.2: Several West Ford dipoles displayed against an unidentified finger for 
scale.224  
 
Expanding the Industrial Exosphere: West Ford and the Astronomers, 1961 
On October 22, 1961, a New York Times article conveyed a dire prediction by Dr. Harold 
Weaver, founder and director of the Radio Astronomy Laboratory at the University of 
California, Berkeley. Weaver did not mince words in criticizing Project West Ford. “This 
is a very bad omen for the future of astronomical research,” he prophesied. “It could 
mean the start of the demise of one branch of knowledge—astronomy.” Dr. Weaver’s 
opinion echoed that of a large number of optical and radio astronomers the world over 
who concurred with what they saw as, in Weaver’s play on Cold War political imagery, 
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the act of “drawing a copper curtain over the Earth.”225 The day before, the Air Force had 
made its first attempt to deploy Project West Ford.  
In the months between the publication of the special issue of the Astronomical 
Journal in April and the West Ford launch in October, similarly apocalyptic visions of 
the end of an ancient discipline reverberated in local and international presses, in 
epistolary exchanges between individual astronomers, and among memberships of 
national and international scientific organizations determined to put a stop to the Air 
Force’s space needles project—or at least delay it until they were satisfied that the project 
would be safe for astronomy in the present and into what many astronomers predicted 
would be an imminent revolutionary future. 
As one of the most prominent dissenters within the SSB, Leo Goldberg welcomed 
critique from a broadening scope of specialists from different astronomical disciplines, 
anticipating that the distribution of the heavy burden of proof assigned to him by Berkner 
across thousands of shoulders like Weaver’s would reinforce his position that West Ford 
should be prohibited. He bristled at the thought that the SSB had adorned West Ford with 
“a cloak of scientific respectability” in spite of the beliefs held by Goldberg and his 
optical astronomer associates that dipole belts would be “a menace to science.” In the 
interim between the final SSB report and the publication of the April 1961 Astronomical 
Journal, Goldberg issued a grave warning to Berkner on the likely outcome of the search 
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for proof outside the ranks of the SSB, noting: “The reaction from the scientific 
community we represent is sure to be adverse and angry.”226  
This prediction proved prescient. Almost immediately following the publication 
of the special issue of The Astronomical Journal, irate responses from astronomers began 
to roll in, both to the SSB and to the Lincoln Laboratory. The SSB general board’s 
imperative to publish details in a scientific journal yielded two concrete outcomes: 
Astronomers from around the world were indeed not adequately convinced that West 
Ford would not adversely affect their research; and the SSB ad hoc committee’s 
suggestion that transparency could yield international relations benefits proved almost 
comically over-optimistic. In the following months, individual astronomers and 
memberships of American and international scientific organizations united behind the 
collective opinion that the Air Force’s space needles project must be stopped, or at least 
delayed until those most likely to be impacted by the dipole belts were satisfied that the 
project would be entirely safe for current and future astronomical practices.227 
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In the second half of 1961, a flood of resolutions against the project issued forth 
from scientific organizations around the world. The International Union of Radio 
Science, the French and Belgian National Academies of Science, the Royal Astronomical 
Society, the American Astronomical Society, the Committee on Space Research of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions, and the International Astronomical Union 
(IAU) adopted resolutions against what the IAU unequivocally called the “contamination 
of space.” The IAU resolution framed orbital space as part of “Earth’s environment,” 
charging that no individual group or entity had the right to alter the conditions of what 
amounted to an international common pool resource without multilateral scientific 
consultation.228 The same organization would reiterate its resolution a year later, 
employing similar rhetoric, following the resumption of high-altitude nuclear tests on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain. Renowned American and European astronomers such as 
Fred Whipple, Jan Oort, Lyman Spitzer, and Bernard Lovell registered their concern 
about West Ford through correspondence with the Kennedy Administration, the SSB, and 
the popular presses of their respective countries.229 Many requested delays to the project 
so that apprehensive astronomers might better predict negative effects of the project and 
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suggest changes.230 The volume and intensity of these reactions prompted the Presidential 
Science Advisory Committee and the State Department to enter the fray in order to 
mediate the dispute, with one State Department official observing in private 
bewilderment: “Astronomers seem to be a remarkably noisy and parochial group!”231 
Astronomers had several reasons for raising their voices against West Ford in 
1961. One reason concerned the possibility that new types and quantities of industrial 
products and byproducts would further overtake and obscure the night sky, to an even 
greater extent than had already occurred over decades of burgeoning industrialization. 
Optical astronomers as a group were historically no strangers to environmental conflict, 
engaged as they were in what historian David Aubin has characterized as a century-long 
effort to preserve the skyward gaze in the face of instrument-disrupting vibrations and 
what we now call light pollution resulting from urbanization and industrialization.232 
Optical astronomers feared that the reflective dipoles could raise the brightness of the sky 
in a “Milky Way effect,” impeding their ability to obtain images of celestial objects even 
on the clearest nights.233 Radio astronomers, practitioners of a relatively new discipline 
operating at a wavelength unencumbered by the natural and artificial obscuring properties 
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of the atmosphere, struggled with a different kind of pollution—that of the radio 
spectrum. Radio astronomers had already begun to agitate for legal allocation of specific 
frequencies for observation—a proposed panacea that came up in many of the anti-West 
Ford resolutions.234 For radio astronomers, the dipoles could raise the background noise 
of the night sky, making it difficult to differentiate their objects of study from an excess 
of surrounding information. Worse yet, radio astronomers anticipated that a high volume 
of reflective copper could yield a spectacular rise in false signals, which might indicate 
the existence of a distant celestial object when in reality the signal came from a 
proximate anthropogenic object. A permanent, dense set of belts—ostensibly the end 
game of a successful Project West Ford in astronomers’ understanding—would 
drastically compound the concealing qualities of the industrial atmosphere with dire 
consequences for both extant forms of observational astronomy. 
Plans for new observational tools and practices that promised to revolutionize the 
discipline of astronomy as a whole were also at stake. At roughly the same time that the 
West Ford controversy raged, the initiative led by prominent American astrophysicist 
Lyman Spitzer to develop the first generation of Orbiting Astronomical Observatories to 
observe the cosmos in ultraviolet wavelengths began to gain favor within the ranks of the 
National Academy of Sciences.235 Spitzer led the American Astronomical Society in its 
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anti-West Ford resolution, which specifically condemned the project as a threat to 
orbiting space observatories scheduled to be operational within two to three years.236 The 
IAU resolution similarly emphasized the risk to future astronomical practices both 
anticipated and as yet undetermined, indicating an international expectation that 
collecting astronomical data from outer space would become an indispensible practice in 
the coming decades.237 
Aspiring space astronomers anticipated that space telescopes would open entire 
unseen parts of the electromagnetic spectrum that could not be observed from the ground, 
including light in gamma ray, X-ray, and ultraviolet wavelengths. At such an early stage 
of planning, advocates of space astronomy were unsure which orbital altitudes or 
inclinations different types of space observatories might occupy. Should the West Ford 
belt (or future West Ford-type belts) inhabit the same environs as a space telescope, the 
dipoles might collide with and damage the spacecraft. More importantly, some 
astronomers expressed concern about the high altitude of the proposed West Ford belt. At 
3600 kilometers above the ground, a cloud of dipoles would be above the supposed 
altitude limit for exoatmospheric nuclear weapons; but it could also effectively extend the 
obstructive effects of the atmosphere so high as to force future orbiting observatories to 
be launched to even higher—and thus more expensive and riskier—altitudes. Optical 
astronomer William Liller of the SSB West Ford committee, one of a small number of 
West Ford moderates in 1961, noted these concerns as his ultimate apprehension about 
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the project, warning that the opportunity to observe extremely faint objects from the 
unparalleled darkness above the atmosphere might be permanently destroyed by a fully 
functional dipole system.238 Astronomers opposed to West Ford anticipated the latest 
environmental threat to their practices in a new form of pollution made of a common 
industrial material, redolent of the changes that had plagued previous generations of their 
profession. However, unlike the Industrial Age atmosphere, the Space Age atmosphere 
could not be escaped by observing from an isolated, high-elevation location. Space Age 
industry would be truly global, and therefore unavoidable. These formal resolutions 
highlighted the possibility that the foreseen revolution in astronomy would die before it 
could take off. Given the highly charged anxiety about threats to both ground-based and 
space-based astronomy evidenced in these official collective pronouncements, it is 
perhaps no wonder that some astronomers believed West Ford to be, in the words of 
British astronomer Fred Hoyle, an “intellectual crime” committed by the United States 
government against science as a whole.239 
However, not all American astronomers were united in favor of space telescopes. 
In the midst of the post-war surge in federal funding for scientific research, a long-
standing rivalry between astronomers living in the American West and those living on the 
Eastern seaboard sparked anew. Many on the West Coast argued that federal funds 
allocated to a space telescope could be better spent building more telescopes in regions of 
the American west that had the high, dry conditions necessary for optical and radio 
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observation—known as “good seeing.” No big telescopes had been built on the east coast 
for decades, and some astronomers on the West coast claimed that the embrace of federal 
funding and plans for a space telescope among East coast astronomers was part of a plan 
to wrest power and capital from western research institutions, many of which continued 
to receive private funding. In 1963 Allan Sandage of the Palomar Observatory 
vehemently rejected calls by his East Coast colleagues for an orbiting observatory, 
calling support for such a project “space propaganda.”240 
However, even Sandage united with his east coast rivals and space telescope 
advocates in condemning West Ford. Irwin Shapiro, one of West Ford’s chief designers 
at the Lincoln Laboratory, recalls receiving a phone call from Sandage during which he 
argued that the artificial ionosphere was a conspiracy by East Coast astronomers to put 
West Coast astronomers—and their mountaintop observatories—out of business. Should 
the West Ford needles block the view from the ground, federally funded space telescopes 
would be the only legitimate sensors available to astronomers, and leadership in 
American astronomy would shift back east to space telescope control rooms in 
Washington. According to Sandage, his colleagues on the East Coast could even be 
conspiring with the Lincoln Laboratory to force this power shift, their protests a 
deliberate, Janus-faced act to obscure their true support for West Ford.241 In this mindset, 
a cloud of copper fibers in orbit would serve an insidious political purpose beyond those 
stated by the American military, promoting a shift in the power hierarchy of American 
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astronomy. Whether for or against space telescopes, many American astronomers 
expected West Ford to change their professional lives for the worse. 
Western astronomers who opposed West Ford in its design phases expressed their 
dissent as self-defense against a looming disciplinary crisis over which they appeared to 
have little authority or sway. Unsurprisingly, the reaction of Soviet scientists revealed 
similar resistance. Academician Mstislav Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences, wrote a letter to the president of the American National Academy of Sciences 
that took the language of space contamination perpetuated in other anti-West Ford 
pronouncements a step further, admonishing what he called a precedent that could lead to 
“serious pollution of space near the Earth.”242 These rhetorical characterizations of outer 
space as an environment at risk in late 1961 mirror the language of the lab—“pollution” 
and “contamination” reflect multiple, context-bound connotations. However, the choice 
of these words in particular would later serve a different purpose in the hands of the 
mainstream press in America and overseas under a different cultural context. For the time 
being, most popular newspapers across the world that picked up the story in 1961 focused 
on astronomers’ disciplinary complaints, the growing number of American government 
and diplomatic mediators brought into the fray, and the inflammatory response of Soviet 
presses to what they characterized as unacceptable military activity in orbit. For the time 
being, the potential destruction of a site of real or imagined scientific practice represented 
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a compelling enough story to transmit to lay audiences in media markets from Brussels to 
Bombay. 
Days in advance of the classified launch date, John Findlay of the SSB West Ford 
committee visited Europe in an attempt to gauge the general feelings about the project 
among astronomers across the Atlantic. After discussing the expected properties of the 
belt and its estimated lifetime, Findlay reported back to the SSB that the majority of 
British astronomers that he met were in agreement that the impact of the project as 
proposed on radio and optical astronomy would be negligible. He noted that the biggest 
concern among astronomers continued to be a long orbital lifetime for the dipoles and 
future dense belts. Findlay concluded that the best solution to allay these concerns would 
be to conduct the experiment and solicit in situ test feedback from the larger international 
scientific community.243 
The Air Force moved ahead with the launch on the strength of Findlay’s 
recommendation and the advice of the Presidential Science Advisory Committee’s panel 
on Project West Ford.244 A West Ford package launched on October 21, 1961, 
piggybacked atop an Atlas-Agena expendable rocket alongside a classified military 
reconnaissance satellite.245 However, the dispenser mechanism failed to operate as 
designed, emitting clumps of dipoles in nonfunctional clusters. The SSB distributed data 
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on the failure of the project, and the expected orbital properties of the dipole clumps, 
although neither the Lincoln Laboratory nor outside astronomers could establish visual or 
radio contact with the deployed objects.246  
West Ford appeared to be only temporarily grounded by this setback. The Air 
Force immediately began working on a new dispenser that would not only disperse the 
dipoles as directed, but would incorporate concerned astronomers’ requests that the 
mechanism be activated manually by a signal from the ground rather than deploy 
automatically. With these modifications, the dipoles would only dispense if the package 
reached a “resonant” orbit—one that ensured that solar pressure would force the dipoles 
to reenter the atmosphere after a short orbital lifetime.247 To all outward appearances, the 
Air Force and Lincoln Laboratory had catered to astronomers’ demands, altering the 
West Ford mission accordingly in the lead up to a second launch attempt. 
 However, a new wave of controversy would surround West Ford before and after 
this second launch. A pronounced shift in worldwide popular media coverage of the 
second West Ford attempt took radio and optical astronomers’ 1961 resolutions and 
refashioned their invocations of celestial contamination in proto-environmentalist terms. 
By referring to the dipoles as invisible waste, these journalists rendered the threat 
identified by astronomers recognizable to a broad lay audience increasingly aware of, and 
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concerned about, local terrestrial pollution. The “space pollution” feared by some 
astronomers in 1961 represented a new kind of hidden environmental hazard imposed by 
the United States government, military, and industry upon a nonconsenting society. In 
newspapers and radio programs, dipoles fit neatly alongside chemical pesticides and 
nuclear fallout into an increasingly publicly maligned category of invisible dangers to life 
and property. Rather than an esoteric threat to astronomers’ present and future practices, 
the real threat of West Ford transformed in the hands of mainstream journalists and 
newspapers editors into a global environmental crisis with moral ramifications for all 
humankind. 
Litterbugging Space: West Ford and Emerging Environmentalism, 1963 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union resumed conducting atmospheric nuclear 
tests after a brief moratorium collapsed in 1961. The 1962 American exoatmospheric 
nuclear test codenamed Starfish Prime exploded at an altitude of 400 kilometers, well 
beyond the 100-kilometer high Karman line widely, if unofficially, considered to be the 
boundary between the terrestrial atmosphere and outer space. Not only did Starfish Prime 
disable radio and television systems 700 miles away in Hawaii; it also damaged or 
permanently disabled eight of the twenty-four active communications satellites in orbit at 
the time of detonation. The groundbreaking, iconic telecommunications satellite Telstar 
eventually went silent due to the Starfish Prime blast. The grave results of this test meant 
that the conditions that initially suggested using a field of passive reflectors for a nuclear-
proof military communications backup in 1962 had become even more serious, and 
justified the need for a second West Ford test. 
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The Air Force moved forward with plans for a second launch in late 1962. As 
urged by the SSB committee, details of changes to the experiment were released to 
astronomers, largely through the SSB committee and major scientific unions. By this 
time, many individual astronomers who had once protested the project as dangerous and 
shortsighted had tempered their tone. In early May of 1962, the IAU committee on West 
Ford overwhelmingly voted to stand down. After further study of the first test launch, and 
continuing research on the effects of reflective satellites on astronomical research, 
members of the committee were satisfied that the test project itself would not pose an 
immediate threat to optical or radio astronomy. They were also encouraged by ongoing 
communication from the Air Force and the Presidential Science Advisory Committee 
about changes to the payload that would safeguard against a long orbital lifetime for the 
dipoles, such as the inclusion of a device that would only deploy the dispenser upon a 
signal from the ground, thus assuring that the dipoles would not dispense unless they had 
reached the correct orbit from which they would decay on the proposed 2-year schedule. 
The IAU as a group elected to adopt a wait-and-see approach to West Ford and agreed to 
conduct tests on the belt should the second launch attempt succeed, and committed to 
sharing collected data with the Lincoln Laboratory and the SSB after the dipoles 
deployed.248 
However, some individual astronomers, particularly in the United Kingdom, 
remained vocal in their opposition. British radio astronomers, who saw themselves as 
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leaders in their nascent field, were notably vociferous.249 A few short months after 
publishing multiple journal articles criticizing Soviet and American high-altitude nuclear 
tests, the newly knighted radio astronomer Bernard Lovell once again loudly voiced 
opposition to what he saw as the “unforgiveable contamination of space.”250 When asked 
about his opinion towards West Ford in the intervening time between the 1961 failed 
launch and the anticipated second attempt, Lovell stated: “My attitude to this experiment 
has not changed one scrap. I deplore it.”251 He interpreted the test as a unilateral incursion 
into space by the United States military without adequate consultation with the 
international astronomical community—an opinion shared by Lovell’s British comrades 
in radio astronomy but not the majority of astronomers represented by the IAU who had 
reacted favorably to the information shared by the SSB before and after the first launch. 
Lovell and his allies dominated press coverage of the second West Ford launch attempt. 
While the 1961 launch had spurred a flurry of press critical of the project’s potential 
impact on astronomy research—an issue of romantic if not urgent interest to 
nonspecialists—the imminent second launch transformed in the hands of a vocal minority 
of astronomers and mainstream journalists into much larger problems of appropriate 
consultation, consent, and contamination of a delicate natural environment.  
The minority opinion that the Air Force had insufficiently solicited astronomers’ 
advice about space pollution resonated with an international mainstream population 
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increasingly aware of invisible contamination of ecosystems and bodies. The “almost 
invisible” needles that had caused such uproar among scientists in the preceding years 
corresponded with growing cultural anxiety about unseen pollutants following the 
publication of Rachel Carson’s bestselling book Silent Spring during the 1962 leadup to 
the planned second launch.252 Popular outrage over nuclear fallout increased in the United 
States and abroad as atmospheric nuclear tests resumed following the end of a short 
moratorium. 1962 saw the highest number of nuclear weapons tests in history, including 
several record-breaking high altitude and exoatmospheric tests that damaged active 
satellites and generated new global fallout patterns.253 With the increasing regularity of 
nuclear detonations and evidence of radiation sickness in those proximate to weapons 
tests, anxiety over nuclear fallout—a largely invisible, insidious bodily threat—had 
already worked its way into American popular consciousness and culture. Themes of 
bodily contamination from an unseen source, imposed upon millions of people who had 
not sanctioned or consented to its use, showed up in a wide array of popular media from 
movies to novels.254 
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 In Silent Spring, Rachel Carson used nuclear fallout as a clarifying metaphor to 
reify the invisible threat of chemical pesticides to a general readership.255 As this 
groundbreaking book rose to cultural currency, fallout and pesticides together came to 
serve as a convenient referent for any unseen military or industrial threat—space 
experiments included. Political cartoons satirically featuring umbrellas as protection 
against nuclear fallout and copper space needles alike suggest continuity between popular 
responses to the atmospheric nuclear tests of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the 
specter of mismanagement of near-Earth space. Through the symbol of an umbrella as 
meager localized shelter, these images illustrated the futility of individual defense against 
the global actions of a faceless military-industrial complex that appeared to operate 
against the moral guidance of scientists and the consent of citizens. The ascendance of 
Silent Spring between the two West Ford missions likely eased the way for a shift in 
journalistic focus during the second launch.256 
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Figure 2.3: Political cartoons about nuclear fallout (left) and West Ford (right) both use 
an umbrella to signify the futility of resistance against global-scale military pollution. 257 
 
Unlike Cold War physicists, whom Ron Doel and Alison Kraft have described as 
taking on “outsider” roles to combat the moral and environmental impacts of nuclear 
weapons in the mid-1950s, astronomers at first did not deliberately attempt to translate 
their political concerns into moral imperatives that would resonate with environmentally 
aware lay communities.258 While they might not have explicitly agitated for the 
environmental protection of outer space in their exchanges with popular media outlets, 
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American astronomers serving on the SSB internally expressed firm belief in the great 
esteem in which the lay public held scientists in general, and astronomers in particular—
especially in the Soviet Union, where the SSB West Ford committee claimed that 
astronomy has “great stature in the public mind.” These astronomers suggested that a lay 
populace would side with rebelling astronomers, even if it did not fully understand the 
purpose of their protest.259 The language of their concern about correct and conservative 
activities in space found traction with journalists and newspaper editors across the world. 
The cultural archetype of the moral American scientist as celebrated by Rachel Carson 
clashed with shifting postwar public opinions about the integrity of physical scientists; 
however, astronomers actively fashioned a professional identity entirely separate from 
their physicist counterparts.260 Conflated with growing public awareness of invisible 
large-scale contamination and backlash against unilateral military action on Earth and 
beyond, astronomers’ words against Project West Ford—processed through the writings 
of mainstream journalists—provided damning arguments against the Air Force in foreign 
and domestic popular presses.261 
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When the Air Force launched a second West Ford package on May 8, 1963, the 
dipoles successfully dispersed into a single polar-orbiting belt. The SSB West Ford 
Committee solicited feedback from interested astronomers about whether or not they had 
been able to detect any of the dipoles, or whether the experiment had negatively affected 
their research.262 When the Air Force announced the launch, this particular detail of 
information sharing went unremarked in mainstream news reports. Instead, a firestorm of 
criticism surrounded the announcement, with some American and European newspaper 
editorials arguing that the United States military had willfully ignored the advice of 
morally engaged, environmentally conscious astronomers to cancel the launch.263  
The Soviet government saw this clash as an opportunity. Academician Keldysh, 
who had called West Ford “unscientific” in 1961, saw his criticism amplified by the more 
famous and charismatic voice of cosmonaut Gherman Titov, the second person to orbit 
the Earth. Titov publicly lambasted the experiment as a subversive capitalist act of 
sabotage against progress and science—a cynical attempt by “American monopolists” to 
wrest access to Earth orbit from superior Soviet engineers. He suggested that the 
American government would rather use copper needles to make space impassable—a 
place where no man, including an American, could go—than allow cosmonauts to claim 
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near-Earth space for Communism.264 The ongoing, highly publicized international 
condemnation of West Ford sparked terse interactions between the United States and 
foreign delegations at the United Nations, and led American Ambassador Adlai 
Stevenson to go before the UN General Assembly less than a month after the second 
launch to defend the United States’ decision to move forward with the test.265 
While some news items of this period mention astronomers’ concerns about their 
research, the majority of critical articles and editorials from 1963 represent scientific 
dissent to West Ford as more concerned with preventing the “serious pollution” in space 
predicted by Academician Keldysh two years prior.266 One such editorial, published in the 
New York Times on the day of the second launch and cited by newspapers across the 
world, declared “there is no United States right unilaterally to make changes in the space 
environment of this planet.” The editorial does not mention the change in IAU policy 
regarding West Ford, arguing instead that the project had not received sufficient scientific 
vetting.267 This editorial and many more of its kind published worldwide characterized 
West Ford within the same military lineage as Rachel Carson’s chemical pesticides and 
the high-altitude nuclear tests that created new radiation belts and threatened the bodies 
of non-consenting citizens below. Each of these developments came about with the 
assurances of an unreliable government public relations machine that they would be safe; 
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and each came to be seen as the potential source of unintended, catastrophic 
environmental change. In these critical articles, West Ford set a “dangerous precedent” 
by allowing the American military to embark on unilateral activity in space.268 Should 
projects like West Ford continue unchecked, these journalists argued that the United 
States government would proceed with unmitigated power. The military could 
subsequently unleash forces of environmental destruction that would go beyond the 
dramatic spectacle of nuclear bombs. Though West Ford involved relatively mundane 
copper filaments they, like fallout, could quickly and easily prove a destructive problem 
too difficult to solve. 
This journalistic narrative of local and global pollution from West Ford 
supplanted astronomers’ disciplinary anxieties as the primary focus of popular news 
outlets. Whereas articles on West Ford at the time of the first launch took a neutral 
position on the project, focusing mainly on the existential crisis anticipated by 
astronomers, by the time the second launch attempt came around, American and foreign 
newspapers referred to the project as “rubbish,” “litter” and “cluttering;” the dispersal of 
dipoles as “dumping” in space.269 An editorial in the Providence Rhode Island Journal 
accused the Air Force of “litterbugging the sky” and the San Francisco Chronicle issued 
a jeremiad mourning a “space environment cluttered with litter.”270 
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Many popular news reports of West Ford clung to the “needle” pejorative in 
describing waste that was not only dangerous in aggregate, but individually perilous, 
imbued with a sharp shape with commonplace analogs familiar from suburban mothers’ 
sewing kits—a pollutant more easily visualized than the contemporary invisible menaces 
of pesticides and nuclear fallout.271 Tiny copper filaments in space might not otherwise 
seem like much of an environmental threat on the ground. Translating the shape of the 
project rendered the dipoles material and therefore more easily comprehended by a range 
of non-scientist audiences. Although the Lincoln Lab attempted to comply with the 
SSB’s suggestion of a thorough public information campaign three years prior, the series 
of press releases distributed in advance of each launch apparently did not ward off all 
fears of the dipoles coming home to roost. For instance, a columnist with a local British 
paper pondered if metallic debris recovered from his neighborhood cabbage gardens 
might have fallen from space, and invited anyone with relevant expertise to examine and 
authenticate the artifacts.272  
In contrast, Lincoln Laboratory staff sought to use the same material attributes of 
the dipoles to combat their portrayal in the popular press as environmental pollutants. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, John Kessler of the Lincoln Laboratory Office of the Director 
circulated samples of the dipoles to American journalists, foreign diplomats, and others 
who might help change the mainstream conversation about West Ford. Packets of dipoles 
that could be seen and handled directly confirmed their minute size, familiar composition, 
and apparent harmlessness. Unlike chemical pesticides or nuclear fallout, a person could 
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safely and repeatedly encounter a copper dipole. The dipoles themselves resembled fine 
hair, lending them natural, almost human qualities. Kessler’s attempts to solicit a kinder, 
gentler name and material identity for the project found little official or popular traction 
in the spring of 1963.273 
Those who directly worked on the design of Project West Ford had an entirely 
different view of the same minute copper fibers. Rather than penetrating needles, 
nonthreatening “fluff,” or careless cosmic clutter, these individuals perceived the West 
Ford dipoles as innovative space technology, individually and collectively. In the words 
of one West Ford engineer, each dipole represented a discrete spacecraft—performing a 
defined function in the space environment for which it was designed. From this 
perspective, those who worked on Project West Ford had the distinction of designing and 
manufacturing the largest number of satellites in orbit, a record that they still hold.274 Yet 
another community interpreted the dipoles differently: Amateur radio operators expressed 
interest in using the open-access dipole belt for long-distance transmissions—a hallmark 
of prestige for many ham radio enthusiasts. Although the high-powered transmitters 
needed to utilize the dipoles presented a cost obstacle to most operators, at least one 
active amateur community in the United Kingdom enthusiastically solicited data on the 
West Ford belt from Lincoln Laboratory and celebrated the 1963 launch as a boon to 
																																								 																				
273 J. A. Kessler to Watson Davis, Director Science Service, May 22, 1963, History of West Ford, 
MITLL. Oswald F. Schuette to J. A. Kessler, May 20, 1963, History of West Ford, MITLL; 
Barbara Tufty to J. A. Kessler, May 27, 1963, History of West Ford, MITLL. 
274 Charles W. Perkins, in conversation with the author, January 17 2010. 
		
126 
radio research.275 The interpretive flexibility surrounding the design of communications 
satellites at the time of West Ford’s genesis persisted even as active satellites settled into 
the current standard form by the mid-1960s. Questions of interpretation in play in 1963 
concerned not what a communications satellite should be, but rather, what constituted a 
functional satellite and what constituted dangerous space debris. Even a minute, hairlike 
copper fiber, when placed in orbit and the subject of intense, worldwide public debate 
over its safety, could be categorized anywhere within a range of ontological possibilities 
that depended on the political, institutional, and disciplinary location of the interpreter. 
In summary, during the months leading up to the first, failed attempt to launch 
West Ford into orbit, astronomers expressed their concern in terms of disciplinary crisis. 
Fearing the loss of their contemporary and anticipated future observational practices, 
West Ford detractors spoke out through professional society resolutions and direct 
correspondence with the Space Science Board and the Lincoln Laboratory, and in doing 
so instigated a discourse of contamination and environmental risk that would eventually 
prove both volatile and enduring. As the second, successful launch attempt neared, fewer 
astronomers raised their voices in dissent. However, a vocal minority upheld the original 
collective complaint and, in some cases, amplified their disapproval to a fever pitch—one 
American astronomer likened non-action on West Ford by the IAU to Chamberlain’s 
policy of appeasement towards Hitler during World War II, and anticipated an inevitable 
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build up of space garbage that would soon make the dipoles look trivial by comparison.276 
In transmitting their disapproval to the public, these lingering dissidents found purchase 
for their case within a burgeoning, proto-environmentalist ethos spreading throughout the 
world in the years immediately following the publication of Silent Spring. By changing 
the terms of the debate to resonate with emerging mainstream environmental values, 
popular news writers brought the West Ford controversy into view of a broader public 
that had begun to pay attention to and challenge the hegemony of the military-industrial-
academic complex of Cold War America. The allegorical umbrella, already opened 
against nuclear fallout and the chemical industries, pointed spaceward to the as-yet 
unknown consequences of the military’s latest attempt to alter Earth’s natural 
environment. 
West Ford’s Legacy 
One week after the second launch, West Ford operators successfully transmitted teletype 
and voice data between the two terminals located in Massachusetts and California. 
Meanwhile, the SSB West Ford committee solicited observational data from optical and 
radio astronomers provided with the proper ephemerides to test the belt’s reflectivity. In a 
special issue of the Proceedings of the IEEE published in 1964, Lincoln Laboratory and 
SSB scientists announced their conclusion that, as originally predicted, the West Ford 
dipoles had not caused any significant interference to radio or optical astronomy. The 
internationally organized Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) agreed with this 
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conclusion.277 The practice of astronomy would continue unchecked, the anticipated 
space telescopes safe from heavenly needles. However, the preservationist arguments 
initially employed by astronomers and reinterpreted by journalists in the public fight 
against West Ford yielded concrete political outcomes that extended beyond the lifetime 
of the project itself. When the UN Outer Space Treaty entered into force in 1967, it 
included a provision requiring full international consultation prior to any activities that 
might lead to “harmful contamination” of space, emphasizing that scientists must be 
made aware of the “nature, conduct, locations, and results of such activities.”278 As a 
growing club of spacefaring and aspiring spacefaring nations negotiated a new model of 
international governance for outer space, astronomers successfully ensured that the final 
frontier would also be a site of scientific moral authority. 
Additionally, the controversy surrounding West Ford led to the creation of a new 
working group within COSPAR dedicated to vetting the safety of scientific research in 
outer space. COSPAR formed in 1958, the same year that the dipole scatter model was 
initially proposed at the Lincoln Laboratory and the Department of Defense conducted 
the first high-altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear tests. COSPAR established the 
Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments in 1962, in 
direct response to calls from astronomers to protect the space environment from further 
experiments like West Ford.279 This group would eventually transform into what is now 
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the Panel on Potentially Environmentally Detrimental Activities in Space (PEDAS). 
PEDAS provides a forum for COSPAR members to discuss matters relating to the 
creation and mitigation of orbital debris and the environmental impact of space 
technologies, both in space and within the atmosphere.280 
In an undated press release following the successful second launch, Lincoln 
Laboratory referred to the “practical objective” of the project as a test to determine if the 
orbiting dipole scatter communications model could be instituted without damage to 
science or space activities.281 In retrospect, project managers have represented West Ford 
as a feasible method of testing the resilience of the space environment, in particular 
whether solar radiation and the Earth’s outer atmosphere could be relied upon to remove 
objects of a certain mass-to-area ratio.282 Lincoln Laboratory saw this objective as having 
been perfectly fulfilled, in addition to more widely broadcast mission objectives. West 
Ford enabled cheap, reliable, easily accessible radio communications between two points 
using a scattering medium in orbit, without the obstruction to optical and radio astronomy 
predicted by its fiercest opponents. By these measures, West Ford was a resounding 
success. 
And yet, the Air Force terminated West Ford eight months after its successful 
second deployment, and a fully operational system was never implemented. Depending 
on the source, the reason for this concurrent success and failure could have been the more 
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general trend in space communications toward active satellites rather than passive 
reflectors, as suggested in a 1989 Lincoln Laboratory retrospective.283 The Partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty of October 1963 outlawing the testing of atomic weaponry in the 
atmosphere and in outer space may have lessened the urgency for such a system.284 Or, as 
suggested in a 1966 report by astrophysicist Irwin Shapiro of the Lincoln Laboratory, the 
project may have been doomed by little more than a bad reputation. Claiming that all the 
dipoles had reentered, with the exception of a few that would fall to Earth within two 
years, Shapiro lamented the end of West Ford, saying:   
 
Our gratification at having seen experimental results in agreement with 
predictions is tempered by the realization that little can be done to clear the 
clouded reputation of Project West Ford. For, as was observed long ago, the 
(alleged) evil that projects do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their 
bones. So let it be with West Ford.285  
 
In Shapiro’s eulogy, the experimental success of dipole scatter communications, and 
confirmation of his theory of the decaying effect of sunlight pressure on low mass-to-area 
																																								 																				
283 Ward and Floyd, “Thirty Years of Research and Development in Space Communications at 
Lincoln Laboratory.” 
284 For an overview of the context and negotiation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, see Richard 
Dean Burns and Joseph M. Siracusa, A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, 
Strategy, and Politics (Oxford: Praeger, 2013). 
285 Shapiro, “Last of the West Ford Dipoles,” 154. 
		
131 
space objects, had been sunk under a reactionary rhetoric of astronomy-killing needles, 
heavenly litter, and invisible environmental pollution.286 
Shapiro’s claim that all West Ford dipoles had reentered turned out to be 
premature: Ground-based space surveillance sensors have identified and currently track 
several clumps of needles from both West Ford launches that remain in orbit—and these 
represent only those clusters large enough to be detected from the ground.287 Individual 
needles themselves may in fact remain in orbit, “almost invisible” indeed to current space 
surveillance technology that cannot easily detect objects of such small size.288 Shapiro 
was perhaps right to mourn a bad reputation, however. In 1985, journalists and orbital 
dynamics researchers claimed that a clump of dipoles collided with the PAGEOS 1 
geodesy satellite in 1975.289  However, the fragments of PAGEOS and West Ford occupy 
similar orbital paths and have occasionally been mixed up and cross-tagged in the 
cataloging process, such that blame for the incident remains disputed.290 Two of the 
greatest fears of West Ford’s opponents—a long orbital lifetime of fibers from the test 
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and a threat to spacecraft—have at least partly come to pass. The negative reputation the 
test acquired in the early 1960s persists into the present, as evidenced by the 2012 IMAX 
film Space Junk 3D, in which the filmmakers feature a bundle of “West Ford Needles” 
among common sources of small space debris such as microchips and screws shed from 
orbiting satellites and rocket bodies.291 In 2013, on the fiftieth anniversary of the second, 
successful West Ford launch, several American news outlets published retrospectives on 
the project, some of which characterized the dipole scatter model as part of a poorly 
planned and poorly executed scheme to put a Saturn-like ring around the Earth. An echo 
of Shapiro’s lament appears to have lingered decades beyond the functional lifetime and 
popular memory of the test itself.292 
While the project did not impede ground-based observing as some astronomers 
feared, the concerns of would-be space astronomers about West Ford’s effects on their 
future practices turned out to be well founded. Optical and radio astronomers spoke out 
against the contamination of outer space, which has become, as advocates of the first 
space telescopes predicted, a crucial site of astronomical practice in certain wavelengths. 
The remnants of West Ford that continue to circle the planet form part of an ever-
growing body of speeding orbital debris that indeed threatens space observatories. In 
2012, operators of the Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope executed a risky maneuver to 
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nudge the spacecraft out of the intersecting path of a defunct Soviet-era satellite.293 The 
Hubble Space Telescope has been bombarded by micrometeoroids and human-made 
debris over its quarter century in orbit. A small object punched a hole in one of Hubble’s 
antennas, through which the tube of the telescope can be clearly discerned in 
photographs.294 The Hubble Wide-Field Planetary Camera 2, retrieved from orbit by 
astronauts during the final repair mission in 2009 and placed on exhibit at the 
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in 2014, sports a radiator cover that 
resembles a giant slice of Swiss cheese.295 Although none of these impacts or close calls 
ultimately impeded telescope operation, they provide material evidence of the 
environmental conditions anticipated by astronomers and journalists fifty years earlier 
during the first debates over what space policy analysts now call the sustainable use of 
outer space.296 
This first recognition of near-Earth space as a pollutable environment connected 
what many communities might have otherwise dismissed as a remote, invisible void to 
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terrestrial environments susceptible to destruction by human activity. The debate over 
Project West Ford gave rise to a new but persistent perception of outer space as an 
environment at risk, in need of international safekeeping. It also situated scientists—
astronomers in particular—as the appropriate stewards to provide the necessary 
environmental oversight. The breadth and legacy of the West Ford controversy reveals an 
expansive transnational consciousness of pollution in outer space during the early years 
of both the Space Age and mainstream environmentalism. A ring of minute, mundane 
metal fibers brought lasting worldwide attention to a strange, illegible natural 
environment that rapidly came to be understood as fragile and worthy of protection. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“Terror in the Skies:” Falling Space Junk, Space Weather, and International 
Environmental Liability During the Long 1970s 
 
Cows Over Cuba 
On Sunday, December 4, 1960, approximately 300 protesters, six cows, and one bull 
paraded past the United States Embassy in Havana in the first government-organized 
rally since Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s ascent to power. The assembled humans 
chanted anti-American slogans and demanded that the United States cease its imperialist 
assault on Cuban sovereignty. The cows wore sandwich board-style placards painted with 
messages such as “We condemn the use of atomic arms to kill defenseless cows” and 
“Killing cows will not stop our revolution.”297 American newspapers reported that the 
rally lasted about forty-five minutes, and that the bovine contingent left the ground in 
front of the embassy “thoroughly soiled.”298 
 Four days earlier, on November 30, the United States Navy launched a Thor 
rocket from Cape Canaveral, Florida. It carried three satellites destined for orbit around 
the planet. Following an anomaly at the end of the flight, the range safety officer sent a 
self-destruct signal that destroyed the rocket and its payload. However, several large 
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fragments survived the explosion and fell through the atmosphere back to Earth.299 The 
Cuban government broadcasted reports of shrapnel raining from the sky, striking and 
killing an unlucky cow in Oriente Province. American sources claimed that the cow had 
merely been injured.300 In the weeks that followed, the U.S. Department of State agreed to 
pay the Cuban government damages to the tune of two million dollars—quite a lot of 
money to replace a cow. This inspired critics to call the event “the Cuban Cash Cow” and 
the “herd shot round the world.”301 Castro threatened to hand the rocket fragments over to 
the Kremlin for intelligence use.302 The cow is said to have received a state burial.303 
 The destroyed spacecraft did not contain nuclear weapons or radioactive material. 
However, the protesters denounced what they believed to be an act of nuclear aggression 
by Cuba’s neighboring superpower, in this case destroying a living symbol of pastoral 
domesticity. Radioactive or not, falling pieces of space hardware materialized a pervasive 
form of Cold War nuclear anxiety in an increasingly volatile region. The rocket shards 
delivered fiery, indiscriminate destruction from the sky, sent by a foreign enemy but—
depending on the politics of the observer—without the malicious intent behind a nuclear 
warhead. Whether the cow lived, died, was slightly injured, or never existed in the first 
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place, the event came to worldwide public attention as one of the first of a new kind of 
envirotechnical disaster that would test emergent space liability law.304 It heralded an era 
in which the geophysical forces that draw space artifacts back to Earth from orbit—in an 
event known as “reentry”—would come under international scrutiny as geopolitical 
actors. Scientific understanding of the physical topography of near-Earth space 
transformed as in situ data from satellites and the uncontrolled movement of 
anthropogenic objects revealed a near-Earth environment that was as active and resilient. 
Near-Earth space could heal itself of human interventions as thoroughly as could the 
terrestrial ecosystems that the burgeoning mainstream environmentalist movement sought 
to protect. During the long 1970s several reentry events collapsed geography and brought 
geographically and politically disparate states into unexpected, sometimes dangerous, 
often contentious proximity. During this critical time period, the orbital environment 
itself became a culpable, uncooperative actor in the legal and environmental history of an 
increasingly messy, increasingly global Space Age. 
The passage of the first international space treaties in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, particularly the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, established a common legal language to 
support the transnational governance of a global environment. However, 91 nations, 
representing a plethora of languages, cultures, and legal traditions, initially signed a 
treaty meant to govern a remote, illegible ecosystem that followed its own set of arcane, 
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strict laws. In such a messy mix, the issue of responsibility—in the legal language of the 
United Nations, the issue of fault—became even more contingent and controversial than 
the concept of utility at play during the years of West Ford and Echo. Even the addition 
of the more explicit and expansive Liability Convention of 1972 could not, in advance, 
fully articulate the complexities of damages wrought by objects passing through, and 
coming back to Earth from, outer space. This fraught scaffolding of outer space 
governance was put to the test during the long 1970s, when a confluence of natural and 
social factors brought about an unprecedented rate of reentry of large space artifacts—
including some that did in fact contain radioactive materials.305 These reentries forced all 
Outer Space Treaty signatory nations, spacefaring and non-spacefaring alike, to consider 
who should be at fault for nuclear damage, not through human intent but via the vagaries 
of the geophysical world. During the long 1970s, questions of how to ascribe culpability 
to states and the natural world came to the forefront of international political debate when 
the sky began to fall. 
Controlling the Reentry Message 
In the years before the first spate of large reentries, NASA officials sought to keep 
information about reentering debris as unpublicized as possible—even within the lower 
ranks of the NASA bureaucracy and among space technology contractors.306 In 1964, 
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NASA policy regarding the agency’s response to inquiries about potential or actual land 
impact by space fragments required a great deal of evasion. A confidential memo 
distributed among top NASA officials offered stock responses that personnel should use 
to address hypothetical public inquiries about the threat of falling debris. The memo 
instructed officials to dismiss the possible endangerment of human life from reentering 
hardware fragments as “remote” and “conjectural,” and to actively restrict any public 
discussion of reported debris impacts before the country of origin could be identified.307 
NASA responded to inquiries from citizens that claimed to have found space hardware 
with a standardized form requesting more information about the landing site, object, and 
conditions of observation. NASA would arrange to retrieve such objects in the event that 
the information provided by the individual citizen on the form suggested that the 
fragment might yield “some scientific or technological value”—a euphemistic way of 
denoting the intelligence value of recovered space hardware, which could be exploited to 
learn about Soviet engineering and manufacturing.308 
By 1966, following the recovery that year of several pieces of reentered American 
hardware from the Rio Negro district of Brazil, Apollo program administrators suggested 
developing a public information plan.309 However, the internal debate within NASA over 
the benefits and dangers of public education about falling space debris continued into the 
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1970s. A classified 1972 NASA Office of Policy Analysis memo reveals that some in the 
administration harbored “questions of morality”—specifically whether or not NASA was 
justified in taking the chance that someone might someday be hit by a piece of one of the 
ever growing number of satellites that would eventually fall to Earth, while NASA also 
withheld information about this danger from the public. The memo suggests that, by 
providing useful, modernizing services to the nation and world, NASA had “assumed the 
moral right to impose that incremental risk on society.”310 However, recent milestones in 
national and international policy tempered this recommendation. The 1970 enactment of 
the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) indicated that the United States 
federal government had begun to take certain environmentalist priorities seriously. 
Additionally, the 1971 Liability Convention clarified extant rules of responsibility for 
damage caused by space artifacts in the UN Outer Space Treaty, meaning that any future 
reentries would be subject to stricter rules and recourse procedures than had previously 
been in force. Given these recent changes to relevant environmental and space policy, the 
same memo predicts widespread political fallout—especially among an increasingly 
environmentally conscious American public and international diplomatic networks—
should space debris cause bodily harm to people or animals, or contaminate the soil, 
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water, or atmosphere.311 By this time, NASA policy explicitly stated that the movement 
of fragments from orbit to Earth endangered the “quality of the human environment” as 
set forth in NEPA, and officials began developing an official national policy on the 
matter of reentry control and public awareness.312 
The Sky is Falling: Space Junk Comes Back to Earth 
“What goes up must come down”—an adage used to describe everything from fly balls to 
the stock exchange—also applies to objects that humankind sends into orbit. In his 
famous cannon thought experiment, Isaac Newton described what would happen to a 
projectile shot with enough velocity to “escape” the invisible forces that would otherwise 
bring the projectile back to the ground. A cannonball that reaches this velocity continues 
to be gravitationally attracted towards the massive planet Earth. However, with no land 
below to stop it, and therefore no way to land, the projectile will continue to plummet in a 
path around the planet—a perpetual free fall known as orbiting.313 Unless the object gains 
enough velocity to escape from Earth’s gravitational field and move into interplanetary 
space, gravity continually pulls the object into this cycle of free fall. 
 What goes up can stay up—but only temporarily. 
 All objects that human beings have launched into orbit will one day come back 
down to Earth. When they return depends on a combination of factors including the mass 
and area of the object, and external conditions including altitude, atmospheric density, 
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and solar activity. The higher an object orbits, the thinner the atmospheric density—and 
therefore the fewer particles to impart drag upon the object. The orbital altitude directly 
correlates to the length of time it takes for an object to fall back into the atmosphere—in 
the parlance of orbital mechanics, for its orbit to decay. Some objects’ orbits decay at 
rates so slow as to defy geological scale. Objects in orbits higher than 1,000 kilometers 
will take centuries to reenter, and objects in geosynchronous orbit 35,786 kilometers 
above the ground will take millennia to decay.314 Unless humankind moves elsewhere 
into the cosmos, or devises a way to bring high altitude objects back to Earth, the orbital 
lifetimes of these artifacts will far outlast the human species and the majority of the 
changes it has wrought on the geophysical world. 
 However, the vast majority of anthropogenic hardware and debris orbit at lower 
altitudes, where the atmosphere (although thin) still exerts significant drag. Objects in 
low-Earth orbit reenter on shorter time scales. Subjected to punishing friction and heat-
generating air pressure as it moves through denser and denser layers of the atmosphere, 
any object—natural or human-made—begins to fall apart. Most objects that fall through 
the atmosphere without special heat shielding either dissipate entirely or break into 
fragments that fall into the oceans that cover the vast majority of the planet. NASA, the 
North American Air Defense Command (now the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command, or NORAD), and the international mainstream media have long represented 
marine disposal or atmospheric absorption of reentering artifacts as ideal outcomes, 
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portraying these global terrestrial environments as consequence-free sinks for space 
debris.315 
 However, on occasion, as in Havana, a piece of space junk will hit terra firma, 
spurring political, diplomatic, financial, and environmental complications. The 
repercussions of such events do not remain localized at the landing site, but also among a 
range of geographically dispersed state actors and international organizations with legal, 
financial, or political stakes in the outcome of a real or potential space junk disaster. The 
physical properties of the most valuable orbits (and the geographical orientation of launch 
sites required to send satellites to these orbits using minimal resources) often result in 
uncontrolled space junk landing far from the state of origin, often in regions of the Global 
South.316 The first few such reentries included the Cuban cow incident and the survival of 
several large pieces of American space hardware retrieved from South Africa following 
John Glenn’s historic orbital spaceflight a year and a half later. Following these events, 
many more state parties than the Cold Warring superpowers became invested in securing 
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a guarantee of recourse in the event that a piece of falling space junk should strike 
sovereign ground. 
 The advent of the satellite age was inextricably entwined with the development of 
the intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. These missiles descended from V-2 
missiles designed by German engineers and built by prison camp labor during World War 
II. At the end of the conflict, the Soviet Union and United States scrambled to claim both 
rocket technologies and rocket specialists from Germany in order to build their own 
rocket programs—a clandestine expertise grab known in the United States as Operation 
Paperclip.317 When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into space aboard an R-7 rocket—
the world’s first operational ICBM in one of its first successful flights—the nation 
demonstrated its powerful, unprecedented ability to access outer space. It also signaled to 
the rest of the world that the Soviet Union was ahead of everyone in ICBM technology, 
suggesting that a Soviet missile could, in the near future, deliver nuclear weapons nearly 
anywhere in the world at the push of a button.318 Soon, the militaries of both superpower 
nations developed and maintained arsenals of ICBMs for use in spaceflight, and in 
anticipation of warfare. 
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 The ICBM marked a sea change in munitions technology, shrinking the spatial 
and temporal scope of warfare. Whereas before the development of the ICBM a large-
scale attack would have required mobilization of forces and implementation of invasion 
and withdrawal strategy, a single disposable long-range missile with a warhead could 
cross the globe in minutes. Even the relatively recent advances in long-range bomber 
technology appeared to be destined for imminent obsolescence, replaced by a quicker (if 
initially less accurate) delivery system that did not rely on an onboard human pilot for 
success.319  Warfare became truly global when ICBMs shortened geographical distance 
and facilitated the ability to launch quick retaliation in case of attack—a major lynchpin 
upholding the Cold War version of the global military strategy known as mutually 
assured destruction.320 
 As an integral part of large-scale weapons systems, ICBMs enabled the controlled 
delivery of destructive materials from the sky above the intended target. As launch 
vehicles for non-armament space technology, these rockets facilitated a similar 
outcome—without the control and, in many cases, the synchronicity typified by advanced 
nuclear ICBMs. Even in the absence of a warhead, ICBMs made it possible for a nation 
to drop dangerous projectiles onto faraway lands without intent, control, or accuracy, as 
illustrated by the fate of the hapless Cuban cow.321 In the first decades in which ICBMs 
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were used to launch spacecraft, both expired satellites and pieces of these rockets fell 
from orbit, generating different kinds of threats to both the state in which the fragments 
landed and the launching state. Beyond the physical danger of high-speed objects falling 
from high altitudes, if any fragments were to survive the fall they could be used as 
valuable currency in the intelligence community on either side of the Iron Curtain. 
Should fragments land in enemy territory, or in a region within a particular sphere of 
influence, that fragment could be recovered, examined, and exploited by hostile operators 
and used against the launching state. The ICBM thus facilitated an expansion of the 
material and virtual scope of space technology, but also a new way to gather information 
about the technical knowledge of the enemy’s space industry.322 As much as these 
technologies collapsed time and space by delivering bombs and then spacecraft further 
and more quickly than previously imaginable, the unprecedented mobility of byproducts 
and wastes of the space industry confirmed that the Cold War Space Race had become a 
truly global phenomenon.323 
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Stormy Space Weather: Solar Maximum in the Space Age 
In early October 1957, as the rest of the world reacted to the stunning launch of the first 
artificial satellite by the Soviet Union atop a modified ICBM, physicists at the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment (RAE) found themselves deeply enthralled by the motion of 
Sputnik’s rocket core as it tumbled through space. RAE physicists’ research revealed that 
atmospheric particles exerted drag on moving objects at unexpected altitudes, causing its 
orbit to “decay,” or dwindle in altitude. The group of RAE physicists who would soon 
come to self-identify as “orbital analysts” tracked the motion of the rocket core over the 
course of its eight weeks in orbit to reveal entirely new information about the wind 
currents and density of the upper atmosphere.324 This early orbital research, conducted 
using the rocket core as a scientific instrument, changed contemporary understanding of 
the orbital environment that would continue to shift as humankind sent greater numbers 
of artifacts into orbit around the planet.325 
This research, as well as newly acquired data about the regions just beyond 
Earth’s atmosphere, shattered physicists’ previous perception that a “vast region of 
emptiness” enveloped our isolated planet.326 Within five years after the launch of Sputnik, 
a rapidly coalescing international community of space scientists discovered a complex 
topography of magnetism, radiation, energy, dust, and transiting plasmas, alongside 
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atmospheric and trapped solar particles extending tens of thousands of kilometers from 
Earth’s atmosphere into space. Although the effects of sunspots on terrestrial systems had 
been a subject of formal study since the mid-19th century, the discovery of a web of 
magnetic and radiation fields above the atmosphere pointed to the likelihood that Earth’s 
geophysical influence extended far further into space than previously imagined.327 The 
Sun did not exert its influence upon a wholly passive third planet. Almost overnight Earth 
had become a power player in a physically and materially interactive solar system.328 
As the space age progressed, evidence of Sun-Earth interactions manifested most 
spectacularly within the region of near-Earth space into which humankind sent its first 
technological envoys. The Sun entered solar maximum—the active peak of its roughly 
eleven-year-long solar cycle—three times between the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the 
mid-1980s.329 During solar maximum, the Sun’s energy output increases to its highest 
levels. Ultraviolet emissions increase by more than a factor of two, heating the Earth’s 
atmosphere and causing it to expand several hundred kilometers further into outer 
space.330 The first solar maximum of the Space Age peaked in early 1958, when only five 
artificial satellites circled the globe. Over the course of the next two solar cycles, 
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spacefaring nations accelerated the manufacture of the satellite infrastructure and the 
concurrent production of space junk. At the time of the solar maximum of 1968-1970 and 
the following solar maximum of 1978-1982, humankind had launched several thousand 
anthropogenic objects into orbit, including both satellites and the uncontrolled detritus of 
this construction project.331 
 
Figure 3.1: The blue area graph illustrates the number of uncontrolled, non-deliberate, 
“natural” reentries of payloads and empty rocket stages. The red line graph shows the 
mean number of sunspots per year after Sputnik, with peaks denoting solar maxima. A 
clear correlation exists between periods of high solar activity and the orbital decay of 
space debris.332  
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The second and third Space Age solar maxima demonstrated what happens to 
objects orbiting at low altitudes during periods of stormy space weather: As the layer of 
the atmosphere known as the thermosphere expands due to ultraviolet heating, 
atmospheric particles extend further into space and exert drag on a broader subsection of 
orbiting artifacts, causing their orbits to decay, or decrease in altitude. Eventually, gravity 
takes hold and the object falls back to Earth through the punishing friction and pressure 
of the upper atmosphere. This cyclical expansion and contraction of the atmosphere acts 
as a self-cleaning mechanism, sweeping lower orbital altitudes clear of uncontrolled junk. 
Like terrestrial ecosystems, the near-Earth space environment demonstrated mechanisms 
of natural resilience that are both shaped by and resist the effects of anthropogenic 
activity.333 The effects of these first Space Age solar maxima on early space hardware 
reinforced Cold War physicists’ claims of an interactive solar system and confirmed that 
Earth’s environment did not stop at an arbitrary layer of the atmosphere. 
The combination of turbulent solar activity and the steadily increasing number of 
satellites sent into space during the long 1970s resulted in some of the biggest pieces of 
orbital debris to return to Earth. Of the sixteen most massive artifacts to reenter the 
atmosphere from space since 1957, ten fell to Earth during the period of time from 1969 
																																								 																				
333 In 2012, a group of chemists argued that reentries were on the decline, citing increasing 
inefficiency of this self-cleaning mechanism due to anthropogenic climate change causing the 
thermosphere to contract. This research provides contemporary evidence of the interconnectivity 
of Earth and orbital ecosystems, and that the boundary between Earth and outer space is a social 
construct. J. T. Emmert et al., “Observations of Increasing Carbon Dioxide Concentration in 
Earth’s Thermosphere,” Nature Geoscience 5, no. 12 (December 2012): 868–71. 
		
151 
to 1984.334 This included the fall of the Cosmos 954 satellite over a remote part of Canada 
in 1978 and the infamous 1979 reentry of the American space station Skylab over rural 
Australia. Both events received significant attention in the international press. They 
mobilized both state space programs and State departments to determine the best way to 
reduce risk from falling objects. They also sought ways to appropriately inform a general 
public, which reacted along a spectrum of responses ranging from terror to macabre 
acceptance of an inevitably falling sky. 
In addition to an increasing number and size of reentering artifacts, many of the 
artifacts themselves had changed in a significant way by the 1970s. Starting in 1965 the 
Soviet Union and the United States began installing nuclear power devices on 
spacecraft—and continue to do so today, especially on deep space probes. These ranged 
from simple generators that draw heat energy from the decay of a radioactive isotope to 
small nuclear generators deriving power from enriched uranium, the latter being more 
common on Soviet era satellites.335 Since then, several nuclear-powered satellites have 
slipped beyond the control of their human operators and fallen to Earth with their 
generators intact. Nearly all of them have disappeared from view, either in the 
atmosphere or in water. However, in 1978, a nuclear powered satellite fell to solid 
ground, with local and international ramifications that would reverberate well after the 
end of the Cold War conflict that bore it into space. While this was neither the first nor 
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the last of what I call “nuclear reentries,” a confluence of material, legal, and ecological 
factors amplified the ways in which this particular kind of accident uniquely reified and 
materialized extant nuclear anxiety in the midst of the Cold War arms race. 
The Nuclear Reentry of Cosmos 954 
In September 1977, the Soviet Union launched an ocean reconnaissance satellite named 
Cosmos 954 into orbit. By December of that year, the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command noticed that the satellite had begun to behave erratically, indicating 
that it was no longer under control. American intelligence efforts suggested that the 
Cosmos satellites drew power from onboard nuclear reactors. Whether this particular 
satellite contained a reactor (and if so what kind of reactor), and what kind of emergency 
failsafes Soviet satellite engineers might have installed, could only be extrapolated from 
older data. Should a live reactor fall into a populated area, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency could not fully predict the extent or scale of potential damage. When briefed on 
the issue, some senior American government officials even wondered if the satellite 
might detonate upon impact like a nuclear weapon.336 
When pressed in secret, the recalcitrant Soviet government provided few details 
beyond admitting that the satellite contained a reactor fueled by uranium-235. The 
Kremlin insisted that the reactor core would not go critical upon reentry—that it had been 
designed to fully disintegrate and dissipate into the upper atmosphere. They allowed the 
faint possibility that pieces of the satellite might survive, arguing that any fragments 
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would fall in a localized area and therefore pose no risk to communities or environments 
below following “limited usual measures of cleaning up”—a confusing suggestion given 
that the impact of a nuclear powered spacecraft on land had no precedent, and therefore 
no “usual measures” existed. American trackers predicted that Cosmos would fall 
somewhere over North America, but could give no more specifics about the margin of 
impact. Under cover of secrecy, the United States government informed allies who might 
be affected by the reentry, especially the Canadian government. None of the notified 
nations chose to inform their citizenry of the potential threat. 337 
In the early morning of January 24, 1978, Mounties and night janitors in the 
Northwest Territories of Canada reported seeing a bright meteor falling over the Great 
Slave Lake in the vicinity of Yellowknife.338 Other eyewitnesses determined that some 
pieces of the satellite had survived and landed in a stretch of mostly frozen tundra in a 
region commonly known as “the Barren Lands” or simply “the Barrens”—a region that 
exemplified the definition of wilderness put forth in the American 1964 Wilderness Act: 
“a place where man himself is but a visitor.”339 First responders remarked that only those 
hardy individuals seeking a return to nature braved the elements of the Barrens. 
Subsequent reports characterized the region as “a most inhospitable place…where flora 
and fauna must be tough to survive.”340 In January 1978, the landscape of the Barrens 
appeared uniformly white under a thick, impenetrable cover of snow and ice—
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inhospitable, tough, and yet potentially endangered by a nuclear reactor inadvertently 
dropped from above by a foreign, hostile government. 
A coalition of American and Canadian nuclear experts and intelligence personnel 
scrambled an ad hoc search and containment project code-named Project Morning Light. 
After eight and a half months of careful work, often under survival conditions, the 
Morning Light team recovered approximately 65 kilograms of debris from a well-defined 
600-kilometer path across Great Slave Lake and its vicinity. All but two of the hundreds 
of pieces of collected debris turned out to be radioactive. The rest of the massive satellite 
dissipated in the upper atmosphere as predicted by the Soviet engineers. The falling 
debris didn’t hit any people or animals, and nobody witnessed the impact, but six 
naturalists that stumbled upon one of the largest pieces of debris were promptly 
evacuated and eventually given a clean bill of health. The more difficult task lay in 
determining what to do about the dispersal of tiny particulate nuclear fuel over a 100,000 
square kilometer area. Some of these particles reached Alberta and Saskatchewan, as well 
as regions where the 1978 Arctic Winter Games were shortly to be held. Particulate 
nuclear material posed a significant risk to humans through inhalation or digestion, either 
directly or by consumption of contaminated flora or fauna. However, after chemical 
testing revealed the particles to be insoluble, Morning Light managers concluded that no 
more needed to be done; the particulate matter would be absorbed in lakebeds and 
permafrost, where the isotopes would decay in safety, peace, and isolation.341 Those 
responsible for cleanup assigned the harsh arctic environment itself a crucial role in the 
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cleanup. After two search phases to account for the spring thaw, Operation Morning 
Light ended on October 14, 1978. The American and Canadian teams dispersed, satisfied 
that they had returned the Great Slave Lake area to an adequate semblance of its pre-
Cosmos state of nature.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: A radioactive particle shed during the Kosmos 954 crash, next to a penny for 
scale. 
 
 Once word got out about the accident after the fact, the details dominated 
mainstream international news for several days. Because it had already happened and was 
not an impending threat, updates in the American press quickly tapered off as news about 
the Panama Canal, Anwar Sadat, and welfare reform reclaimed center stage. Reactions 
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among lay citizens in America and Canada varied. A Canadian government official 
assured a group of 250 concerned Inuit that they were in no danger of ingesting 
contaminated caribou meat.342 American editorials lauded the quick work of the 
international response team, reserving their most pointed critique for the sloppy, nuclear-
happy Soviet space program—conveniently neglecting to mention the radioisotope 
thermal generators regularly used by NASA. Soviet news outlets accused the “bourgeois 
press” of embellishment, comparing Cosmos 954 favorably to American nuclear weapons 
accidents on its own soil.343 Of course, a few public reactions by civilian observers 
reflected greater alarm.344 The back cover copy of a journalist’s memoir of the cleanup 
effort published immediately afterward compared the Cosmos 954 reentry to “all our 
nightmarish memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”345 For the most part, those who 
responded publicly about the accident expressed relief that it had happened in a place 
seemingly devoid of life—human or otherwise.346 
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In the months after Cosmos 954’s plunge, several space objects fell to Earth. 
Many made American news in advance—to the public puzzlement of at least one NASA 
spokesperson who noted that space junk had been falling for years with similar non-
outcomes, and nobody had said a word.347 This public performance of openness and 
surprise obscured decades of classified NASA policy on containing and concealing 
instances of reentering debris and the potential for damage at the site of impact. Private 
citizens were actively aware of reentering space junk before the rash of late 1970s 
reentries, most notably members of the Smithsonian-sponsored Operation Moonwatch.348 
Moonwatch enlisted amateur astronomers to track satellites as well as participate in what 
the Smithsonian called “death watches”—tracking falling debris and aiding in the 
recovery of fragments that survived.349 By the late 1960s, reentering space junk became 
the star of major novels and films. The Michael Crichton novel The Andromeda Strain, 
published in 1969 and adapted into a film of the same name in 1971, features a fallen 
satellite that has transported a deadly microorganism to a small American town, where 
officials must contain it before it decimates the entirety of human civilization.350 The 
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groundbreaking 1968 horror film Night of the Living Dead portrays a group of civilian 
and military bureaucrats arguing over whether radiation from a destroyed space probe 
should be publicly held responsible for an epidemic of reanimated corpses.351  
Ground Testing Liability  
The Cosmos 954 incident briefly influenced broader nuclear negotiations between the 
Cold War superpowers. On January 30, 1978, President Jimmy Carter held a press 
conference in which he praised the United States’ cooperation with Canada in the 
Cosmos 954 tracking and cleanup efforts. In his remarks, Carter called for the Soviet 
Union to join the United States in a bilateral ban on nuclear powered spacecraft, citing 
the newly demonstrated threat of damage by reentry accidents.352 The Soviet government 
roundly rejected this call, as did American space scientists and engineers who understood 
the utility of nuclear energy on spacecraft with certain energy requirements, or those that 
cannot use solar energy efficiently due to distance from the sun and other physical 
obstacles.353 However, at the international level, the United Nations created a space 
nuclear power working group within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in the 
summer of 1978.  
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By 1979, the Canadian government put the United Nations’ relatively new rules 
on space liability to the test for the very first time.354 Recalling the exorbitant payout of 
the Cuban Cash Cow, national liability in the case of damage by space junk, particularly 
between two opposite sides of an era-defining geopolitical divide, can be an extremely 
messy affair. On January 23 1979, exactly within the 1-year limit imposed by the 1972 
Liability Convention, Canada filed a claim against the Soviet Union for an amount of 
$6,041,174.70 to cover the cleanup expenses alone.355 The total costs of Operation 
Morning Light would climb to an excess of $14 million, but at the time of the claim 
deadline the full extent of damages were not yet fully known.356 The claim called for 
compensation of what the Canadian government had spent so far in order to return the 
affected region back to the condition in which it had been before the accident occurred—
the required outcome for efforts to rectify reentry damage stipulated in the Liability 
Convention. The Canadian government argued that the introduction of radioactive debris 
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into the Barrens rendered a part of Canadian territory unfit for use, which qualified as 
“damage to property” in the Convention.357  
As part of this claim, two members of the Dene nation submitted affidavits 
speaking to the particular utility of the environment in which the Cosmos satellite fell. 
Georges Erasmus, president of the Dene Nation of the Northwest Territories, contributed 
sworn testimony in which he expressed deep concern that the radioactive effects of the 
debris field, as yet unknown, could “cause injury to the Dene and their way of life.” 
Erasmus described meetings held among the Dene in which many citizens worried about 
the uncertainty of contamination even after the cleanup—that fishing and hunting, as well 
as water and land use, could be negatively affected for years.358 John Marlowe, also of the 
Dene Nation, obliquely suggested in his affidavit that the cleanup effort might not have 
taken place with the best interests of First Nations at heart. In relaying his memories of 
the reentry, Marlowe recalls that the “army” came to clean up, and forced Dene residents 
to remain in their homes for a day and prevented them from visiting the lake for a week. 
Noting the importance of fishing in his family for winter subsistence, Marlowe related his 
habit of visiting his lake fishing nets every two days, yielding over ten trout and whitefish 
in each haul. During the period of cleanup, no Dene residents of nearby Snowdrift could 
procure food, even as Marlowe claims they found pieces of satellite debris in town.359 
Erasmus concluded his testimony by noting that the Dene “fish and trap in almost every 
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square mile of [the] area” in which the debris landed, concluding that “therefore, there is 
no place where the debris fell which is not used by the Dene.”360 
Indeed, an official with the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board concurred in 
separate testimony that radioactive particles had been found in Snowdrift and other 
nearby towns, supporting the concerns put forth by Dene citizens.361 In spite of this 
supporting evidence from local communities, the idea of utility was just one point of 
translation difficulty that had plagued the UN space treaties for decades. For example, the 
French term “responsibilité” contains the English meanings of both  “responsibility” and 
“liability”—very different concepts, particularly in a case like the Cosmos 954 crash in 
which one of the responsible parties was not human, but rather the natural environment of 
near-Earth space that brought the satellite down in the first place.362 The translation was 
not just linguistic, but also cultural: In the case of the Northwest Territories, the damaged 
“property” amounted to a seemingly empty snowscape described by its own citizens as 
barren, lifeless, and inhospitable—arguably a perfect picture of uselessness, even as 
defined by a defendant nation that governed vast areas marked by similarly extreme 
arctic conditions. Soviet representatives noted that the small debris had been determined 
by the claimants themselves to not be a threat to the environment or bodies of humans or 
animals in the region. The large pieces of radioactive debris represented the only real 
sources of damage subject to liability, and those had been safely contained and removed 
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from the environment by the time the Canadian government filed its claim with the 
United Nations.  
 In a chapter titled ““When Satellites Fall: On the Trails of Cosmos 954 and USA 
193,” in Down to Earth: Satellite Technologies, Industries, and Cultures, cultural theorist 
Lisa Parks argues that Soviet officials pushed back against Canada’s claim by stating that 
Cosmos 954 had, upon reentry, ceased to be a Soviet satellite. Parks contends that the 
Kremlin took the official position that Cosmos 954 had transformed into an assortment of 
undifferentiated metals and substances and, since this diffuse conglomeration could no 
longer perform the functions of a satellite, it could therefore not be held to the absolute 
terms of the Liability Convention.363 This argument suggests that Soviet legal officials 
imbued the borderlands between Earth and outer space with unique powers of ontological 
transformation. However, the earliest international space law, which predates Cosmos 
954 by fifteen years, declares that passage through the atmosphere does not negate basic 
liability for damage caused by space objects.  
After over two years of wrangling with these translational issues, the Soviet 
Union relinquished a tidy and even settlement of $3 million, which the Canadian 
government accepted.364 This was the first, and to date the only invocation of the Liability 
Convention by two signatory nations. Canada would go on to play a leading role in 
subsequent international negotiations of nuclear space power source regulation. These 
negotiations snowballed into a decades-long debate in the United Nations as space 
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industries developed, evaluated, and adopted new power technologies for rockets, probes, 
and satellites, and as nuclear energy crises unfolded on the Earth below.365 
While Canada was the third nation to launch an artificial satellite into outer space, 
it did not have its own launching capabilities and relied on an alliance with America as its 
launching state. The encounter with hazardous fallen space debris forced the Canadian 
government into the combative aspects of the Space Race without warning, on the side of 
its neighbor and ally. The legal fight over the remains of Cosmos 954 highlighted the 
necessity of further elaboration and codification of an expansive definition of space 
debris at the international level. Beginning in the 1980s, most state space programs, the 
United Nations, and international space policy organizations issued formal statements 
defining “fragments” of space technologies as falling within the legal realm of space 
debris. This strengthened the legal foundation of space liability law should a future piece 
of falling space debris cause similar sparring as occurred over Cosmos 954. 
Cosmos 954 was not the first object to reenter the atmosphere. It was not the first 
piece of space junk to hit land, nor was it the first radioactive artifact to fall from orbit. 
However, it was the first of this kind of phenomenon to happen at the exact confluence of 
circumstances to create a minor maelstrom: the right space weather, the right antagonists, 
the right material attributes (i.e. nuclear), and the right location—just safe enough to be a 
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test and not a conflict. The Great Slave Lake area where the visible debris landed 
occupied a perfect sliver of Western cultural space between empty wasteland and Fragile 
Arctic at a time when such liminal spaces were only beginning to become visible and 
precious to mainstream communities around the world.366 By 1978, a broad Western 
public was already aware of the potential dangers of nuclear energy production, and as 
influential space law scholar Eileen Galloway put it at the time, these dangers would soon 
provide a dependable source of international momentum towards environmental 
protection in cases of nuclear reentry.367  Galloway maintained that a mainstream 
international public had grown increasingly acclimated to the burgeoning discourses of 
environmentalism, grounded in early resistance to invisible contamination forced upon a 
non-consenting society by faceless authoritarians. She anticipated that from that point 
forward an educated populace would demand to be made aware of the sources of said 
contamination, whether within the atmosphere or hundreds of kilometers overhead.368 
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 While the social and political ramifications of a nuclear reactor-powered satellite 
crash-landing on solid ground may have been unprecedented, at the atmospheric level the 
Cosmos 954 accident barely left a mark. If the United States Department of Energy had 
not detected unique aerosol signatures of 90% enriched uranium-235 in stratospheric 
samples gathered in the months following reentry, the existence of fissile material from 
the satellite would have been all but invisible against the mixing and remixing of over 
thirty years of atmospheric nuclear fallout from weapons tests.369 Like the caribou that 
could have transported uranium across the tundra and into human bodies, the biological, 
geochemical, and geophysical world played an incontrovertible role in rendering 
humankind’s nuclear presence into a uniform continuum from underground to outer 
space. 
Skylab Falling 
Mere days after Cosmos 954 fell from the sky, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Patsy Mink sent a letter to NASA 
Administrator Robert Frosch. Mink noted that the recent impact of the nuclear satellite 
had brought the hazards of satellite reentry to the attention of the international press—
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which had recently switched its focus to another potential reentry disaster. This time, the 
feared object contained no nuclear fuel, but was several times more massive than Cosmos 
954, and American in origin. The American space station, Skylab, had been drifting in 
orbit for some time since its last crew of astronauts departed in 1974. Mink related a deep 
concern about what might happen if NASA did not interfere: “It is said that about 50 tons 
of metal can be expected to survive the Skylab reentry and impact the earth’s surface. 
This appears to represent a substantial hazard to life.” Fearing the potential international 
implications and detrimental effect on US foreign policy, Mink concluded by offering the 
services of her office to NASA in devising both a plan to avoid catastrophe and to 
address the seemingly inevitable international pressure as Skylab’s orbit continued to 
decay.370 
 The 1979 reentry of Skylab inspired worldwide space junk mania, and remains 
the best-known and most-repeated story of falling anthropogenic debris.371 Launched in 
May 1973, Skylab was America’s first space station—a spacecraft that remains in orbit 
for extended periods of time. It hosted three different mission crews from 1974 to 1975, 
who used Apollo-era spacecraft to arrive and depart from orbit. At the end of the first 
Skylab program, NASA developed intermediate plans to continue use of the space station 
in conjunction with the upcoming Space Shuttle program, which was then still in the 
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early design and study stage. However, two converging obstacles interfered with these 
plans—one social and one environmental.  
 As part of the complex, years-long series of deliberations and decisions that went 
into the construction of Skylab, engineers compromised on whether to include a rocket 
engine on the space station. Such an engine would enable astronauts or ground controllers 
to move the spacecraft to a different orbit or bring it back to Earth in a controlled fashion 
in the event of orbital decay or other incident; however, it would also require greater 
spending on this final application of the cash-strapped Apollo program. NASA 
researchers reasoned that a native engine would not be necessary, considering that a new 
spacecraft then under development could do the job just as well at no additional upfront 
cost.372 The Space Transportation System, of which the Space Shuttle program was to be 
the keystone technology, had been designed with the retrieval and rescue of satellites in 
mind as a primary mission. As NASA administrators and engineers struggled against 
ongoing design conflict, political gridlock, and budgetary overrun, the projected first 
launch of the Shuttle slipped until it became clear that the spacecraft would not fly until 
the early 1980s.373 Before returning the Earth, the final Skylab crew used the propulsion 
system of the Apollo command-service module, which was docked to the station, to 
carefully nudge the space station to a higher altitude. At such heights, NASA predicted 
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that Skylab would safely orbit for approximately ten years, until 1983, by which time 
NASA leadership pledged that the Shuttle program would be well underway.374 
 By whim of chance and nature, the Sun entered a period of solar maximum as the 
end of the decade neared, reaching its peak month of sunspot activity in December 
1979.375 Given the regularity of the solar cycle, NASA researchers and administrators 
anticipated that the increase in solar activity would likely affect the orbit of the dormant 
space station. However, the peak of the 21st solar cycle turned out to yield a stronger 
surge in sunspot activity than predicted by astronomers and accounted for by NASA in 
planning Skylab’s orbital lifetime. All objects in low-Earth orbit were affected by the 
expanded, denser veil of atmospheric particles, but Skylab was one of the most massive 
objects to succumb to the encroaching sky. By the middle of the decade, NASA and 
NOAA officials determined that the space station’s orbit had already begun a rapid decay 
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into the upper atmosphere, starting a downward plunge earlier than expected.376 Had the 
sun produced energy at average solar maximum levels, the space station likely would 
have remained aloft for the entirety of its initial ten-year predicted orbital lifetime, well 
beyond the Space Shuttle program’s first launch in April, 1981.  
 The physical realities of the stormy Solar Maximum meant that Skylab would 
reenter before a Shuttle orbiter—as well as the retrieval and repair spacecraft needed to 
rendezvous and capture the rapidly moving station—could be mobilized to boost it to a 
higher orbit. The space station would undergo an uncontrolled reentry—that is, ground 
controllers could not alter its orbit to ensure that it would fall over a specific part of the 
Earth below. As it stood, the combination of natural and social obstacles led NASA 
administrators to concede that Skylab would reenter the atmosphere anywhere from mid-
1979 to early 1980.377 
 The problems associated with uncontrolled reentry had concerned program 
officials before Skylab even reached orbit. In 1970, Skylab mission operators at the 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) circulated a memo noting the need to take the end of the 
space station’s life into account in the years leading up to its launch. Three years in 
advance of Skylab’s ascent to orbit, JSC commissioned a study of risks presented by 
reentering debris generated by the Skylab mission, and called for the creation of a public 
information plan to be released in the event that any such debris threatened populated 
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areas in the future.378 The report that resulted included the probability that each major 
component of the planned station might hit a human being on the ground upon reentry, 
focusing on objects massive enough to survive the fall more or less intact. The authors of 
the study calculated the likelihood of at least one human casualty resulting from the 
reentry of Skylab at 0.018—or, as one reviewer of the study scribbled in marginalia, one 
in 55.379 After detailing potential changes to the Skylab mission that could reduce the risk, 
the authors of the report concluded that these steps would only take place at great 
expense and could very well be technically unfeasible. They also noted a low likelihood 
that such labor and expense would be recouped in subsequent missions. They concluded 
with a set of simple recommendations for future large unshielded spacecraft that echoed 
NASA policy on reentry risk from the earliest days of the space program: 
 
We therefore recommend: That NASA accept the Skylab orbital debris risks. That 
NASA establish orbital debris criteria for future programs. These criteria, for 
example, may specify acceptable levels of risk and may require that the risks be 
assessed early in the programs.380 
 
Acting NASA Administrator George Low concurred with these conclusions. Upon 
assessing the report, Low relayed to his staff his decision that NASA should accept the 
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risk associated with reentering Skylab debris. He shifted responsibility for preparation for 
such an outcome from JSC to the NASA Office of Public Affairs and Office of 
International Affairs, from whom he requested a comprehensive plan for how to manage 
public information before reentry three months in advance of the Skylab launch.381 
 By the following year, however, as Space Shuttle engineers contemplated the 
survivability of the expendable external fuel tank—designed to be discarded over the 
ocean after each launch—Low reconsidered his stance. In calling for the establishment of 
predictive protocols to account for fragments of the ET that might survive the fall from 
orbit, a group of NASA technical officers advised Low that similar studies ought to be 
undertaken for objects of a certain size and mass that were either slated for launch or 
already in orbit. In addition to recommending that “all future flight projects…should take 
into account methods for defending against returning debris,” the group of technical 
officers also advised Low that the 1971 decision to accept the risk for orbital debris 
generated by Skylab could yield material hazards down the line.382 First among the “open 
issues” that concluded the official memorandum for the record on orbital debris was the 
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requirement that NASA take steps to notify an unidentified audience of the approximate 
time and location of space debris impact.383 
 NASA subsequently supported several studies intended to address the potential 
debris hazard from Skylab as a special case.384 From this initial effort, NASA researchers 
and administrators assembled criteria on risk, how to assess the odds of casualty, and 
reentry assessment protocols for all future massive spacecraft.385 While other large 
artifacts had reentered the atmosphere in the preceding two and a half decades, the size 
and inclination of Skylab’s orbit made it different. Researchers calculated that the total 
weight of Skylab debris that could be expected to survive reentry would likely equal the 
debris generated by the entirety of the Gemini and Apollo missions; additionally, Skylab 
would produce half the total fragments that either Gemini or Apollo flights produced in 
aggregate. However, the size and weight of Skylab fragments would vastly outweigh any 
single piece of Apollo or Gemini debris, and the inclination of Skylab’s orbit meant it 
covered a much broader area of the ground below. The orbits of the previous program 
spacecraft constrained the range of a potential debris impact to areas in South Asia, 
Africa, South and Central America, and Australia. Skylab, as the author of one briefing 
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pointed out, could fall over these regions as well as parts of the continental United States, 
Europe, and Russia.386 
 
Figure 3.3: This map shows the breadth of latitude over which orbital debris from 
Gemini and Apollo could land, and the significantly larger corresponding area of 
potential impact for the Skylab program.387  
 
 The physical properties of the orbit chosen for Skylab meant that the station 
would cross over a greater total area of land, though the probability that any debris from 
its reentry would hit terra firma remained minuscule compared to the likelihood that it 
would land in an ocean. Orbital mechanics affected the potential range of impact, as did 
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other environmental factors such as atmospheric wind currents and the rotation of the 
Earth, some of which proved either difficult or impossible to calculate in reentry 
models.388 The combination of these natural factors with unknowns such as the 
aerodynamic properties, velocity, attitude, and path of surviving fragments exceeded 
researchers’ abilities to precisely predict when and where fragments would land—known 
as the “boundary of dispersion” or “footprint.”389 Determining hazard to human life 
required the consideration of yet another factor that had begun to be featured in other 
assessments of global environmental risk—namely, population growth. In determining 
whether boosting a potentially dangerous object to a higher orbit could provide an 
acceptable alternative to hazardous reentry, researchers argued that such a procedure 
could have the opposite effect. As time goes on and the world population increases, it 
becomes more likely it becomes that a piece of debris will hit someone. Therefore, 
boosting the object to a higher orbit from which it would eventually still fall back to 
Earth could be more likely to yield casualties in a more population-dense future.390 
 In determining the thresholds for human risk, researchers attempted to model 
debris footprints using different object and environmental variables, including a so-called 
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“man-radius” that ranged from one foot to one meter.391 However, one study also 
suggested that the best way to assess the risk of human casualty from falling debris came 
from a natural analogy—namely the casualty rates from falling meteoroids. Although the 
authors of this study recommended a controlled reentry experiment in place of the extant 
theoretical studies, they argued that the behavior and low casualty rates of meteor impacts 
suggested that space junk would be similarly benign to human beings. The simple 
conclusion: "The risk of casualties due to meteorite impact appears to be low. (To date, 
there have been no verified human fatalities due to meteorite impacts.) Therefore, the risk 
from NASA activities should also be low."392 Authors of the study included an overview 
of meteorite-caused casualties that included interpretations of Biblical passages that 
suggested a meteor strike. Such a wide stretch of time perhaps best illustrated the rarity of 
casualties caused by objects falling from space—compared to the mere decades of the 
space age, in which no people had been struck by space debris, the long term low rate of 
meteorite casualties provided a hopeful comparison point. An appendix table at the end of 
the report lists only twenty incidents, each labeled with a “provisional rating” regarding 
the likelihood that the event happened as recorded, ranging from “doubtful” to “possible” 
to “probable” to “certain.” Until an in situ test of a reentry experiment, these natural 
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analogs provided the only logical source of data on what might be expected to happen 
with the reentry of artifacts—and the expectation proved optimistic.393 
 When program parameters changed and Skylab’s weight ballooned from 138,743 
pounds to 169,635 pounds in the leadup to launch, the possible “lethal area” of reentry 
footprint increased by 11.7 percent and raised the probability of casualty to 0.0273, above 
the 0.001 casualty probability threshold designated as “unacceptable” by the Air Force.394 
When NASA officials decided that the program should keep to its planned launch date 
anyway, program technical researchers contemplated different contingency plans—
instead of changing the station before launch to reduce the risk upon reentry, the 
parameters of reentry itself could be changed or precluded entirely. Before Skylab even 
reached orbit, one group of researchers proposed sending a crew of astronauts aboard an 
Apollo spacecraft to dock with Skylab and draw it back to Earth in a carefully planned 
manner to ensure that it would fall over water. The astronauts would separate their craft 
from the station before its final plunge and return through the atmosphere themselves, 
protected from Skylab’s fate by the Apollo command module’s heat shield. However, 
such a plan would require changing the structure of Skylab in such a way that could 
possibly force out valuable components of  the program’s science mission and cause the 
launch date to slip further into the future. Risk to the astronauts, expense, labor, limited 
payload space, and scheduling all doomed the crew-controlled deorbit scenario.395 
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 With direct human intervention off the table, in April, 1973, one month before 
launch, the Skylab program manager commissioned structural testing to determine 
whether certain components of the station could be manipulated so that larger fragments 
would be less likely to survive the eventual reentry.396 Should the station break into small 
enough pieces, the possibility that large fragments would remain intact decreased. 
However, once again, changing critical components of the mission so close to the 
planned May launch proved to be a dead end due to the political and budgetary necessity 
of keeping to the launch schedule.397 In 1974, after Skylab had reached orbit, researchers 
from the Battelle Institute suggested three categories of reentry damage countermeasures 
for future spacecraft of similar size and mass. The first, “destructive systems,” involved 
destroying the station before it began its eventual Earthward plunge. On-board explosives 
could be triggered from the ground at an optimal moment of decay, breaking large 
structures into smaller, less resilient pieces. Battelle researchers even suggested that a 
small nuclear device would do this job well, though perhaps such a method would not be 
a practical choice due to safety and political concerns.398 By 1977, after the final crew of 
astronauts had departed, this idea resurfaced, this time with conventional chemical 
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explosives launched in a separate vehicle to destroy Skylab while it remained in orbit.399 
A second category of countermeasure, “protective systems,” involved building 
components of spacecraft to survive not only reentry, but impact as well—particularly 
those components that house hazardous materials, as had been done on spacecraft 
equipped with radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs). 
 The final category of reentry countermeasure proposed in 1974 gained favor 
among Skylab officials as the likely reentry date drew closer. “Orbital control systems” 
required using a native or external propulsion system to boost the spacecraft to a higher 
orbit.400 The first and best option from this category involved using the under-
development Space Shuttle to do the job. As an additional perk to this plan, Skylab 
program managers developed embryonic ideas for ways to reuse the space station. In an 
attempt to save money as the Space Transportation System development rapidly ran over 
budget and schedule, researchers at MSFC advocated turning the extant space station into 
the basis of a much larger, longer-lived orbital outpost and platform for the future Space 
Shuttle. Reusing the orbital workshop and the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), perhaps 
with the addition of a discarded Space Shuttle external tank, such a system would be 
made almost entirely out of free materials and scientific apparatus, and could even 
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eventually serve as a servicing station to repair failing satellites.401 In 1977, after the last 
astronauts departed and the first shuttle had yet to launch, the reuse of Skylab seemed to 
be an ideal way to both reduce costs for the next generation space infrastructure and 
diminish the risk of the station causing damage or casualties on the ground upon 
reentry.402 However, as the Solar Maximum became more intense and Skylab’s decay 
accelerated, the feasibility of such a solution also declined. As noted earlier, although the 
final crew had boosted the station to an orbit that, under normal solar conditions should 
have kept it aloft into the mid-1980s, new estimates suggested it would come down 
before the end of the 1970s, well before the Shuttle would be operational. One more last-
ditch effort to assemble an orbital control method to save Skylab involved sending an 
uncrewed, automated expendable rocket armed with a teleoperator retrieval system 
(TRS). However, the TRS had not yet been fully developed and tested by spring 1978.403 
The chief forecaster for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
claimed that NASA had not used the most accurate model for sunspot activity, and 
predicted that none of these methods would be ready before the station began to 
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tumble.404 With the TRS still at an early stage of development, launched atop an 
automated rocket without a “man in the loop” to facilitate any last-minute changes 
needed to ensure mission success, the ELV-TRS plan could not continue as a viable 
rescue option.405 By December 1978, NASA cancelled the planned orbiter rendezvous 
mission with Skylab, and with it the possibility of recycling the venerable space 
station.406 
 With no way to break up the spacecraft into smaller pieces, nor money and time to 
scramble a rescue mission to move it to a higher, safer orbit, NASA had to determine 
how best to gain control over a potentially dangerous situation. In the summer of 1978, 
NASA joined forces with the Department of State, the DOD, and NORAD in forming a 
Skylab Contingency Working Group (SCWG).407 Another victim of the active solar 
maximum provided a test run a few months before Skylab’s predicted reentry. The 
Pegasus program launched three satellites during the mid-1960s to study the 
micrometeoroid environment in orbit, yielding early information about what NASA 
currently calls the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris environment (MMOD), the natural 
and artificial objects that can degrade or destroy functioning payloads.408 Pegasus 1 fell 
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from orbit in September 1978, and SCWG used the opportunity to fine-tune their models 
for estimating reentry footprints and protocols for alerting diplomatic agencies of any 
potential danger. Shortly after the Pegasus reentry, the working group released its first 
general Q & A package about the impending Skylab reentry, and sent an accompanying 
telegram to all American diplomatic posts.409 
 SCWG researchers eventually decided to attempt to change the attitude of the 
station using dormant thrusters and moveable external components. By changing the 
orientation of Skylab relative to the rapidly encroaching atmosphere, controllers could 
influence the amount of drag and friction exerted upon the station and thereby slow or 
accelerate decay as needed.410 At the same time that SCWG contemplated potential ways 
to reduce the debris impact, members also worked to reduce the likelihood of a negative 
social impact. With the controversy and cleanup of the nuclear-powered Cosmos 954 in 
recent memory, SCWG began providing information to interested state governments 
ranging from orbital elements and prediction maps to Q & A documents regarding 
nuclear power sources aboard Skylab—which, unlike the Soviet satellite, drew power 
only from solar panels and fuel cells and contained no radioactive materials.411 While 
some elements of the reentry plan remained classified, and the SCWG fielded FOIA 
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requests from a handful of newspapers and individuals, the group regularly updated its 
diplomatic materials during the first half of 1979. 
 Skylab hysteria hit the entire world before the debris itself hit the ground. The 
prospect of getting hit by a piece of a former space habitat struck a chord of macabre 
humor among many communities across the globe. In a media spectacle since repeated, 
but at smaller scales, individuals speculated about the likelihood of being hit by space 
hardware falling back to Earth. An undercurrent of jaded acceptance of the reentry as the 
inevitable result of technological hubris ran through the popular discourse regarding the 
reentry of Skylab. Vendors hawked shirts and other memorabilia emblazoned with 
targets, local news outlets held reentry prediction contests, and a San Francisco 
newspaper offered a $10,000 reward to the first person to deliver a verifiable piece of 
Skylab debris.412 The Massachusetts-based Brookline Psychoenergetics Institute held a 
“think-in” on May 25 to try boosting Skylab by meditation and telekinesis.413 Former 
astronaut John Glenn, by that time a United States Senator, brought a piece of his 
reentered rocket to his office to demonstrate that while Skylab may have been unusually 
large, this reentry would be neither new nor something to fear.414 
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 Two computer programmers started a consulting firm called “Chicken Little 
Associates” that provided localized Skylab viewing times and predictions of where and 
when the station would land to media and municipal clients who believed that NASA’s 
predictions about a safe reentry seemed too sanguine.415 The head of the interagency task 
group charged with handling mission support and public information about the Skylab 
reentry blamed Chicken Little Associates for much of what he considered to be a larger 
than warranted level of international interest in where and when the space station would 
fall.416 But it wasn’t just aerospace outsiders who received the blame for inflating Skylab 
mania. The introductory memo prefacing a NASA-sponsored compilation and 
bibliography of Skylab debris studies conducted before the reentry critiqued aerospace 
companies such as Lockheed for using language that some at NASA considered to be 
inappropriately inflammatory—such as using “lethal” rather than “hazardous” or 
“capable of causing injury”—and suggesting that the Skylab reentry posed “a very high 
risk to human life.”417 
 On July 11th 1979, Skylab began its final plunge. The trajectory of reentry brought 
it over land—specifically, a large island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean: Australia. 
Because Skylab was made up of two main components, the orbital workshop and the 
ATM, trackers were surprised to observe that the station remained intact throughout most 
of its plunge through the atmosphere. It finally broke into several fragments that hit the 
																																								 																				
415 Thomas O’Toole, “‘Chicken Little’ Is Looking Up: The Sky May Not Be Falling, but Skylab 
Will,” Washington Post, January 20, 1979. 
416 William G. Bastedo, “Skylab Final Report,” Appendix 3. 
417 Larry K Edwards, “Skylab Debris Documentation” (Washington, DC: NASA, June 20, 1979), 
Skylab Series, General Subject Files, Box 761, Skylab Debris Documents, JSC History 
Collection. 
		
184 
ground in remote areas in and around the municipalities of Balladonia and Esperance. No 
casualties—human or animal—were reported. However, in the days after citizens in Perth 
reported seeing hundreds of glowing pieces falling from the sky, Australian citizens 
began to recover pieces of hardware that appeared to have been part of the American 
space station.418 One resident of Esperance took the American radio station up on its 
posted bounty, flying to America with a few small pieces of blackened debris in his 
luggage. Local governments recovered the larger fragments, the largest of which was an 
intact oxygen tank. 419 A team from MSFC traveled to Australia to observe and collect 
debris, as per stipulation in the Outer Space Treaty regarding the return of space objects 
to the launching state.420 Several pieces of debris remained behind, however. One 
fragment of the orbital workshop component of Skylab made a publicity circuit around 
the country, even being featured in the Miss Universe pageant that took place in Perth a 
few days after it was recovered.421 
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Figure 3.4: Skylab debris on display at the Miss Universe Pageant 1979 in Perth, 
Australia.422 
 
 Comparing the reentry of Skylab to the reentry of Cosmos 954 a year and a half 
prior reveals some similarities and some stark differences. Like Cosmos 954, Skylab fell 
over land, into a remote part of a country geographically removed from the launching 
state. The natural environment of each landing site provided a sink for each field of 
debris: the muddy lake bed and frigid waters of the Great Slave Lake covered the 
insoluble particulate matter shed by the Cosmos nuclear reactor, and several pieces of 
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Skylab debris likely remained undiscovered in the Australian outback and ranch land.423 
However, following the reentry of Cosmos 954 the Canadian government mobilized an 
international search and cleanup team, for which Canada invoked the Liability Treaty 
against the Soviet Union to recover money dedicated to the effort; whereas the Australian 
government opted to waive any claims against the United States. NASA reported that by 
August of that year, some 13 claims had been filed against Skylab, none of which 
originated in Australia.424 The local government in Esperance charged NASA a $400 
fine—for littering. This fine went unpaid until 2009 when a radio disc jockey serving 
California and Nevada raised money from his listeners and paid the fine on NASA’s 
behalf. A giant novelty check marked “paid in full” now hangs on the wall of the 
Esperance Municipal Museum, above display cases housing some of the largest 
fragments of Skylab collected from the surrounding area.425 
 In the midst of the Cold War, the fall of a nuclear powered Soviet satellite over a 
sovereign Western nation reified the nuclear threat feared but never realized in the form 
of atomic weapons use in warfare. Australia and the United States—two nations on the 
same side of the Iron Curtain with open lines of communication and information—did 
not have the same substrate of animosity pushing them to invoke legal recourse. The 
difference between in the two spacecrafts’ nuclearity—a category that Gabrielle Hecht 
has argued emerges from a complex web of material and social realities—also factored 
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into the difference in legal action.426 The nuclear reentry, seemingly the result of an 
uncontrolled accident (with neither effort nor information provided by the Soviet space 
program to the regions threatened by Cosmos debris) stood in stark contrast to the 
publicized attempts by NASA to prevent, delay, and eventually direct the reentry of the 
non-nuclear Skylab. Finally, the differences between the two environments—one seen by 
many in Canada as part of a fragile, critical natural resource, the other as empty land 
traversed only by the occasional livestock—also factored into the drastic differences in 
subsequent legal and financial action. These stark contrasts in environmental value, 
political affiliations, nuclearity, and perceptions of control yielded wholly divergent 
outcomes in the days and months that followed each reentry. 
 While both the reentry of Skylab and Cosmos 954 tested new rules of space 
governance and brought the geophysical world into legal negotiations of liability, the 
reentry of Skylab also provided a fitting conclusion to a program intended to yield new 
information about the near-Earth space environment. The Skylab science mission was 
divided into three primary categories: the medical study of long-duration microgravity on 
the human body, Earth resource monitoring, and observations of the Sun.427 The Apollo 
Telescope Mount (ATM)—one of the two main, massive components of the station that 
																																								 																				
426 Gabrielle Hecht illuminates the many material and social realities that together make up a 
nuclear thing, whether an object, a place, a state, or a legal regime. See Being Nuclear: Africans 
and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2012). 
427 The Skylab program description begins with the emphasis on solar studies and learning more 
about the Earth-Sun system: “Basic objectives of the [Skylab] program are: 1) To increase man’s 
knowledge of the sun and its effect on man’s earthly environment…” “Environmental Impact 
Statement - Skylab Program” (Washington, DC: Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA, 
February 4, 1971), 1, Skylab Series, General Subject Files, Box 760, Skylab Debris, JSC History 
Collection. 
		
188 
program controllers feared might present a reentry hazard—constituted the first crewed 
space observatory.428 It housed eight discrete instruments for studying different aspects of 
solar activity in wavelengths spanning the electromagnetic spectrum, including 
wavelengths that cannot be observed from the ground due to atmospheric absorption.429 
Two scientist-astronauts flew aboard Skylab, and were chosen for these flights so that 
astronomers on the ground might benefit from their expertise in ionospheric and solar 
physics.430 Astronomers revised their models of the structure of the Sun’s corona after 
definitively proving, using ATM-gathered data, that the stream of energetic particles 
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known as the solar wind originates in phenomena known as “coronal holes.”431 
Astronomers were astonished to learn just how active the Sun could be even during solar 
minima. So perhaps when this activity accelerated, and the solar wind buffeted the near-
Earth environment, expanding the exosphere and bringing the ATM crashing back to 
Earth, it provided a fitting end to the study of the Earth-Sun environment. While in 
operation, Skylab had revealed new information about our star; on its death, it revealed 
just how much we had yet to learn—both about the Sun and about its interactions with 
the near-Earth environment and the artifacts transiting through it. 
Global Fallout: Space Junk in the Anthropocene 
Following the reentry of Skylab, the Chief of International Program Support International 
Affairs at NASA expressed his fervent hope that “we will not have to repeat such an 
exercise in the foreseeable future.”432 Yet, the Sun continues to shine, it continues its 
cyclical energetic pulsing—and it continues to push our out-of-control technologies back 
home to roost. Two solar cycles have passed since the fall of Cosmos 954 and Skylab at 
the peak of cycle 21. During each subsequent solar maximum, massive Cold War era 
artifacts have fallen back to Earth, with varying degrees of popular attention. In the 
spring of 2001, during the 23rd solar maximum, the 140-ton Soviet Mir space station 
began a slow tumble into the atmosphere when funding ran out to maintain its place on 
orbit. While the Kremlin emphasized that Russian engineers had carefully controlled the 
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reentry to fall over the Pacific Ocean, some echoes of Skylab reverberated through 
popular culture worldwide.433 Not only did early estimates indicate a landing near 
Australia, but displays of macabre humor conveyed a similar popular response, ranging 
from targets mowed into golf courses to an advertising ploy by the fast food chain Taco 
Bell. The company deployed a 40-foot-square floating target within the predicted reentry 
footprint and promised a free taco to every American should the main body of Mir hit the 
bull’s eye.434 The debris missed the target, instead streaking massive plumes of smoke 
through the skies over Fiji and landing far off shore.435 Taco Bell offered a “consolation” 
deal of two tacos for 99 cents.436 
 The most recent solar cycle, which reached a relatively benign maximum in 2014, 
brought several artifacts into the atmosphere. In June 2016, denizens of the Canadian 
arctic once again found themselves asking questions about a reentering spacecraft of 
Soviet origin with hazardous fuel aboard. Local officials from the Inuit hamlet of Grise 
Ford—considered one of the coldest inhabited places on Earth—expressed fear that a 
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falling hydrazine-laden rocket body could contaminate a valuable cod fishery and refuge 
for beluga whales, narwhals, walrus, seals, polar bears, and seabirds.437 While the 
government of Nunavut released a public service announcement reassuring citizens that 
the falling rocket would be a “very low risk event” and that the debris would land outside 
Canadian territorial waters, locals reacted with indignation that a foreign power would 
use sensitive Arctic waters as a toxic space junk dump, as characterized by University of 
British Columbia political scientist Michael Byers.438 A World Wildlife Fund official 
working in the region defended the Baffin Bay region as "the most productive…in the 
Arctic,” and “not an empty wasteland. It's a place that Inuit have lived around and use."439 
An Arctic campaigner from Greenpeace raised a legal analogy, claiming that “dumping 
these chemicals from a ship would be a clear violation of international and Canadian law, 
and it is no more acceptable when it is dumped from the air.”440 In sharp contrast, 
Nunavut Minister of Community and Government Services Joe Savikataaq expressed a 
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healthy measure of defeat in contemplating potential environmental disaster. “It’s a 
Russian rocket,” he opined to the local press. “We have very little control over it.”441 
 As these parallel events demonstrate, reentry of space junk has become a regular, 
material attribute of the solar cycle, as reliable as an increase in energetic activity at Solar 
Maximum. They also demonstrate that questions of consent, control, responsibility, and 
even the definition of toxic waste continue decades after the first tests of space liability.442 
The most optimistic predictions of low casualty rates from falling debris generated by 
Skylab personnel endure; to date, only one person has been struck by a piece of space 
debris, a light piece of mesh that did not cause injury. However, the seemingly random, 
dangerous contact between sea, space, sky, and land facilitated by falling space junk 
continues to raise alarm among those concerned about human health and environmental 
integrity alike. Ancient principles of terra nullius endure into the Space Age, when even 
ultimate sinks turn into political flashpoints in the face of a falling sky. The movement of 
space junk continues to break down geographical boundaries, with waste from one 
extraterritorial region transforming upon arrival in other extraterritorial and sovereign 
places. 
The history of reentering space junk during the long 1970s demonstrates the 
expanding role of the geophysical world of near-Earth space on Cold War geopolitics. It 
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also destabilizes the common historiographical narrative of the Space Race as a binary 
battle between super powers and their spheres of influence. Rather, in being unwillingly 
and unintentionally conscripted into legal, political, and diplomatic exchanges over space 
junk reentries, even the governments and citizens of countries that had not yet or barely 
become spacefaring themselves were drawn by conditions within the orbital environment 
into early debates over safe environmental governance in and through near-Earth space. 
This was one of the first instances in which, as an assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
during the Carter Administration put it in the spring of 1978: 
 
The ‘opposition’ was Newton’s Law of Gravitation, later compounded by 
Bernoulli and the physical effects of aerodynamic drag on the satellite. The game 
was against nature rather than against conscious intelligence.443 
 
An expanded definition of the natural world had become a player in a spatially 
broadening Space Race. Exceeding Cold War binaries, nature inhabited the roles of both 
primary antagonist and primary victim, both in the guise of familiar and strange terrestrial 
environments and in the alien ecosystem of near-Earth space. There, the circulating 
products and byproducts of the space industry inspired new questions of utility and 
liability on the ground as well as in orbit. From Cuban cows to Canadian cleanups, falling 
space junk opened a different extraterritorial front in the Cold War: not among human 
antagonists but with the strange material and physical ecosystem of orbital space.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Salvaging Space: Refuse, Reuse, and the Pursuit of 
Orbital Economy, 1968-1986 
 
Introduction: The Rarest of Beasts 
On a clear day in November 2015, commercial aerospace company Blue Origin launched 
its reusable New Shepard rocket. The rocket dipped into the nearest reaches of outer 
space before safely nailing a vertical landing at the Blue Origin test facility in the plains 
of West Texas. Blue Origin’s owner, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, celebrated the 
accomplishment by breaking his seven-year silence on Twitter with his very first tweet: 
 
The rarest of beasts – a used rocket. Controlled landing not easy, but done right, 
can look easy.444 
 
A used rocket is a rare beast indeed—until 2015 all standalone space rockets could only 
be used once. Since the end of the space shuttle program in 2011, single-use rockets have 
provided the only way off the planet. After sending people or satellites into space, these 
massive artifacts effectively disappear. They are large, complex, expensive, and strangely 
ephemeral.  In order to reach orbit, large rockets fly in stages. As each stage runs out of 
fuel, it detaches, yielding a lighter, more manageable load for the remaining stages to 
propel. After delivering their payloads into space, these stages of so-called expendable 
launch vehicles (ELVs) either remain in orbit or fall back to Earth and burn up in the 
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intense heat and pressure of the atmosphere. In some cases, pieces of these artifacts 
survive the fall, typically landing in the oceans that cover the majority of the planet.445 
 Whether in orbit or falling back to Earth, these objects become invisible to the 
majority of those who consume information products from outer space—whether this 
information materializes in the form of advanced weather reports, time-sensitive banking 
transactions, air travel, or a myriad other technological practices involving satellite 
technology. This impermanence and invisibility connects the consumption practices of 
the American space program to broader cultural patterns of discard. Susan Strasser has 
argued that a conspicuous, even joyous culture of disposability defined postwar American 
modernity. Once primarily the domain of the rich, single-use products marketed towards 
the growing middle class became symbols of freedom from the drudgery of reuse.446 By 
the beginning of the Space Age, an increasing number of Americans—particularly white 
Americans—regularly exercised their right to a life physically and visually separated 
from the trash they produced.447 Early Cold War space technologies could be seen as the 
high-tech pinnacles of this postwar culture of disposability. With the exception of the 
very occasionally visible space artifact that survives the fall from orbit—such as, perhaps 
most famously, the reentry of the Skylab space station in 1979 which shed several 
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retrievable fragments—single-use satellites and rockets disappear from the view of those 
who use space information facilitated by these objects.448 Even the enormous, expensive 
Saturn V moon rocket all but vanished after each single-serve flight—the emptied hulks 
of the multi-stage rocket either burned up in the atmosphere, fell into the ocean, hit the 
moon, or went into orbit around the Earth or around the Sun. Reusable rockets have been 
considered a possibility for decades, from as early as the 1920s. Rocket engineering 
pioneers such as Robert Goddard, Konstantin Tisolkovsky, and Wernher von Braun each 
recorded ideas for a rocket that could be safely landed and relaunched.449 However, the 
industry standard from the beginning of the Space Age embraced multistage, single-use 
rockets for reasons of physical and economic expediency.450 
The current private industry initiative to construct a reusable spaceflight paradigm 
distantly follows on the heels of a period during the Cold War Space Race during which 
reusability and recycling became key goals of an increasingly austere public American 
space industry.451 After the spectacular success and economic excess of the Apollo moon 
program, three presidential administrations alongside leadership in civilian and military 
space programs set out to normalize spaceflight as a common form of transportation. For 
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a prolonged but limited time the vanguard of the American space industry focused on re-
materializing a deeply illegible, ephemeral form of waste into a key component of a 
tangible reuse economy. Rather than designing old rockets and satellites to disappear into 
space, atmosphere, or ocean after use or failure, NASA made efforts to invest in 
developing new technologies that would save money in the long term. However, in order 
to achieve true economy, Cold War advocates of reusability advocated the reuse of all 
components of the space infrastructure, not just launch and landing vehicles. The primary 
means of savings would come through comprehensive revision of spacecraft design that 
privileged the three Rs: not reduce, reuse, recycle; but retrieve, refuel, repair. The unique 
environment of orbital space presented challenges that forced space policymakers and 
engineers to rethink and retool an entire technological system already in place and in use. 
During the long 1970s, Presidents and NASA engineers alike envisioned near-Earth 
space becoming part of the human environment. As Senator Adlai E. Stephenson put it in 
1979, “the United States plan[ned] to make space an extension of life on the Earth’s 
surface.452 In contrast to the high adventure of 1960s frontier exploration, space would 
become a place where people would live and work, a place of industry, and perhaps as 
importantly, a place where we clean up after ourselves; a place that we ought to keep 
clean. 
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“Very Much Like a Modern Airplane" 
Less than a month after the Blue Origin success, Elon Musk’s aerospace company 
SpaceX accomplished a similar feat, returning the first stage of a Falcon 9 rocket from 
orbital space to land in Cape Canaveral, Florida. A media ruckus unfolded around which 
tech millionaire had first achieved true reusability first: whether the launch and landing of 
New Shepard or of Falcon 9 would go down in history as the revolutionary moment, after 
which spaceflight would become as cheap and commonplace as commercial air travel.453 
The SpaceX website uses just this analogy to assert the necessity of its rocketry labors: 
SpaceX rockets costs as much to manufacture as a 747 jumbo jet airplane, but a 747 can 
be used multiple times a day, for tens of thousands of flights. On the company website, 
SpaceX asks readers to imagine the cost of air travel if each transatlantic aircraft could 
only be used once before being destroyed, and a new jet manufactured for each 
subsequent flight.454 
At the beginning of 1972, then-NASA Administrator James Fletcher asked 
American citizens to consider the same question. Fletcher released a statement supporting 
President Nixon’s announcement that NASA would begin developing a next generation 
of human spacecraft that would be the first of its kind to be used more than once. He 
employed a broadly recognizable analog, noting that in air transportation “we don't throw 
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away an airplane after its first trip from Washington to Los Angeles.”455 The next year, a 
final group of American astronauts visited the moon aboard a massive, disposable Saturn 
V rocket that weighed the same as a C-5A military aircraft and cost twice as much to 
manufacture.456 A few months later, Fletcher persuaded the US Senate Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences to consider plans for the reusable space shuttle, a craft 
that he believed would change the space industry in the same way that the DC-3 had 
revolutionized civil aviation.457 In 1976, the editors of the New York Times predicted a 
new age of reusable spacecraft that would open the way to an economic and 
technological revolution, rendering spaceflight as routine, affordable, and accessible as a 
ride on a modern jumbo jet.458 An even more optimistic journalist suggested that perhaps 
even space junk could someday be designed to land in the same manner as commercial 
airlines.459 The Space Age had followed closely on the heels of the Jet Age, and to 
Fletcher and supporters of the American space program it seemed likely that the space 
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industry might continue to follow to the same trajectory to eventual normalization and 
economy.460 
This veneer of technological enthusiasm obscured the grittier realities of an 
increasingly squeezed federal spaceflight budget during and after project Apollo. The 
desire expressed by Fletcher and Nixon to set the US space program on the path to build 
a reusable spacecraft largely grew out of a changing political climate, as legislative 
support for the space program waned following the successful first moon landing in July 
1969.461 Indeed, beginning that same year, NASA consulted with airline companies while 
developing the initial designs for what would become the space shuttle, with the explicit 
aim of emulating the volume, quick turnaround, and most importantly, the economy that 
the American commercial air industry had achieved in a short half-century since the first 
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powered flight.462 The form that the space shuttle took in 1972 not only looked like an 
airplane, in stark contrast to the blunt, small capsule-shaped human spacecraft of the 
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. George Mueller, then the NASA Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, also called for the next generation of spacecraft 
to be integrated into the existing air control and maintenance infrastructure, sharing 
launch and landing facilities with the civil aviation industry.463 In 1968, well before 
NASA officials agreed upon a final design of the Shuttle, Mueller predicted that the new 
spacecraft would eventually even fly out of major American airports, generating savings 
through volume of flights and using a system already in regular, reliable operation. “By 
building a launch-vehicle shuttle for multiple usage,” he argued in a speech before the 
British Interplanetary Society that year, “we can achieve a breakthrough in costs.”464 
However, Mueller noted that the launch vehicles would not be the sole path to making 
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spaceflight affordable; rather, a multicomponent space transportation system made up of 
a reusable shuttle, space station, and reusable satellites would be key to making orbital 
space truly airline-like in efficiency and price.465 
In this sense, the current race to a reusable rocket waged between billionaire 
entrepreneurs only partially recapitulates the earlier effort to make spaceflight more like 
air flight.466 Air infrastructure does not simply consist of airplanes and runways, but 
requires sustainable fueling supply lines, communications networks, maintenance 
facilities, and storage at key points of departure and arrival.467 During the long 1970s, 
those who advocated a reusable space industry paradigm promoted practices that required 
not only a reusable launch vehicle but also the infrastructure necessary to reuse, refuel, 
and repurpose the satellites these rockets launched into space. Given the range of 
altitudes at which America operated its satellites—from low orbits of several hundred 
kilometers to high orbits of tens of thousands kilometers above the planet’s surface—
building this infrastructure would require comprehensive changes beyond simply 
building a new human spacecraft that could reach low-Earth orbit (LEO) over and over 
again. Beginning in the late 1960s, NASA commissioned studies that reached the overall 
conclusion that, for the economics of reuse to yield concrete benefits in the post-Apollo 
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era, all of orbital space—not just the nearest reaches—would need to be governed under 
an ethos of recycling and salvage.468 In order to attain a truly austere, sustainable 
economy of reuse into the 1980s and 1990s, all parts of the space infrastructure would 
need to be designed with reuse in mind from the outset—from design and construction 
through launch, use, and reuse. 
 
Imagining Reuse 
I believe that the exploitation of space is limited in concept and extent by the very high 
cost of putting payload into orbit, and the inaccessibility of objects after they have been 
launched. 
—NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller, 1968469 
 
As more and more countries and private industries sought information services provided 
by orbiting satellites, the American and Soviet space industries produced a burgeoning 
supply of spaceworthy rockets during the first two decades of the Space Age. Many of 
these vehicles started out as ICBMs, and in America the different branches of the armed 
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services modified them to carry benign payloads and human spacecraft aloft. From a very 
early moment, these rockets became known as expendable launch vehicles, their single 
use-ness built into the name of the technology itself. 
 The payloads launched atop these ELVs, however, do not factor significantly into 
the current NewSpace race as they once did during the 1970s.470 Each satellite was (and 
is, with some notable exceptions) purpose built to a specific set of specialized functions, 
carefully tested to ensure functionality, and then launched at a high premium per pound 
into orbits ranging from a few hundred kilometers above the surface of the earth to 
several thousand kilometers high.471 When satellites malfunctioned, ran out of fuel, or 
became obsolete, they could not be revived or upgraded. Without the ability to send 
astronauts to each satellite to safely repair or refuel these technologies, spacefaring 
entities had to replace satellites wholesale and at high cost should any of the above 
conditions render it unusable for the designated purpose. Once they ran out of fuel 
necessary to maneuver or lost contact with operators on the ground, satellites would 
essentially become waste—objects discarded, invisible, and useless. 
From soda bottles to diapers, the luxury of single use consumption and living out 
of sight of waste has signified wealth over centuries of American history. Those with 
disposable income dispose of the products they buy, never to see their discarded waste 
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again; those who do not must use and reuse.472 As Carl Zimring has demonstrated, 
recycling in America grew from the nineteenth-century networks of scrappers, collectors, 
and brokers—many of them immigrants—who transformed the landscape of 
consumption and set the stage for current large-scale recycling systems.473 Before the 
1890s, discarded things represented not waste, but the potential for future value through 
reuse and remaking.474 However, as Donald Worster has noted, the frugality of reuse and 
the value of consumption have not cohabited well under the capitalism of the past half-
century.475 Although space infrastructure, as a publicly funded project, did not arise from 
individual consumer choice in the same direct manner as the purchase of a newspaper or 
glass jar, this uneasy tension of postwar American capitalism was evident even in the 
high technology industry of space technology over the political transitions from the 
Nixon to Reagan eras.476 Those who imagined the next steps in space as crafting near-
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Earth orbit into “an extension of life on the Earth's surface” echoed these terrestrial 
politics in reimagining a future in space based on reuse.477  
Squeezed from all sides by legislative and popular pressure to do more with less 
as Apollo wrapped up, NASA leadership looked to reuse as a way of making ends 
meet.478 At the height of its funding support in 1965, NASA enjoyed an annual operating 
budget of $5.25 billion. This windfall covered the costs of developing new spacecraft, 
purchasing expendable launch vehicles from the US Air Force, Army, and Navy for 
crewed and uncrewed spacecraft, and constructing a proprietary moon rocket. With the 
ongoing conflict in Vietnam bleeding the US budget into a $29 billion deficit by 1967, 
the Johnson administration repeatedly cut funding to NASA during the years leading up 
to the first moon landing.479 By the autumn of 1968, the NASA budget lost more than 
$1.25 billion from its 1965 peak, spurring the standing NASA administrator to resign.480 
Polls showed that the American public continued to support the space program, but also 
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demanded that NASA operate on a greatly diminished share of public funding.481 When 
Richard Nixon ascended to the presidency at the height of Apollo, he immediately set his 
administration to work establishing a future direction for the space program that would 
reflect his agenda. Nixon prioritized the creation of a plan for future space activity that 
emphasized cooperation, rather than competition, with the Soviet Union, and, above all, 
economic austerity.482 Nixon established a Space Task Group, to be chaired by Vice 
President Spiro T. Agnew, upon which he bestowed the responsibility of assessing the 
next directions that the civilian space sector should take in order to move towards the 
goal of achieving a kinder, cheaper American space program.483 
With the knowledge that the windfall of the mid-1960s would not return, 
particularly under the new administration and growing public resistance to government 
spending on big technology projects, NASA commissioned its own series of studies to 
determine how best to reduce costs and keep the American space program competitive 
among the growing roster of spacefaring nations.484 One such report, issued by Nixon’s 
Space Task Group mere weeks after Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin rode a disposable 
$185 million Saturn V to land on the lunar surface, argued that developing a new multi-
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vehicle system of transportation would constitute “the next natural step for us to take in 
space.”485 The report laid out a three-pronged set of priorities that its authors believed 
should govern the development of the new space transportation infrastructure: 
commonality, or the use of only a small number of flexible technologies for a wide 
variety of missions; reusability, or the ability to use the same systems over multiple 
missions and a long time period; and economy, particularly through the simplification of 
hardware and the reduction of “throw away” technologies used in any given mission. 
These priorities would, the study’s authors argued, facilitate vastly cheaper operating 
costs for spaceflight than the contemporary use of non-reusable launch vehicles and 
satellites, and eventually lead to the hoped-for acquisition of airline-level efficiency in 
transporting people and materials between the surface of the Earth and outer space.486 
These three priorities—commonality, reusability, and economy—would become 
central to a new ethos in the American space industry that persisted through three 
presidential administrations and two new large-scale space vehicle projects. These three 
terms made up a refrain that punctuated discussions of how best to develop a more robust 
orbiting infrastructure, particularly one that would also incorporate astronauts as 
necessary participants in recycling outer space technology Human astronauts’ flexibility, 
adaptability, and bodily dexterity would allow them to puzzle out potentially complex 
repair problems. Including humans as a central component of the next generation space 
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program served an additional political purpose, however.487 Although some studies of 
remote and robotic repair technologies took place during this time, few in American 
space policy circles argued against including astronauts in this new age of reusable 
spaceflight.488 As Joan Hoff has argued, the astronaut in orbit represented the only truly 
compassionate symbol of space exploration, and provided a legible point of reference for 
the average American of the 1970s whom Nixon and his Space Task Group hoped to 
gratify with these changes.489 By investing in the development of a large, maneuverable, 
reusable spacecraft to shuttle people and cargo to and from orbit alongside a permanent 
orbiting outpost and agile orbital maneuvering vehicles, the authors of the 1969 Space 
Task Group report expected a large, stable return on an admittedly substantial initial 
investment. By standardizing the size of satellite payloads to fit the parameters of such a 
system, and allowing astronauts to return to faltering or failed satellites to make repairs or 
bring them back to Earth for salvage, NASA saw the potential for an expanded customer 
base that would also save money in the long run by launching and maintaining longer-
lived space assets that could be reliably maintained by human hands.490 
The shape and scale of proposed standardized, reusable space vehicle systems 
varied, and different NASA centers favored different approaches to the challenge of 
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coming up with the next grand space endeavor. Nixon’s ambitions for reelection in 1972 
motivated him to balance two contradictory campaign initiatives: to scale back funding 
for military and big technology projects in favor of domestic programs, while also 
maintaining large-scale space program planning in several key battleground states. He 
hoped to leverage support with local space industries that would stand to benefit 
economically from the development of a post-Apollo human space project.491  
With the Apollo program winding down and the election looming, the Nixon 
administration called on NASA to devise a next generation launch vehicle which would 
set a new tone for America’s future in space in accordance with the 1969 task group 
report.492 Shepherding the goal set by John F. Kennedy through the finish line would not 
be the legacy of President Nixon, whose interest in outer space policy was limited 
compared to his two Democratic predecessors.493 Instead of announcing a race to a new 
finish line—such as Mars, as suggested by some of his contemporaries—President Nixon 
planned to focus his administration’s space policy on making near-Earth space into a site 
of commerce. Supporters of this approach, including George Mueller, argued that in 
order to make space an extension of the human environment, the cost of transportation to 
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orbit must be reduced through an initial upfront investment in new technologies of reuse 
yielding substantial savings over time and regular use.494 Such a commonplace presence 
in outer space would not only yield industrial benefits, but would also foster the first 
steps towards humankind achieving a true understanding of what Mueller called “the 
nature of space.”495 
Technological [Angular] Momentum 
The nature of space that Mueller hoped to know by way of normalizing the nearest 
reaches of the cosmos included both the “first nature” and “second nature” that together 
made up the orbital infrastructure.  As put forward by Bill Cronon, these two terms 
describe the enmeshed networks of human and non-human entities, structures, and 
processes that together become equally invisible and inevitable to the societies that 
encounter them.496 In order to reshape the second nature of near-Earth space, Mueller and 
his colleagues faced an uphill battle. 
 The state of the orbital infrastructure during the early 1970s represents a 
remarkable example of a large technological system that has reached what Thomas 
Hughes calls “technological momentum.” A compromise between technological 
determinism and the social construction of technology (SCOT) approaches to 
understanding the development of technological systems, the concept of technological 
momentum takes additional factors such as environmental forces and time into account to 
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consider the ways in which society and technology mutually shape one another. Although 
human beings fashion technology and continue to do so through early stages of 
interpretive flexibility, with time, use, and integration into larger technological systems, 
artifacts can become so deeply settled into a particular form that they become “black 
boxed.”  Human beings may more easily adapt to black boxed technologies rather than 
change the material characteristics of the technology Itself.497 Those who sought to create 
an affordable, economically sustainable reuse paradigm in outer space believed such a 
massive shift would require more than simply changing the ways we get to orbit. Rather, 
America would have to take the lead in refashioning nearly all aspects of the vast, 
expensive, complex technological system already in place.498 
 During the early days of the Space Age, engineers built satellites that ranged in 
form from passive satellites like the Echo satelloon and West Ford dipoles, to the active 
satellites that we think of today as the standard form of space communications 
technology.499 As a web of social conditions led to the prevalence of the active form of 
satellite in the Soviet and American space programs, each national industry 
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simultaneously constructed additional components of a vast technological system to 
further grow the new space-facilitated globalism of the late twentieth century. 
Expendable launch vehicles carried satellites and human spacecraft into orbit. The 
satellites themselves, destined for altitudes ranging from a few hundred to thousands of 
miles above the surface of the planet, would never be seen or touched by human hands 
again. Engineers did not design them with the expectation that they could be retrieved 
once they left the atmosphere. Whether through anomaly, fuel depletion, or eventual 
orbital or material decay, these artifacts could not be reused. The considerable 
momentum of expendability permeated all aspects of the space infrastructure from 
Sputnik through the early 1970s.500 
 The attempt by Nixon, his advisors, and leadership at NASA to push a change in 
momentum—and the subsequent challenges faced by those who attempted to fulfill the 
initial charge—represents a unique case study in technological momentum. The 
idiosyncratic attributes of the orbital environment further complicate the interplay 
between social and technological forces that make change difficult to enact once 
momentum builds. The combination of physical and temporal illegibility and remoteness 
of the space environment itself, the extreme mobility of orbiting objects, as well as the 
highly visible risk to human life required for substantial change to occur, intensified the 
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momentum at an early stage of technological system-building. Without the ability to 
materially modify components of the system already in space, and with the high cost 
associated with launching new spacecraft generating resistance among funding decision 
makers, enforcing a shift would require monumental change among all stakeholders in 
the space industry. Given the paramount role of the geophysical world of outer space in 
stabilizing the initial paradigm, the attempt to strong-arm a change from expendability to 
reusability could perhaps be stylized as a fight to overcome “technological angular 
momentum.”  
 When nonhuman nature occupies a position of such dominance—even a 
dominance that lacks the intentionality that critics of actor-network theory defend as 
unique attributes of human beings—it becomes a force on par with, or even stronger than, 
social construction and technological determinism.501 When human actors, from Nixon to 
NASA administrators to engineers, attempted to change the direction of the technological 
momentum of the space system, the strangeness, inaccessibility, and intractability of the 
orbital environment presented obstacles to reuse that arguably equaled political factors 
and the economic climate on the ground below. As the history of the space shuttle 
program demonstrates, changing one component of the system in space does not 
accomplish enough to foster comprehensive change in the infrastructure as a whole. 
Interested social groups that wished to change one or more components of a 
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technological system must change the entire system and create an entirely new vector of 
momentum.  
 NASA would make several attempts to foster a change in momentum by changing 
one major component of the infrastructure, namely the shift from using ELVs to using the 
reusable space shuttle to launch all American space technologies. Political coalitions 
driven by the promise of a reuse economy supported this drastic change in protocol. For 
example, in 1971, the US Air Force agreed to cease design and production of new ELVs 
in deference to using the space shuttle to launch DOD payloads.502 Buying into the new 
reusable civilian spacecraft in advance promised to yield savings in the long run, 
particularly if the high cost of development could be shared between government 
agencies. With such a complex system, developed over the course of decades, the forces 
undergirding these political coalitions shifted. As the Air Force used up its store of extant 
ELVs and the Shuttle schedule slipped into the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan 
stepped in to ensure the enduring solidity of the DOD-NASA partnership. In a November 
1981 National Security Directive, the Reagan administration designated the Shuttle—
which was in the midst of its second crewed test flight—as the exclusive delivery 
mechanism for all spacecraft, by all space users. Any exceptions to this policy would 
have to be made directly through the president’s office.503 
 However, the continuous motion of satellites through space and the complexities 
of operating in a microgravity vacuum meant that single-use technology would be 
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difficult to replace. During the long 1970s, as the typical form of communications 
satellites firmly settled into complex multifunction units with active electronics on board, 
those at NASA who advocated the adoption of reusable spacecraft attempted to introduce 
some flexibility into this momentum. NASA and its contractors proposed—and in a few 
rare cases designed, built, and launched—a radically new form of satellite: one that we 
could see, touch, and alter after its initial ascent into orbit. NASA and its contracted 
organizations attempted to redirect industry priorities in such a way as to predict the 
afterlives of products and reanimate them. Instead of building new satellites at great 
expense, with the possibility that failure or accident would mean a complete loss of 
investment, the change in momentum would mean long-lived satellites that could be 
repaired, refueled, or even salvaged to make new technologies. In addition to saving 
money in the long run, this would also minimize the impact on the near-Earth space 
environment by reducing the amount of non-functioning material in orbit—a priority that 
Fletcher emphasized as an important benefit towards investing in a wholesale shift in the 
way that humans occupied the nearest regions of outer space.504 
 As the movement towards a paradigm of reuse in space gained ground, the 
environment of outer space remained simultaneously a central problem and resource to 
those who hoped to relinquish single-use technology. In a yearly report on national 
aeronautics and astronautics activity put out by the Ford administration, the phrase 
“unique environment of outer space” occurs some five times, denoting its value for 
scientific research and commercial and industrial production, particularly with respect to 
																																								 																				
504 Fletcher, “Spaceship Earth, A Look Ahead to a Better Life.,” 21. 
		
217 
microgravity conditions that cannot be replicated on the ground.505 The strange 
environment itself was laden with value due to its unique gravitational properties; 
however, these same properties also generated greater technological momentum that 
would deeply hinder incremental steps towards reuse. In combination with intransigent 
political forces and the ever-present priority of austerity after Apollo, the strange space 
environment presented an enormous obstacle to those who sought to change the direction 
of an entrenched technological angular momentum. 
Building A Reusable Space Transportation System 
Space historians have spilled plenty of ink on the development of the space shuttle and 
the different reusable designs considered before NASA settled on the partially reusable 
(and therefore cheaper to build) spaceplane and booster system.506 However, few have 
illuminated the extent and scope of the reuse paradigm heralded by the late 1960s flurry 
of studies, speeches, and articles that preceded the Shuttle program. In addition to 
designing a vehicle that could move people and payloads to and from orbit over and over 
again, many within NASA believed that the space infrastructure in its entirety must 
undergo a comprehensive redesign that would include reusable satellites. NASA 
Administrators from James C. Fletcher in the early 1970s to James Beggs in the mid 
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1980s emphasized the economic and political necessity of fostering a new way of 
building standardized, repairable satellites that met the commonality, reusability, and 
economy criteria of NASA’s 1969 Space Task Group study. 
The space shuttle represented only the most visible part of a much larger system 
that American space leadership hoped would make outer space accessible and affordable. 
As a launch and landing vehicle, the space shuttle orbiter would provide the critical link 
between Earth and space. The full Space Transportation System (STS), as it came to be 
known moving into the 1970s, included several components that most Americans would 
never have a chance to see should the various proposals come to fruition. From plans for 
a reusable Space Tug, space-based nuclear shuttle, Spacelab, upper stage rockets, and 
space stations, the early, ideal STS required multiple vehicles that would remain in space 
for the entirety of the technologies’ useful lives. 
In its earliest design iterations, the space shuttle was intended to be fully reusable. 
More than that, it was meant to facilitate the launch and operation of reusable, long-lived 
satellites. Shuttle supporters argued that the shape of the vehicle itself would yield greater 
economy in satellite production and performance. Should satellite builders be constrained 
to the spatial dimensions of a shuttle payload bay, NASA engineers predicted that a 
standard satellite form would emerge. Instead of a fleet of satellites built to individual 
specifications and matched to the appropriately sized expendable rocket, a standardized 
satellite form would enable mass production and economy of scale. If standardization 
also included uniform handholds, docking apparatus, and other features necessary for 
capture, refueling, and refurbishing, the space program would save time and money that 
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would otherwise be spent training astronauts for specific, non-generalizable repair 
missions. Additionally, if satellite companies designed their products with the possibility 
of cheap servicing and repair, they might be able to eschew some measure of expensive 
pre-launch ground testing.507 
 The shuttle would serve as a garbage truck and salvager, both directly and 
indirectly. By removing the need for disposable rockets, fewer rocket bodies and other 
mission debris would litter near-Earth space. And by bringing back dead satellites and 
other payloads that could not be refurbished in space, the Shuttle would remove more 
potentially dangerous large debris and safely transport the satellite through the heat and 
pressure of the upper atmosphere, potentially to be refurbished and used again. Fewer 
large pieces of debris would be left to reenter the atmosphere and potentially threaten 
people, property, and environments on the ground—a threat that increased as the Solar 
Maximum of the late 1970s drew large dead spacecraft back to Earth to the chagrin of 
concerned publics and governments alike.508 Rather than littering near-Earth space with 
pieces of empty single-use rockets and dead satellites, NASA and its contractors 
attempted to build a vehicle that would allow the United States to clean up its own 
messes in space, and perhaps even clean up after others. 
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 The space shuttle constituted “the major element,” or the “key element,” but 
certainly not the only piece of the reuse-based Space Transportation System.509 In two 
studies, produced for NASA in 1971 and 1972, Mathematica, Inc. projected significant 
savings for state and commercial space customers, to the tune of nearly half the direct 
costs of the expendable launch vehicle paradigm. However, Mathematica researchers 
emphasized that this savings would not come about through the launch and successful 
operation of the shuttle alone. Only with additional components and clearly defined reuse 
objectives firmly in place would the STS yield the projected savings.510 Even as evolving 
shuttle designs conducted by different organizations considered varying degrees of 
reusability and partial expendability, the need for such additional components as a 
reusable Space Tug and reusable satellites persisted throughout the design stages of what 
would eventually become the partially reusable space shuttle that NASA and the DOD 
would use from 1981 to 2011. STS designers planned that this combination would 
facilitate the refurbishment and reuse of satellite payloads, both in space and by bringing 
obsolete or complex systems back to Earth for repair via the Shuttle.511 By the mid-1970s, 
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as engineers began to design the space shuttle vehicle, NASA continued to field studies 
on how to implement satellite servicing using the proposed Space Transportation 
System.512 Those who pitched the STS to lawmakers and the public emphasized that the 
greatest cost of the system would come in upfront development expenses. The overall 
system would see the most savings in implementation and operations.513 All of the pieces 
would be necessary in order to get the American space industry to reach a sustainable 
economy. 
 The most enduring proposed components of the Space Transportation System 
included the space shuttle, the Space Tug, a Space Station, and satellites designed to be 
retrieved, repaired, refueled, and redeployed. The economics, promise, and arguable 
failure of the space shuttle may be gleaned from the significant historical and policy 
literature. In the remainder of this section, I will examine each of the less well-known 
components of the original plans for the STS, each of which would see some level of 
implementation but not in a coordinated fashion that would yield the economy promised 
by a fully reusable space infrastructure. For each of these components, the technological 
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momentum resulting from political immobility, failed coalitions, and the intransigence of 
the outer space environment impeded the implementation of each. Rather than 
representing the vanguard of technological innovation, the Shuttle instead indicated the 
limitations of changing only one part of a system in use. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: An artist’s concept from 1970 shows an integrated system consisting of a 
space shuttle, Nuclear Shuttle, and several Space Tugs that could expand humankind’s 
access to space from low orbit to the lunar surface. Marshall Space Flight Center 
engineers studied these concepts in response to the Space Task Force’s 1969 call for 
commonality, reusability, and economy.514 
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Space Tug 
In January 1961, Joseph McGolrick of the NASA Office of Launch Vehicles privately 
proposed an idea for a reusable orbital vehicle that he called the “space tug.” In a note to 
self, McGolrick imagined a small, reusable craft, either crewed or uncrewed, whose 
versatility would allow the United States to maintain a vast future infrastructure in outer 
space over the next decade. McGolrick’s vision of the space tug supported several 
different missions that, if implemented, would go a long way towards keeping space safe, 
affordable, and clean: 
 
One space tug mission would be to correct the orbit of earth satellities [sic]. This 
could prolong the life of some satellites, which would otherwise prematurely enter 
the earth's atmosphere. Satellities [sic] requiring precise positioning could be 
made simpler, cheaper and more reliable if their final positioning was made by a 
space tug. It could even come back from time to time to make minor corrections 
or move the satellite to a new position. A space tug could afford a means of 
cleaning junk out of space by directing it at the earth's atmosphere. It 
could…bring friendly satellites to orbiting space stations for repair.515 
 
Written when only a few dozen artificial satellites circled the planet, months before the 
first human flew into space, and years before the cost overruns of the moon project and 
the subsequent downturn in the American aerospace industry of the 1970s, this memo 
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suggests that some at NASA had already considered the ramifications of the single-use 
economy from an early moment in the Space Age. McGolrick primarily emphasized the 
importance of developing space technology that could support longer-lived, less-
expensive satellites, which made up the largest percentage of the total cost of space 
launches.516 The form of the tug itself does not matter much in this memo; what matters is 
the ways in which it might enable a new way of saving money and maintaining order in a 
forbidding environment that would not make such efforts easy. In closing, McGolrick 
claims that human presence and space would not become routine until such satellite 
servicing and removal practices became the norm. 
 The 1969 Space Task Group report specified that the next generation space 
transportation system should include just such a vehicle. In April 1970, the NASA 
Manned Space Center put out a request to the American aerospace industry for 
preliminary studies of a reusable Space Tug, formalizing the name that McGolrick 
speculated a decade earlier. The call for proposals specified that such a vehicle should be 
versatile enough to operate from low-Earth orbit to the moon, and be capable of boosting 
spacecraft to high altitudes, supporting construction projects, and rescuing and repairing 
disabled spacecraft. It should be designed to operate autonomously or with an onboard 
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crew. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) published a press release the following 
month that highlighted the tug as an important component of a larger, multi-vehicle 
Space Transportation System—relatively small and mundane in purpose but no less 
crucial than the “larger and more publicized” shuttle and space station.517 The Space Tug 
would also be at the core of STS self-maintenance, keeping all other components in 
working order to preclude expensive replacements for any piece of the system that should 
fail. Marshall engineers proposed that the tug would have particular value in its capacity 
as a “satellite repair shop”: 
 
Arriving at a satellite, for example, powered by a propulsion module, two 
astronauts in a crew module could use manipulator arms to grasp and insert the 
satellite into the cargo module. The module could then be pressurized, the crew 
could enter it and repair or service the satellite (without going outside the craft). 
The satellite could also be taken inside the cargo module to a space station for 
extensive repair.518 
 
The following year, North American Rockwell completed a preliminary, pre-Phase A 
study for NASA that pitched significant savings based on a projected ten-year span of 
Tug use. Noting that the failure rate of satellites after reaching orbit hovered between 5 to 
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10 percent, Rockwell researchers claimed that retrieval, repair, and relaunch of 
satellites—particularly those from GEO—would yield some $15000 per pound of 
satellite in savings over wholesale replacement. They projected that over the course of ten 
years, payload recovery and repair would eventually yield $250 million in savings, a 
figure that would all but recoup the initial outlay to develop, test, and operate the Space 
Tug.519 In addition to paying for itself, Marshall researchers argued the next year that the 
Tug would make the difference in whether or not the STS project as a whole would meet 
the primary goal of bringing down the cost of spaceflight. The Shuttle, while planned to 
be maneuverable, would not be capable of reaching orbits beyond several hundred 
kilometers in altitude. The ability to retrieve payloads from very high orbits, which could 
only be achieved using a versatile hypothetical tug, would be the key to making the 
shuttle itself “economically feasible.”520 Two other American companies, including 
Boeing and the Aerospace Corporation, as well as the European Launcher Development 
Organization, conducted pre-Phase A studies on the Space Tug in 1970 and 1971. Each 
study inextricably tied the Tug to Shuttle costs: Both must be developed and used in 
efficient conjunction for the economy of reuse to be truly successful over the course of a 
decade of operations.521 
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 The Tug would effectively increase the diameter of space access on the order of 
several thousand kilometers. Without the Tug to reach higher altitudes in order to launch 
and retrieve malfunctioning satellites, the STS would fall far short of the economies 
suggested by its advocates. The Mathematica studies of 1971 and 1972 also put forward 
the necessity of a Space Tug to make the STS system cheaper than the extant expendable 
launch regime.522 By April 1972, Marshall put out a call for a more intensive, nine-month 
study of a Space Tug that would be “an efficient, compact system designed exclusively 
for delivery and retrieval of space payloads” to and from the Shuttle, thus providing a 
seamless transit link from high, geosynchronous orbits to the surface of the Earth.523 As 
MSFC and the Johnson Space Center (JSC) generated in-house studies and solicited 
external reviews of potential Tug design capabilities, each description and call for 
proposals emphasized that any Space Tug must become available for use at the same time 
as the space shuttle in order to ensure that the STS could be used immediately to retrieve 
and service satellites—and by extension, to set the accumulation of savings in motion as 
soon as possible. Although the Space Transportation System would go through several 
conceptual design changes—dropping the nuclear shuttle, gaining a shuttle-based 
Spacelab, the rise and fall of different space station concepts—the Space Tug remained a 
constant requirement of STS proposals throughout the 1970s.524  
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 However, even as NASA studies compartmentalized the Tug and the Shuttle 
together in co-development and readiness, the less flashy component of the STS did not 
garner enough of a spotlight to merit the same level of steadfast internal and external 
support in the midst of setbacks. From the outset of the Shuttle project in 1972, Fletcher 
acknowledged that expendable orbital rocket stage would be necessary to fill any gaps in 
development between Shuttle and Tug.525 By 1974, the DOD agreed to develop a “kick 
motor” upper stage for use by both NASA and military projects that required payload 
placement in high orbits.526 Called the “Interim Upper Stage” (IUS), this expendable 
rocket would not have the capacity to retrieve payloads; it would simply provide a 
stopgap until the NASA-developed reusable Tug could be called into service.527 After 
over two years of competition, the DOD contracted Boeing to develop a solid rocket 
concept for the IUS that could deploy from either the Shuttle or extant expendable 
rockets to deliver payloads to high orbits, then maneuver into a different orbit for 
disposal so as not to present a collision risk to the newly activated satellite.528 By 1975, 
the DOD had committed to providing IUS units beginning in 1980, until the mid-80s 
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when NASA projected that the tug would be ready for use.529 As the IUS development 
also began to slip, McDonnell Douglas developed a similar single-use kick motor for use 
on expendable rockets and modifiable for Shuttle use. Built by a private company for 
primary use by commercial customers, the Spinning Solid Upper Stage (SSUS) would 
not cost the federal government any development money, with the added benefit of 
providing a unique ability to deploy spinning payloads.530 The SSUS would eventually 
become known as the Payload Assist Module (PAM).531 Each of these technologies was 
expendable—they could only be used once. In spite of being designed to deploy from a 
partially reusable spacecraft, these kick motors reinforced the existing single-use 
paradigm. 
 Because neither the IUS nor the PAM were being designed to retrieve payloads, 
when the Skylab space station began to fall from orbit towards the end of the decade, the 
Tug and an accompanying mechanism referred to as the Teleoperator Retrieval System 
(TRS) once again became a top priority at NASA. Many at the agency hoped that the 
imminent first launch of the space shuttle alongside completion of the Tug and TRS 
would allow astronauts to either boost the station to a higher orbit, or bring it back to 
Earth. However, as the development schedule for the Shuttle slipped, the Tug and TRS 
project went over budget and had to be temporarily abandoned. Skylab fell from orbit as 
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expected, and in the without the immediacy of a potential reentry disaster the focus on a 
reusable high orbit booster solution shifted in short order. By 1981, the Space Tug was no 
longer on the table, though space technology reports from that year onward continued to 
gesture to “low level efforts” to build a Space Tug at some future date.532 
 The expendable rocket stages that served a smaller subset of the planned Tug’s 
functions effectively extended the reach of the Shuttle from its low-Earth orbit 
operational ceiling, boosting satellites to GEO and in some cases sending space probes 
such as Galileo, Magellan, and Ulysses on their way to other planets and the Sun.533 
Fifteen IUS units launched aboard space shuttles, including one that was destroyed 
during the ill-fated Challenger’s final flight.534 An IUS unit that never launched currently 
hangs above the payload bay of the Shuttle habitability trainer in the Boeing-sponsored 
Museum of Flight in Seattle, Washington. An explanatory sign notes that Boeing 
designed the stage only to fill in for the planned reusable Space Tug before it could enter 
service, but after budget cuts the IUS became the “permanent solution” for high orbit 
missions.535 At this point, the word “interim” no longer described this technology; to 
preserve the in-use acronym, it became known as the “Inertial Upper Stage”—a less 
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ethereal name for a less than ideal fix.536 The name shift along with the preserved 
acronym illustrates another attribute of the unswayable technological momentum of space 
technology: even as the intended use shifted in profound ways, the in-use acronym 
proved so entrenched as to remain in place even as the underlying words changed. 
 As the STS program limped along in development and ran over budget, it became 
more difficult to justify the price of developing such a reusable ancillary vehicle. As a 
1982 study of potential orbital transfer vehicles indicated, none of the necessary 
component technologies for such a vehicle existed yet. The procedures and technologies 
would require extensive in situ development and testing at considerable cost and human 
hours. Terrestrial testing could not provide the necessary conditions to fully test and 
develop methods to construct, operate, and maintain such a vehicle. A particular 
challenge came in the need to safely transfer and store fuel in a microgravity vacuum, 
which would be necessary for a reusable Tug.537 By contrast, an expendable upper stage 
like the IUS and PAM would not require refueling, and could be based largely on extant 
rocket technologies that had already been extensively tested in space during the Apollo 
program. While the reusable Space Tug promised to revolutionize the American satellite 
infrastructure, the necessary wholesale overhaul of the rest of the transportation system 
and the challenges of the space environment proved too big an obstacle for Tug designers 
to bring their plans to fruition in the midst of the stable, settled single-use paradigm. 
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Space Operations Center 
SOC: We’ve got a bunch of satellites coming in for servicing close to your arrival time, 
but we’ll hold them for you. 
 
Tanker 3: Thanks….we have a full load of cry[ogenics] for you….an extra 11,500 pounds 
from the ET. Looks like the boost engines were better than nominal on today’s run. That 
ground crew is doing a great job!538 
 
Relative to the small, agile Space Tug, plans for a continuously operated Space Station 
inspired a more visible debate and controversy within and outside NASA.539 With the 
space shuttle ferrying people and cargo from Earth to orbit and a versatile Space tug 
providing the link to higher orbits, this third piece of infrastructure rounded out early 
conceptions of the reusable Space Transportation System. Robert R. Gilruth, the first 
director of the Manned Spacecraft Center (later renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space 
Center) argued in 1968 that to achieve true economy in space flight, America would need 
to first achieve a permanent presence in orbit.540 While a space station of some sort 
featured in nearly every STS proposal from the late 1960s through the 1980s, the size, 
shape, and purpose of such a station varied widely from person to person and among staff 
at different NASA centers. The initiative to reuse space technology showed up in the 
proposed form and function of several space station ideas studied by NASA and its 
contractors during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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 At the time that the NASA centers began developing STS space station concepts, 
they had a single reference point for permanent American presence on orbit. The Skylab 
space station launched atop (and was made of pieces of) a spare Saturn V moon rocket. 
For two years three different crews of three astronauts used Skylab as an orbital 
laboratory, conducting mostly medical and astronomy experiments within the station and 
undertaking spacewalks to fix the station itself when automated systems failed. In NASA 
terminology, Skylab was a Space Laboratory. The station did not have the thrusters 
necessary for maneuverability and could not be used as a base from which to construct or 
retrieve satellites. At first, Skylab mission operators hoped to reuse the station after its 
final crew departed, reviving the derelict vessel and repurposing it for use as an extension 
of the Shuttle during missions that would require roomier accommodations.541 Plans for 
such reuse imagined the second iteration of Skylab as extra laboratory space, relatively 
spacious quarters for less hardy astronauts, and even eventually as the backbone to a 
manufacturing and repair center in orbit.542 Once it became clear that the Shuttle would 
not be ready in time to boost Skylab to a high enough orbit to prevent it from reentering 
the atmosphere, NASA officials realized that they would need to start from scratch on a 
new form of orbital platform. In exchanges between administrators and researchers, three 
clearly delineated types of station emerged as the most appropriate applications of limited 
funds and research resources during the upcoming STS era: a station that would support 
																																								 																				
541 J. Murphy, B. Chubb, and H. Gierow, “Skylab Reuse Study Presented to Mr. Yardley by 
MSFC.” 
542 “Skylab Reuse Program Strawman Plan”; Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., “Skylab Reuse.” 
		
234 
Space Industrialization, an Operational Base, or another Space Laboratory.543 Different 
NASA centers, from Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland to the Manned Space 
Center in Texas, each backed one of these primary station functions depending on the 
mission strengths of the institution. However, many Space Laboratory models such as 
those advocated by NASA Goddard personnel during the mid 1970s included satellite 
servicing and operations in the overall mission.544 Satellite servicing became a consistent 
refrain in many station concepts as the most important factor in justifying and recouping 
the cost of STS development.545 
 As part of an ideal Space Transportation System, a continuously occupied space 
station would provide the on-demand access to space technology that the STS was 
intended to facilitate. The form and purpose of the space station—and the degree of its 
autonomy as a separate component of the larger STS—vacillated widely under the tenure 
of different presidential administrations and NASA administrators.546 Regardless of the 
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intended primary use of the space station, the role of the station to facilitate space 
technology reuse showed up in several early proposals. One early idea for an orbiting 
platform, proposed by Fletcher and later supported by Beggs, demonstrated the feasibility 
and challenges of building a spacecraft quite literally upon reuse.547 This proposal 
suggested using discarded space shuttle external tanks (ET) for purposes ranging from 
equipment storage to crew quarters.548 Each large ET by design fell back into the 
atmosphere after feeding liquid fuel to the orbiter’s main engines—a disposable 
component of the otherwise reusable space shuttle system. What could be cheaper, 
Fletcher’s space station team argued, than building the foundations of a necessary piece 
of infrastructure using an expensive technology that otherwise immediately went to 
waste?549 This plan would not move beyond an early, informal proposal, though it 
recurred periodically throughout the Skylab and Shuttle programs, cropping up as part of 
the Skylab reuse study of the mid-1970s and in studies conducted as recently as the early 
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years of the International Space Station program.550 The authors of one such proposal 
acknowledged the likely material difficulties of using an ET to build a space station, 
noting: “The alchemists of the Middle Ages who sought to transform lead into gold 
would feel quite at home with space designers seeking to transform expended rocket 
propellant tanks into useful space payloads."551 In imagining a second life for expendable 
launch technology, those who supported an ET-based space station took the reuse 
initiative to the next level, transforming an artifact designed to be disposable into a 
utility-laden object of value. 
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Figure 4.2: This artistic conception portrays one potential reuse for the expendable 
shuttle external tank, as part of an orbital construction facility.552 
 
 In another study sponsored by NASA and actively researched by aerospace 
subcontractors from the late 70s to early 80s, the space station itself became a critical part 
of the reuse economy, serving as the neighborhood salvage and recycling center for low-
Earth to geosynchronous orbits. The Space Operations Center (SOC) station proposal 
grew out of an idea by researchers at the Johnson Space Center in the late 1970s. Those at 
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NASA, Rockwell, and Boeing that executed studies of the proposed SOC aimed to design 
an orbiting depot where astronauts and automated vehicles could undertake satellite 
repurposing, refurbishing, and salvage on a daily basis. Contributors to the planning of 
the SOC did not intend the station to be a scientific lab like Skylab and the spacecraft that 
would eventually become the International Space Station. As the name implies, its 
primary purpose was to support operational missions—run-of-the-mill construction 
projects, maintenance, and transportation that would keep the space infrastructure 
running cleanly and cheaply for government and commercial space consumers.553 The 
SOC model provided a permanent, consistently occupied, in situ berth for the space 
shuttle, a Space Tug, and an orbital maneuvering vehicle like the ill-fated TRS. Using the 
SOC as a home base, astronauts could manipulate satellites as high as geosynchronous 
orbit or even the moon.554 As one NASA press release argued, the SOC would provide 
the cheapest way to maintain the growing satellite infrastructure through upgrading and 
repairing faltering satellites rather than the expensive contemporary—and continuing—
practice of launching replacement satellites in the event of failure or obsolescence.555 
 Johnson Space Center researchers rallied around the Operational Base model of 
the space station at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, and the SOC became a 
																																								 																				
553 Some space station studies presented a teleological “evolutionary” set of steps for 
development of an orbital platform—typically starting with a laboratory craft, then a site for 
technology testing, and then, in its most evolved form, an operations base. See for instance 
“Evolutionary Space Platform Concept Study.  Volume 1,” 19–22. 
554 Mission Evolution Through Hardware Commonality; Planetary Mission Evolution, January 1, 
1970; Spacecraft Reuse and Commonality. 
555 “Unique STS Services” (NASA, n.d. ca 1984), Satellite Retrieval from Space 20226, NASA 
Headquarters Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
		
239 
favored option for implementing this mission.556 Sam H. Nassif of the Program 
Development Office of the NASA Engineering and Development Directorate noted that 
the SOC would provide “a logical extension of the operationally oriented space capability 
that began with the space shuttle.”557 With the space shuttle providing space customers 
with cheap, reliable ways to extend the functional lives of satellites, the SOC would 
provide greater working and storage space, particularly for unfixable satellites that could 
then be brought back to Earth for salvage upon the next returning Shuttle.558 With 
retrievable satellites in service and an agile Space Tug, or even an expendable orbital 
maneuvering vehicle, JSC personnel and affiliated researchers at Rockwell International 
expected the SOC to provide the key to access to all orbital altitudes and the reduction of 
necessary Shuttle flights, which had already become more expensive than initially 
hoped.559 While none of the SOC designs made use of discarded Shuttle fuel tanks as part 
of the material infrastructure, researchers sought to reduce the amount of waste generated 
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with each jettisoned ET.560 For instance, in the Rockwell SOC study, each Shuttle flight 
would end with the ET accompanying the orbiter to the station, whereupon any excess 
fuel therein would be transferred to a holding tank. Instead of dissipating in atmosphere 
or ocean with the rest of the disintegrating ET, this fuel could then be used to power the 
orbital transfer vehicles, and perhaps even refuel satellites.561 
 By May 1981, acting NASA Administrator Alan Lovelace came out with his 
support for the SOC, calling for an operational station by 1984.562 Astronauts John Young 
and Robert Crippen, who flew the first space shuttle mission the previous month, also 
supported the SOC concept, calling it “the next logical step to our exploration of 
space.”563 The DOD concurred, with officials expressing their desire to save money 
through regular refurbishing of defense payloads.564 The following month, Representative 
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Bill Nelson publicly called for the Reagan Administration to commit to putting the SOC 
in orbit by 1989.565 However, NASA never devoted funds to the development of the SOC 
beyond the initial Phase A concept. The NASA budget for fiscal year 1982 allocated only 
$1 million for continuing SOC studies.566 At the end of November 1981, Reagan’s 
assistant director for national security at the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
argued that the SOC should not be America’s next step in space, and that if such a 
spacecraft should become necessary then the private sector would fill the void—a charge 
that would prove prescient of future launch vehicle policy positions taken by Reagan in 
subsequent years. Such directives would adversely shift the American space industry 
away from reuse.567 
 By 1990, plans for Space Station Freedom (which would eventually turn into the 
International Space Station program) were already in motion, with the station explicitly 
defined as a laboratory for scientific research. Initially, Freedom would also be used as a 
home base for the construction and servicing of spacecraft—but specifically human 
spacecraft intended for Mars and the moon, rather than Earth-orbiting satellites.568 By the 
time the first modules of the space station reached orbit, the construction and servicing 
component fell away, and the International Space Station (ISS) of today primarily 
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operates as a scientific research facility. The ISS’s shape was determined by the size of 
the Shuttle’s payload bay, as anticipated by those who hoped that the payload bay would 
shape a cheaper standardized satellite. The ISS does not have the facilities to serve as an 
orbital repair shop, and for the most part its thrusters are only used to move it out of the 
way of space junk that might have been cleaned up using the Space Transportation 
System in its original form. 
NASA and its international partners used the space shuttle as the primary 
workhorse to build the ISS, which has been continuously occupied for a decade. The ISS 
took a shape determined by the size of the Shuttle’s payload bay, and serves as an 
orbiting science laboratory rather than an operations center.. Early cost projects of the 
SOC and ISS suggested that a similar investment would be necessary to build a 
permanent structure in space. In 1981, JSC staff estimated the cost of developing and 
operating an SOC in conjunction with a Space Tug would come to some $1.5 billion per 
year initially, tapering down after 3 years.569 A separate estimate brought the total SOC 
cost to $6.99 billion including the cost of seven shuttle launches over the two years 
budgeted for building the station.570 In 1993 NASA adjusted the American contribution to 
ISS construction to around $1.3 billion per year from 1994 to 2005, rising to over $2 
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billion during peak years of construction.571 While this figure parallels the projected costs 
for the SOC, the ISS required 40 total construction launches, including 36 shuttle flights 
over the course of twelve years.572 
Although the actual costs of the SOC had it been approved cannot be calculated, 
and the total costs of the ISS including Shuttle launches also cannot be easily determined, 
in the planning stages the ISS and SOC models diverged in terms of cost recouping 
through satellite recycling. As a laboratory with no equipment to capture or refurbish 
satellites, cost estimates for the ISS did not incorporate any additional projected savings 
through providing a platform for satellite repair and reuse. In contrast, 1981 budget 
projections for the SOC included millions of dollars in savings by the year 2000, 
particularly if the station operated in conjunction with an upgraded Shuttle and reusable 
Space Tug.573 With the loss of the SOC in favor of a second Space Laboratory to succeed 
Skylab, another important piece of the reusability paradigm fell by the wayside. 
 
Reusable Satellites 
Planning for the space shuttle began in earnest in 1970, but was not without its enduring 
skeptics. For instance, Democratic senator Walter Mondale consistently resisted the 
expenditure of such large sums of federal money that would be required as an initial 
																																								 																				
571 “International Space Station (ISS) Response to the Cost Assessment And Validation Task 
Force on the ISS,” June 15, 1998, NASA.gov. 
572 NASA considers forty missions to have been dedicated to the construction of the International 
Space Station, including those that used the Shuttle as well as missions launched atop expendable 
Russian rockets. “International Space Station Assembly - Past Flights,” NASA.gov, accessed June 
2, 2016, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/iss_assembly.html. 
573 J. P. Loftus, “Advanced Missions Briefing for Administrator.” 
		
244 
outlay, no matter the projected eventual savings.574 Fletcher addressed these concerns by 
emphasizing that the Shuttle would provide over a billion dollars in savings compared to 
expendables once it became operational. He cited studies by the Aerospace Corporation 
and other external organizations that demonstrated the monetary payoff of repairing and 
maintaining satellites, even if some would be lost to obsolescence. However, Fletcher 
also clearly delineated the need to provide other “essential future elements” that would 
make it truly reusable—including the Space Tug, and perhaps most importantly, satellites 
that had been built from the outset to be retrievable and reparable. Rather than requiring a 
staggering research and development expenditure, Fletcher argued that “repair and 
maintenance of satellites in orbit is technically and practically feasible when the satellites 
have been designed with this in mind.”575 
 As part of STS development, NASA dedicated resources to developing a new 
satellite design called the multimission modular spacecraft (MMS). Initially developed 
for scientific research satellites, the MMS streamlined manufacturing costs by 
incorporating standardized modules for power, attitude control, communications, and 
data management, thereby fulfilling the “commonality” priority from the original 1968 
Space Task Group report. In addition to saving money by manufacturing these 
components in bulk rather than building them to spec for individual missions, MMS 
designers expected that standardized modules would save money by enabling easier on-
orbit repairs to failing satellites. Because all MMS satellites used the same components, 
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replacement parts would be easy and cheap to both procure and install. In 1981, NASA 
projected that some 75 percent of space science missions of the 1980s could be achieved 
using the MMS. The first tests of the MMS model came with the Solar Maximum 
Mission and two Landsat satellites. NASA anticipated that other astronomical, 
geophysical, climatological, and defense missions could be fulfilled by the MMS at 
greatly reduced costs to the customer.576 
 Additionally, NASA developed several larger satellites that would be retrievable 
from orbit, some of which used the MMS system. The candidates for such design 
supported science research that would benefit from regular servicing and upgrades. Four 
such satellites went into service: the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), Compton Gamma 
Ray Observatory, Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, and the Upper Atmosphere Research 
Satellite.577 Of these four, only the Hubble received visits from the Shuttle—five over a 
span of seventeen years, most infamously in 1993 to correct the telescope’s faulty 
optics.578 Both the MMS and larger research satellites required specific features in order 
to be considered “man-rated,” or safely manipulated by astronauts. These features 
included hand holds and safety locks, and required larger overhead to include—which 
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some satellite customers found onerous.579 However, not just any satellite could be 
retrieved by Shuttle astronauts, as NASA demonstrated in several initial satellite rescue 
missions during the mid-1980s. The high speeds at which satellites orbit in microgravity 
conditions, as well as the risk inherent in sending astronauts into a lethal environment, 
rendered repair nearly impossible without safety and manipulation devices that astronauts 
could be adequately trained to use.580 In published materials intended to describe the 
latest space technology to the American public, the NASA public affairs department 
described the HST as “a test-bed for satellite repair work.” Lockheed designed the HST 
to be serviced in space, and occasionally brought back to Earth for more complicated 
upgrading and refurbishing.581 
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Figure 4.3: The Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) served as the basis for several 
different satellites across a wide variety of science missions. Two of the featured 
spacecraft have reentered the atmosphere, and one continues to orbit the planet following 
its decommissioning in 2001.582  
 
 In addition to putting up the development costs from the outset in an austere 
budget environment, NASA also ran into obstacles of compliance with its intended 
satellite customer base. In 1982, JSC researcher Gordon Rysavy lamented NASA 
management’s lack of attention to the need for a coordinated set of rules and regulations 
for retrievable satellites, like the technical manuals provided by the FAA to military and 
civilian jet manufacturers. Rysavy claimed that commercial satellite customers especially 
had clamored for such defined parameters, and that NASA’s failure to provide them may 
have set satellite servicing back by five years—at a cost of some $1.5 billion in estimated 
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savings to be achieved through reuse.583 A Grumman Aerospace Corporation estimated 
that the cost of repairing a satellite in orbit represented only 5 to 10 percent of the cost of 
building a new satellite.584 However, in order to achieve these savings satellite customers 
had to comply with man-rating standards that NASA did not have the resources to 
distribute and regulate.  
The strange physical environment of orbital space precluded any simple, one-
point solution to replace expensive single-use space infrastructure with reusable 
technologies. Most satellites launched into orbit would never be seen again, and no 
spacecraft existed that could reach artifacts at orbits above a few hundred kilometers. 
Therefore, they were not designed in such a way as to make capture or repair possible. 
Catching a satellite in a microgravity environment in which objects move at speeds of 
upwards of 7 kilometers per hour presented a design challenge. Like the airline industry 
of the preceding decades, satellite designers would need to adhere to a set of 
specifications in order to qualify for access to outer space.585 Advocates of the reusability 
paradigm saw greater economy in a more standardized form of satellite that they believed 
would take shape dictated by the rest of the technological system in which it would be 
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embedded. Constrained in size by the payload capacity of the proposed space shuttle 
orbiter, commercial and government satellites would become part of a larger, integrated 
system of reuse. 
Compromises and Cuts 
Those who advocated the development of the reusable Space Tug, Space Operations 
Center, and serviceable satellites as the components of a reusable space transportation 
infrastructure argued that the United States ought to work on making space a place for 
industry, rather than solely a place for conducting science. While on the surface this 
perhaps runs counter to the uses of space advocated by astronomers and biologists during 
the early years of the Space Age, the operational model of Space Transportation System 
nonetheless would support the overall goals of those who sought to protect the nearest 
regions of outer space for scientific research.586 Not only would the large space telescope 
be designed from the outset to be serviceable by astronauts or brought back to Earth for 
full upgrading; but the ability to reach a wide breadth of near-Earth space to retrieve 
nonfunctional satellites would mean a less cluttered place, a site of scientific research that 
would be protected from potential collisions and obstructions.587 
 As the Shuttle slipped in schedule and rose in costs, each additional piece of the 
Space Transportation System fell victim to the vagaries of legislative and presidential 
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support. The nuclear shuttle dissipated in the face of contemporary anti-nuclear politics; 
the reusable Space Tug gave way in the face of skyrocketing Shuttle expenses and 
competitive expendable launch vehicles; and the operations model of Space Station 
yielded to a more competitive laboratory version. Soon, the space shuttle was all that 
remained from the heady proposals for an integrated, highly reusable space transportation 
system of the 1970s.588 The name “Space Transportation System” eventually became a 
synonym for the space shuttle.589 As physicist Thomas Johnson argued six years after the 
first Shuttle launch, the Shuttle program ultimately failed because it was “expected to do 
the impossible”—in Johnson’s framing, to provide an economy of scale that would 
financially justify the program without cutting corners that would lead to catastrophes 
like Challenger in 1986.590 It failed to deliver on its promises, which were willfully 
sustained in order to maintain support from presidents and other branches of government. 
 In its 1981 report, Rockwell researchers laid out the ideal elements of an 
operational system in orbit: Shuttle, man, SOC, orbital transfer vehicle, and serviceable 
satellites.591 By that time, the first two of those elements had flown together and returned 
safely to the Earth, with plans underway for a second launch the following month. The 
second two elements continued to be debated among NASA personnel as the Space 
Station program evolved and private enterprise developed expendable kick motors for 
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interim use. The final component—satellites that were designed to be serviceable by the 
other components of the system—would be the next test of the reusability. Even as the 
operational Shuttle proved pricier than hoped, and the Space Tug that would provide 
efficient access to higher orbits remained in limbo, many at NASA anticipated that the 
most expensive part of the single use economy could still be replaced with more 
affordable, standardized, reusable technologies. By the third year of the Shuttle program, 
several critical trials would test the ultimate feasibility of the reuse economy. 
Testing the Limits of Reuse 
After the Shuttle went into service, and in the midst of debates over what form the 
proposed space station should take, NASA demonstrated the feasibility of each of the 
capabilities promised by a reusable space transportation and operations platform. As a 
servicing station for satellites, such a system must be able to provide the ability to 
achieve, with regularity and reliability, the three Rs of a reusable space technology ethos: 
retrieve, repair, refuel. Each of these capabilities would be necessary in order to maintain 
a longer-lived, and therefore more economical satellite. If any one of these tasks could 
not be completed on budget and on time, the extant paradigm of expensive, single-use, 
multipurpose satellites would continue into an indefinite future. 
 Within nine months in 1984, NASA astronauts tested all three Rs using the space 
shuttle. In April of that year, astronauts maneuvered the Challenger within range of the 
malfunctioning Solar Maximum satellite. An astronaut used a remote jet pack to reach 
and grapple the Solar Maximum satellite, then used the orbiter’s remote manipulator arm 
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to bring the satellite into the payload bay for the astronauts to assess and repair.592 After 
replacing a faulty electronics box, they returned the satellite to orbit to continue its 
mission of collecting data about the sun for an additional five years before it reentered the 
atmosphere. The astronauts filmed the retrieval, repair, and redeployment of Solar Max 
using the then-new IMAX film camera, immortalizing their activities in the movie The 
Dream is Alive. On the same mission, astronauts deployed the Long Duration Exposure 
Facility (LDEF), which would reveal the mixture of micrometeoroids, and anthropogenic 
debris in low-Earth orbit over the course of its six years in orbit after a different mission 
retrieved it in 1990.593 
 Later that same year, in October 1984, astronauts tested a refueling system that 
could be used to revive satellites that had used up propellants—once a satellite consumes 
its maneuvering fuel, it can no longer maintain its orbit and as a result often cannot fulfill 
mission objects. On the STS-41-G mission, astronauts transferred hydrazine fuel from 
one spherical bladder tank to another using the experimental Orbital Refueling System. 
Although they did not retrieve and refuel any extant satellites, this demonstration showed 
that volatile fuel could be safely transferred from one tank to another in microgravity 
using pressurized nitrogen as the propelling force.594 Should such a practice become 
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common, then satellites that continued to provide useful services could spend longer in 
orbit, requiring fewer expensive replacements using entirely new satellites. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: This image from a briefing on the Space Operations Center space station 
model demonstrates high hopes among NASA researchers at the Johnson Space Center 
for the future ability to refurbish and refuel satellites in situ and at low cost.595 
 
The following month, NASA demonstrated the feasibility of accomplishing a 
third lynchpin of the reuse economy using the space shuttle. When the Challenger 
deployed the Westar and Palapa communications satellites earlier that year, the single-use 
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PAM-D orbital maneuvering vehicle intended to boost the satellites to geosynchronous 
orbit failed to function correctly. They remained stuck in an orbit too low to provide the 
services for which they were designed. The companies that had insured the Westar and 
Palapa satellites made a deal with NASA: The insurance companies would pay for 
astronauts to retrieve and return the satellites to Earth for refurbishment and eventual 
resale. After an extensive training period in which they practiced the customized rescue 
plan devised for this particular mission, the team of astronauts that flew aboard the 
Discovery that November first deployed two new satellites from the orbiter’s payload 
bay, leaving room for the drifting Westar and Palapa satellites. Satellite controllers first 
had to use the satellites’ thrusters to move them to a lower altitude and reduced spin for 
easier manual capture. Because both satellites had been designed to be deployed using the 
space shuttle, their size and shape made it possible to return both artifacts safely to the 
ground. However, they had not been designed to be serviced, as both satellites were 
destined for geosynchronous orbit far above the Shuttle’s highest functional altitude. In 
order to bring the satellites back to Earth, astronauts had to manually grapple each using a 
specially designed device meant to be inserted into the empty motor casing on one end of 
the satellite, then use the thrusters of the newly designed manned maneuvering unit to 
slow the spin of both satellite and astronaut so that the Shuttle’s remote manipulator arm 
might then attach to the newly inserted grappling device. The lack of pre-installed 
servicing features on the satellites complicated their rescue. The astronauts themselves 
expressed doubt that the mission would succeed. According to astronaut Joseph Allen, 
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mission commander Rick Hauck exclaimed that “it would be a fucking miracle” to get 
both satellites back to Earth as planned.596 
 After struggling to follow the training plan and improvising new techniques, the 
astronauts successfully retrieved the satellites. Upon safely securing them into the 
payload bay, astronaut Dale Gardner posted a “for sale” sign on one to indicate its 
intended future reuse. The Westar 6 satellite would eventually be sold to Chinese 
company AsiaSat, which refurbished and launched again in 1990 atop a single-use Long 
March rocket. Westar/AsiaSat represents the only instance of successful salvage and 
reuse of a flown satellite. Whether the insurance company recouped its losses through the 
sale to AsiaSat remains a proprietary matter. 
 These three demonstrations of each the three Rs of space economy appeared to be 
the culmination of over a decade of negotiations with three different presidential 
administrations. NASA had met the goal set by Fletcher and Nixon a decade earlier, and 
as one space policy analyst claimed in 1985, the “era of ‘throw away’ space activities is 
coming to an end.”597 Riding on the success of these missions, the future seemed bright 
for a reuse economy in space. In an open letter to NASA in the magazine “Space World,” 
space journalist David Leonard called for NASA to use these abilities to do even more 
than revitalize the orbiting infrastructure on the cheap. He suggested that the Shuttle 
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could be used to save a select number of orbiting artifacts that had historic or cultural 
value; the shuttle could bring back such treasures as the first weather satellite. In addition 
to preserving priceless historical artifacts, this practice would serve an ancillary benefit, 
clearing orbital regions and making more room for functioning technologies while giving 
space junk a second life in a museum.598 
A Return to Disposability 
In the end, the shuttle itself would become one of the only spacecraft of its era to enjoy 
this form of retirement. When the space shuttle program ended in 2011, its three 
remaining orbiter spacecraft went on to second lives as popular artifacts in museums 
around America.599 NASA dedicated one of the final missions of the Shuttle program to 
servicing the storied Hubble Space Telescope. Over its 26 years on orbit, the Hubble has 
hosted five crews of visiting astronauts and persisted alongside the Shuttle as a rare relic 
of the paradigm of reuse envisioned during the long 1970s. During a final Hubble 
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servicing mission in 2009 astronauts installed several new instruments in the telescope 
and retrieved the instruments that groundbreaking optical corrections equipment installed 
during the 1993 repair.600 Given how rarely NASA used the space shuttle in its initial 
planned role as a salvager, these space-flown artifacts are a true rarity. They now reside 
at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in a display that teaches about the 
handful of repair missions achieved using the Shuttle—also a true rarity in the history of 
space technology.601  
 The economy of reuse envisioned during the long 1970s fell victim to the same 
combination of social and environmental factors that made the shift an uphill battle from 
the outset. The proliferation of STS planning studies generated by NASA and American 
aerospace companies during the mid-1970s predicted an economy of scale that would 
eventually follow the wholesale implementation of a reusable space infrastructure. The 
sticker shock that legislators suffered in response to the anticipated outlay needed to 
develop the brand-new space shuttle system proved difficult for its supporters to 
counteract. After this struggle, studies for the SOC model of space station emphasized a 
lower initial investment required for research and development, given that such a station 
would be built entirely out of “off-the-shelf” technology. However, the one-two punch of 
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the upfront sticker shock needed to develop, build, and test the space shuttle and its 
planned STS counterparts, and the eventual skyrocketing costs of the Shuttle program 
itself doomed the dream of a fully reusable space infrastructure that many at NASA had 
hoped would come to fruition by the 1990s and 2000s. While the success of such an 
economic ethos would undeniably save money in the long run, a publicly funded space 
program required the kind of investment and legislative support that no number of 
dramatic satellite rescues could inspire. As seen in subsequent and continuing legislative 
fights over other large-scale civilian satellite programs, garnering enough financial 
support for the construction of new, expensive spacecraft presents a battle by those who 
hope to use the space environment.602 
 Although it remained in use for thirty years, the space shuttle is considered by 
many historians and amateur space junkies alike to have been a failure.603 Its skyrocketing 
costs, proportionally high rate of failure, irregular launch rate, and inability to move 
beyond the close confines of low-Earth orbit seem to some to have accomplished the 
opposite of its stated purpose of routinizing space travel on the road to Mars and beyond; 
rather, many argue it closed America out of the final frontier through demonstrating the 
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considerable material and economic limits of routinely inhabiting space.604 As the one 
part of the Space Transportation System that did come to full fruition, the Nixon through 
Reagan administrations accepted the upfront cost for the Shuttle. Unfortunately the in-use 
costs for the program ballooned well beyond the economy that was promised to follow 
after that investment. By 2011 each launch cost approximately $450 million. Shuttle 
flights became too expensive to justify using the spacecraft for routine satellite 
launches.605 Building one-off expendable launch vehicles, while akin in cost to wasting a 
747 after each transatlantic flight, still amounted to fewer overall expenditures than 
required to launch, land, inspect, and refurbish a crewed spacecraft, which cost more than 
any airplane in existence—in stark contrast to the promise of a revolution in space travel 
to match that of civil aviation decades earlier. 
 The price of flights constituted only one component of the technological 
momentum that sent the American space industry back to a single use culture. The 
geophysical properties of the near-Earth space environment factored into the failure of 
another component of the STS infrastructure. Different orbital angles and altitudes 
require launches from different latitudes. For instance, vehicles that take off from Cape 
Canaveral, Florida fly in an easterly direction to take advantage of an extra boost 
provided by the Earth’s rotation. Florida-launched spacecraft reach orbital inclinations 
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from 28.5 degrees to 57 degrees relative to the equator.606 Due to this physical reality, as 
well as the need to adhere to air space sovereignty and safety concerns, spacecraft that 
require a polar orbit cannot be launched from the subtropical Florida site. A second, Air 
Force-sponsored space shuttle launch facility planned for Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
the departure point for many DOD space launches destined for polar orbits, fell victim to 
design conflict and the post-Challenger drive to consolidate all Shuttle launch activities at 
Cape Canaveral.607 The Vandenberg site would have enabled the Shuttle to serve a 
broader range of orbital inclinations.608 While the DOD did sponsor its own classified 
Shuttle missions, the reusable spacecraft could not serve all national defense space needs. 
After the cancellation of the California launch site and the Reagan Administration’s 
support of commercial rockets, the DOD changed its policy and launched a majority of 
defense satellites aboard single use, expendable launch vehicles, to live out their useful 
lives and then turn into uncontrolled, potentially hazardous, often expensive pieces of 
space junk. 
 The necessary presence of astronauts to fly the Shuttle and repair satellites 
ultimately became one of the most intransigent obstacles to the paradigm of reuse 
envisioned as the end goal of the STS. After the Challenger accident in 1986, NASA 
brought in a committee of engineers, scientists, former astronauts, and administrators to 
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review what had gone wrong and make recommendations for how to reduce the risk to 
astronauts’ lives once the Shuttle program went back online. In the comprehensive report 
delivered by the so-called Robinson Commission, but also in reports written by former 
astronauts and NASA leadership, the regularity of Shuttle launches received particular 
attention as an underlying cause of the tragedy. The commission report pointed to the 
Shuttle’s status as the principle launch technology in America as forcing “relentless 
pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate” that exceeded the resources available to 
sustain safe operations.609 One of the results of the Robinson Commission report came 
about in the revision of the official NASA policy on when to use the space shuttle for 
satellite launches. The commission recommended that the Shuttle manifest be subjected 
to strict controls to ensure that those payloads that did not require human tending for 
mission success would not make the trip to orbit aboard the Shuttle.610 
 The Reagan Administration concurred with this conclusion. The president 
reversed his 1981 position that the STS be made available to “all authorized space 
users”611 in a policy statement decreeing that all commercial payloads would from then 
on fly into space aboard ELVs. Andrew Butrica has argued that Reagan’s early support 
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for the STS program stemmed from an ideology that favored the commercialization and 
industrialization of space. Even in the immediate aftermath of the Challenger accident, 
the President urged lawmakers to support the development of the next reusable 
spacecraft, one that would truly fulfill the airline efficiencies and safety initially 
desired.612 However, the president had also furthered policy positions intended to foster 
private sector development of ELVs as early as 1983.613 A 1986 policy announcement 
supported Reagan’s proven preference for free enterprise over government spending, 
couched within appropriately presidential expressions of mourning for lives lost and 
reassurances against future accidents:  
 
The private sector, with its ingenuity and cost effectiveness, will be playing an 
increasingly important role in the American space effort. Free enterprise 
corporations will become a highly competitive method of launching commercial 
satellites and doing those things which do not require a manned presence in 
space…The greatest tribute we can pay to those brave pathfinders who gave their 
lives on the Challenger is to move forward and rededicate ourselves to America’s 
leadership in space.614 
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A National Security Decision Directive issued by the White House at the end of the year 
formalized the new requirement that all commercial space users launch payloads aboard 
ELVs, unless a mission absolutely required the attention of astronauts. This directive 
pushed the US space industry back in the direction of single-use production that had been 
the rule since 1958. The tension between the austerity of reuse and the consumption of 
free market capitalism embraced by Reagan saw an uneasy articulation in the aftermath 
of the Challenger accident.615 
 The promise of a reuse economy was compromised by the larger-than-expected 
costs of Shuttle use, but ended definitively with the demise of Challenger and her crew. 
Saving money or the space environment could not outweigh the risk to human life 
inherent in each crewed launch. Six weeks after the Challenger accident, veteran 
astronaut and chief of the astronaut office John Young—who had vigorously campaigned 
for the SOC as the first Shuttle commander—summarized this accusation in an 
unintentionally evocative statement that reversed the lofty optimism of Shuttle advocates 
two decades prior: “Our space shuttle machinery is not airline machinery.”616 By 1986, 
the airline-like safety and economy of scale expected in 1968 had clearly not borne out in 
the American space industry.617 With the exception of a few necessary payloads, and the 
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servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope, NASA returned to its earlier policy of throwing 
away the equivalent of a 747 jet after each orbital flight. 
 Of the thousands of satellites launched by America since the start of the space 
shuttle program in 1981 only 180 were brought into orbit aboard the space shuttle. Only 7 
satellites were retrieved from orbit, repaired, and placed back into orbit. Only two were 
brought back from orbit to be refurbished and reused.618 Some eight years after the 1984 
satellite refurbishment test flights, very few candidates for further repair seemed to be in 
sight. In 1992, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin asked his staff to devise clear criteria 
and pricing for rescues.619 In the autumn of that year, NASA assembled a Group Task 
Force on Satellite Rescue and Repair. The group compiled a list of total American 
satellite failures that took place over the preceding 22 years, and assessed whether these 
failures might have been corrected by astronaut intervention via the space shuttle. Of 42 
satellite failures, the group concluded that 15 could have been salvaged on orbit. 5 
failures did benefit from repair missions.620 Planning and training for the first, unplanned 
Hubble repair mission took place at the same time that the task force conducted its 
research and potentially influenced its conclusions. The first Hubble repair mission 
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required nearly three years from initiation to completion—hardly the simplicity and 
routine access provided by civil aircraft. The group task force used the Intelsat VI repair 
aboard Endeavour’s maiden voyage as a prime example of the overruns that plague 
planning, training, and funding satellite rescues.621 The Intelsat rescue demonstrated 
several discouraging realities: that such repair missions tended to be non-generalizable, 
requiring highly specific planning and training that could not be extrapolated forward to 
other rescues; that simulating all contingencies in a microgravity environment could not 
be fully accomplished on Earth beforehand; and that the difficulty of routinizing rescues 
and the loss of institutional memory through staff attrition meant that such missions 
resulted in a net loss of knowledge about how to undertake space operations.622 
 The task force concluded that regular rescue, repair, and salvage of faltering or 
failed satellites would not be the best use of NASA resources moving forward, 
particularly given the increased assumption of risk that accompanied each shuttle flight in 
the immediate post-Challenger years. Even if the occasional satellite commercial 
customer were to invest in the expensive overhead necessary to man-rate their satellites 
for future servicing, if the full price of a Shuttle launch were to be considered part of the 
rescue bill, such a cost would more than cancel out the economic benefit of satellite 
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refurbishment.623 Without a significant customer base willing to commit to sharing the 
load, such expenditures would fall on the habitually cash-strapped NASA. The task force 
declined to fully close the door on repair missions, however, particularly given the 
popularity that such successful missions seemed to generate among American citizens—
though they cautioned that the definition of “success” for rescue missions ought to be 
more carefully communicated to the public to preclude negative publicity should any part 
of extremely complex repair missions not go perfectly to plan. With this caveat, the task 
force concluded that only some one percent of total satellites to be launched in the future 
would be candidates for rescue and repair, and recommended that the majority of 
satellites should be initially launched via uncrewed rocket rather than investing in a 
launch via the expensive and risky shuttle.624 
Conclusion: The Future in Reuse 
The hoped-for austerity of reuse proposed and supported by NASA, the Nixon 
Administration, and others in the aerospace industry failed in an additional respect. With 
only single-use rockets and satellites that have not been built to be retrievable, the current 
model of space use has contributed to a mess in orbit that intensifies already considerable 
technological angular momentum. Although state space programs and private companies 
have proposed a variety of space debris removal technologies, most suggest novel ways 
to dispose of technologies at the end of their useful lives. These ideas range from using 
large nets in orbit to ground-based lasers that can nudge debris into a reentry trajectory. 
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Some exceptions to this trend exist. DARPA has developed a few theoretical models of 
flexible spacecraft that can remotely and robotically repurpose old hardware in situ.625 
Project Phoenix is currently developing small “satlets” that can be launched to 
geosynchronous orbit, attach to expensive expired payloads, and commandeer mirrors, 
antennae, and other features for new uses.626 The MDA Corp and Vivisat companies are 
also currently developing satellite-servicing technologies that have been reported as a 
potential “end to space trash.”627 A 2013 fuel test aboard the ISS demonstrated that an 
automated system might be able to revive even those satellites not initially designed to be 
serviced.628 Such a technique would remove one component of the technological angular 
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momentum that plagued the STS program—human risk. The test was conducted under 
the auspices of the Satellite Servicing Capabilities Office at NASA's Goddard Space 
Flight Center, the continued existence of which suggests that satellite reuse remains at 
least a nominal priority at NASA even in the absence of an infrastructure to support such 
endeavors. Benjamin Reed, the deputy manager of the Goddard program, expressed his 
belief that the successful experiment signaled an upcoming paradigm shift. "I don't want 
to sound overly dramatic,” he enthused in a NASA TV interview, “but it is, or it might 
be, the start of what could be a revolution or a new era in how satellites are built and 
flown in space.”629 
 While recycling and reuse programs tend to be a hallmark of austerity at the level 
of the individual consumer, even civic recycling programs fail when expenses outweigh 
savings. The American space industry did not differ from local recycling efforts in this 
sense; much like communities that cease recycling used glass in spite of user desire for 
such programs, environmental politics or attempts at conservation alone cannot sustain a 
recycling program that costs more than single-use consumption.630 However, the attempts 
by legislators and the space industry to adopt reuse in space appears to have been 
forgotten by those seeking to replicate it today. For the foreseeable future, however, what 
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was then perceived as the most expensive way to deal with broken satellites, namely total 
replacement, remains the only way to go. Without the ability to repair and salvage, the 
number of dead spacecraft in orbit continues to grow, to the perennial consternation of 
many in international space policy circles. Gaining the political capital to foster this shift 
continues to be as difficult as it was during the 1970s. A group of engineers writing about 
the history and future prospects of a new reusability paradigm have expressed the hope 
that current mainstream political attention to recyclability and reusability may yield 
support for sustainability in outer space, though the trickiness of demonstrating threats to 
an invisible environment persisted from the early days of mainstream environmentalism 
through the green politics of the present day.631 
Since the end of the partially-reusable space shuttle program, NASA has relied 
upon the Russian space program to provide human spacecraft to bring astronauts to and 
from the International Space Station. The most recent designs for a next generation 
crewed vehicle to come out of NASA have returned to an earlier version of a relatively 
small crew capsule aboard an expendable rocket. The human spacecraft designed by 
SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic all fit the definition of “reusable.” However, 
the latter two are intended only for recreation uses, not research or operations. Arguably, 
opening space to leisure visitors could be seen as a major step towards the routinization 
of space as originally envisioned by Nixon and Fletcher, but for a different purpose. The 
SpaceX Dragon capsule, while intended for flexible use by NASA to conduct a variety of 
missions, does not have the same capability as the Shuttle to retrieve, repair, and refuel 
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faltering or aging satellites. While much of the rhetoric of the long 1970s initiative to 
construct and maintain a reusable space infrastructure endures in the current race to a 
reusable rocket, the end goals set by private aerospace are far narrower than the early 
design and planning years of the space shuttle and Space Operations Center. 
The stark parallels between the post-Apollo era and these most recent stories from 
the private space sector confirm that private aerospace companies are chasing a white 
whale that has tormented the American space industry and government for decades. The 
latest attempt to return to the reuse ethos of the long 1970s American space program has 
yet to bear out. Both Bezos and Musk have the advantage of not being bound by federal 
money—and therefore legislative approval—in the same way that NASA answered to 
Washington in developing the Shuttle. Both have represented reusability and economy as 
inseparable outcomes in celebrating their technological achievements. And while both 
CEOs fight for bragging rights, neither can predict whether the economy of scale they 
anticipate will bear fruit where others have failed. Perhaps most importantly, this latest 
attempt to forge an era of reusability only addresses waste on the front end, so to speak. 
Expensive satellites, whether launched on reusable or expendable rockets, still have shelf 
lives. Rather than repairing, retrieving, refueling, these artifacts either quietly decay in 
their decaying orbits, or are nudged by nature or automated thrusters into the atmosphere. 
Once this happens, these multi-million dollar satellites must be replaced de novo and at 
full price in order to prevent a lapse in service. 
On the morning of June 19, 2016, Blue Origin relaunched the same New Shepard 
rocket it sent into suborbital space the preceding November. This would be the rocket’s 
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fourth successful flight and landing.632 CEO Jeff Bezos provided live commentary 
through all stages of the eight-minute flight. Upon safe touchdown of both the booster 
and a test crew module, Bezos signed off with a celebratory comment: "Any day with a 
rocket landing is a fantastic day.”633 As a rocket intended for suborbital space tourism 
flights, New Shepard will not contribute to the same sector of the space economy 
addressed by plans for the space shuttle, Space Tug, SOC, and reparable satellites. 
However, the aerospace private sector for which Bezos’s company is at the vanguard has 
combined the Reagan call for commercial ELV development with the NASA hope for a 
reusability economy. Should the success of these new reusable private rockets coincide 
with future success in automated satellite capture, a second wave of reuse in space may 
yet succeed. The 1970s dream of making near-Earth space an extension of life on Earth—
economically, routinely, and tidily—may be in reach, but without a robust coalition and 
commitment by all invested space users, such an ethos may yet not be strong enough to 
counter the previously insurmountable forces of technological angular momentum. 
 
																																								 																				
632 Stephen Clark, “Blue Origin Flies Reusable Suborbital Rocket for Fourth Time,” Spaceflight 
Now, June 19, 2016, https://spaceflightnow.com/2016/06/19/new-shepard-flight-4/. 
633 Blue Origin, “Flight 4 Live Webcast,” Webcast (West Texas, June 19, 2016), 
https://www.blueorigin.com/#youtubeEI-tGVFg7PU. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Early on the morning of February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia turned 
homeward after nearly sixteen days in orbit. As it began its journey through the upper 
atmosphere, the protective thermal tiles on the underside of one wing began to 
crumble.634 Shortly before 9AM, a final truncated transmission from the mission 
commander came through to Mission Control in Houston, followed by an eerie silence. 
Observers outside Dallas, Texas reported hearing a loud series of booms, and watching 
smoking trails of debris streak through the clear morning sky. By mid-morning, citizens 
of the small town of Nagadoches, Texas started recovering pieces of charred metal in 
their backyards, farmlands, parking lots, and roadways. Some residents discovered 
human remains among the fragments.635 Moments after crossing through the planetary 
borderlands, space junk was all that remained of the Columbia and her crew of seven.  
 The venerable vessel performed many firsts in its more than twenty years of 
service. The first of the shuttle orbiters to fly into space, Columbia was also the first 
																																								 																				
634 After a lengthy investigation, it was determined that several pieces of foam had become 
dislodged from the external tank at launch, falling and hitting the trailing edge of Columbia’s left 
wing and damaging the thermal tiles. The sister tank to the one that doomed Columbia is 
currently on display at the California Science Center—one of the few remaining artifacts of its 
kind. “External Tank,” California Science Center, accessed July 14, 2016, 
http://californiasciencecenter.org/exhibits/air-space/space-shuttle-endeavour/external-tank. 
635 ABC News, “Remains From All Columbia Astronauts Found,” ABC News, February 2, 2003, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90896&page=1; CNN, “Astronauts’ Remains Being 
Studied,” CNN.com, February 3, 2003, 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/02/us/loss-shuttle-ground-first-air-shook-with-sound-then-
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airplane-style winged orbital spacecraft, the first spacecraft to fly more than once, and the 
first to fly using solid rocket fuel. As would be the case for each of the additional four 
orbiters subsequently built, the new ship received a name that honored a historic sailing 
vessel. Columbia had two namesakes: the first American-built ship to circle the globe, 
and the Apollo 11 command module that took astronauts to the Moon for the first lunar 
landing mission.636 However, the name “Columbia” also unintentionally evokes another 
dangerous moment of exchange earlier in American history. The Columbian exchange 
between “old” and “new” worlds transformed peoples, ecosystems, and landscapes 
previously separated by an uncrossable divide—a moment of exchange that echoed over 
rural Texas as a technology built to brook safe passage between Earth and space instead 
brought both environments into perilous, destructive proximity. 
 In addition to heralding the end of the Space Shuttle program—and with it hopes 
for safe, routine, and cheap spaceflight that had been in decline since the Challenger 
accident—the Columbia disaster serves as a fitting if tragic coda to this environmental 
history of near-Earth space. When the orbiter transformed from a winged spacecraft to 
falling space junk, it rendered the space infrastructure visible for a brief, terrifying 
moment. Texas residents looked into the sky to find something they had not seen 
before—not the moving star of Sputnik’s rocket nor the friendly twinkle of Echo, but the 
fiery debris of destroyed machine and human bodies. Instead of pride, fear, or wonder, 
the pieces of Columbia inspired horror and sorrow. Although pieces of debris hit cars and 
homes, no humans on the ground were harmed—though one news article reported that a 
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Nagodoches farmer spent the afternoon of the accident searching for a dead cow that a 
neighbor suspected had been struck down by a piece of the orbiter in the second reported 
but unconfirmed bovine death from falling space hardware.637 In its final, failed crossing 
through the planetary borderlands, the Columbia transformed from spacecraft to falling 
space junk, spurring potential legal consequences among the citizens below whose lands 
and livelihoods may have been threatened by the unexpected, unsanctioned fallout.638 The 
survival of nematodes that flew aboard the shuttle as part of an experiment on muscular 
dystrophy prompted scientists to reaffirm longstanding appeals to police and protect the 
planetary borderlands against passage by more robust organisms.639 The Columbia 
accident tragically illustrated the dangerous permeability of the tenuous borderlands 
between Earth and space. While this region is capable of self-healing and cleaning up 
human-made messes, the ecosystem of near-Earth space can also cast our creations and 
our selves back at the ground. 
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February 3, 2003, 
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638 While NASA solicited legal claims from those who may have suffered property loss during the 
Columbia disaster, according to some space law experts a clause of the Liability Convention 
precludes any recourse should the claimant be a citizen of the launching nation. Andrew W. 
Murnane and Daniel Inkelas, “Liability Issues Associated with the Space Shuttle Columbia 
Disaster,” CRS Report for Congress (American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, 
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 In his 2004 critique of critique, Bruno Latour points to the Columbia accident to 
demonstrate the catastrophic disbanding of an object into a thing (in the Heideggerian 
sense of the word). Latour notes the multiple transformations at play when “here, 
suddenly, in a stroke, an object had become a thing, a matter of fact was considered as a 
matter of great concern.”640 Latour describes the perfect mastery of the space shuttle 
assemblage—an object simultaneously so complex, yet so banal as to have been utterly 
forgotten by the news media and the American public until it transformed into something 
else.641 As part of an invisible space infrastructure and a system of material and capital 
exchange, the shuttle represented an exemplar of Cronon’s “second nature.” After it 
transformed into debris, it became a failed piece of infrastructure, no longer invisibly 
supporting the practices of satellite users but rather raining down on the heads of a small 
fraction of them.  
Ten years after the Columbia accident, a major Hollywood movie brought space 
junk as a bodily hazard back to broad cultural currency. In Alfonso Cuaron’s action 
thriller Gravity, astronauts played by Sandra Bullock and George Clooney discover that a 
Russian antisatellite mission has accidentally set off a chain reaction of collisions that all 
but instantaneously destroys the entirety of the satellite infrastructure. While the scenario 
as presented in the film would be physically impossible in the universe inhabited by the 
worldwide moviegoing public, it illustrates an extreme, accelerated version of the Kessler 
syndrome and its potentially disastrous outcomes. The social ramifications of losing all 
																																								 																				
640 Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (January 2004): 235, doi:10.1086/421123. 
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satellites in the blink of an eye merits only brief mention in the film—instead, Cuaron 
materializes a space junk crisis in a form far more legible to the average moviegoer. 
Rather than losing a virtual commodity—information—the swirling space junk that 
obliterates the fictional space shuttle and non-fictional Hubble Space Telescope featured 
in the film instead poses a bodily hazard to the astronauts moving through a ruined near-
Earth space environment.642 Loss of life, not loss of information, typifies the plot points 
of most successful summer action films. 
 As with the Columbia accident, Bruno Latour also responded to Gravity as 
heralding a major transformation. In this case, Latour sees the transformation of perfectly 
mastered objects into things as indicative of a symbolic turning inward in a moment of 
global environmental crisis. Even as, once again, human beings turn from objects into 
things, “debris among the debris” of the international orbital infrastructure, the main 
tragedy of Gravity comes in what it tells us about life on the planet Earth during the 
Anthropocene. Without outer space as an escape route, the borderlands between Earth 
and space materialize and constrain humanity within the finite bounds of a shrinking 
planet.643 When Sandra Bullock’s character Dr. Ryan Stone utters an angry “I hate 
space,” she rejects the idealistic American frontierism that sent her into orbit and spends 
																																								 																				
642 In 2014 I published a general audience article that playfully imagines what might have 
happened on the ground at the moment of satellite infrastructure loss, portrayed as a sequel to 
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Clive Hamilton, Francois Gemenne, and Christophe Bonneuil, Routledge Environmental 
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the rest of the film attempting to find safe passage back through the borderlands to the 
safe embrace of terra firma. However, as Latour briefly notes in passing, during the 
Anthropocene Earth has transformed from a planet bounded by its atmosphere into a 
“sub-lunar Gaia”—an expanded realm of human activity and human consequences.644 
In 1997, Launchspace Magazine published an article in which an engineer and 
space policy analyst described recent evasive maneuvers taken by the space shuttle to 
avoid space junk, describing near-Earth space as a “300-mile deep, omni-directional 
dump moving at 18,000 mph.” Noting the success that Rachel Carson achieved in 
spurring social action and legislative attention to chemical pollutants, the author asks: 
“Why is there no ‘Rachel’ currently calling attention to what’s being done above our 
atmosphere?”645  
 In terms of cultural visibility, perhaps even the fictional Dr. Ryan Stone of 
Gravity could have fit the bill. Her body, the main victim of space pollutants, provides a 
somatic grounding for an otherwise illegible environmental threat. However, in 
expressing her hatred of space, Stone turns back to Earth as a refuge from the collapsed 
orbital environment. In Latour’s take, this return to a ruined Earth from ruined space 
signifies a profoundly traumatic, ultimately futile attempt to locate a safe haven in the 
midst of an unforgiving anthropogenic crisis. Rachel Carson did not abandon the pastoral 
landscapes threatened by invisible chemical pesticides; she did not respond to a fearful 
future with expressions of hatred or a turning away, but rather with a concerted effort to 
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make broadly legible the previously invisible networks of knowledge, power, and capital 
that made up both the source and possible solution to the perceived environmental crisis. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that there have been many would-be Rachels 
for space, from Carson’s time through the present. Their accomplishments have not 
inspired the same mainstream cultural transformations and concrete changes to relevant 
sanctioned practices as Carson achieved through the publication of Silent Spring. 
However, the actions of communities of Rachels within specialist and lay communities 
have influenced the forging of agreements and precedents for how best to manage a 
global, extraterritorial environment, simultaneously in everyone’s backyard and in 
nobody’s backyard—even if no hard and fast rules for debris removal or reduction exist 
at the international level. For the time being, the orbital infrastructure functions as it 
should, its invisibility the hallmark of its success. If we have indeed passed the tipping 
point, however, moments of orbital decay will likely become more common and more 
visible—either directly in moments like the Columbia accident, or in the virtual, 
incremental diffusion of a once-global world. 
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